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Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. They will most likely face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies.
An examination of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, with a focus on joint military operations. The 1999 military operation against the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo suggests several areas in which Joint military operations were deficient. This study examined all aspects of the Kosovo conflict,including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt to understand these deficiencies and to recommend improvements. This document--provided in both a classified and unclassified version--is based on extensive original source documents and interviews with most of the principal participants, and serves as the definitive Army record on Kosovo. While the primary focus of the research was on U.S.Army involvement, it covered many other aspects of Operation Allied Force. Topics included NATO objectives in Operation Allied Force, air and ground planning, evolution of the air operation and its effects on fielded Yugoslav forces, Task Force Hawk, and peace operations. The 1999 military operation in Kosovo suggests several areas in which Joint military operations were deficient. This study examines all aspects of the Kosovo conflict, with a focus on U.S. Army involvement, including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt to understand these deficiencies and to recommend improvements.
The U.S. Navy faces uncertainty about the degree to which it will have to prepare for a high-end future conflict versus the so-called Long War. To help the Navy understand how critical near-, mid-, and far-term trends in the United States, China, and Iran might influence U.S. security decisions in general and the Navy's investments in particular, RAND examined emerging domestic and regional nonmilitary trends in each of the three countries.
As the only single-volume work to offer a full account of Navy and Marine Corps actions in the Philippines during World War II, this book provides a unique source of information on the early part of the war. Based on a rich collection of American and newly discovered Japanese sources, it is filled with never-before-published details about the fighting, including a revealing discussion of the buildup of tensions between Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Navy that continued for the remainder of the war.Gordon describes in considerable detail the unusual missions of the Navy and Marine Corps in the largely Army campaign, where sailors fought as infantrymen alongside their Marine comrades at Bataan and Corregidor, crews of Navy ships manned the Army's heavy coastal artillery weapons, and Navy submarines desperately tried to supply the men with food and ammunition. Indeed, this book gives the most detailed account ever published of the Japanese bombing of the Cavite Navy Yard outside Manila on the third day of the war-the worst damage inflicted on a U.S. Navy installation since the British burned the Washington Navy Yard in 1814. It also closely examines the surrender of the 4th Marines at Corregidor, the only time in history that the U.S. Marine Corps lost a regiment in combat. To provide readers with a Japanese perspective of the fighting, Gordon draws on the recently discovered diary of a leader of the Japanese amphibious assault force that fought against the Navy's provisional infantry battalion on southern Bataan, and he also makes full use of the U.S. ship logs and the 4th Marine unit diary that were evacuated from Manila Bay shortly before U.S. forces surrendered.
This book identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency, when the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, to stability and reconstruction, when police and civilian government agencies take the lead.
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right--or wrong--to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.
The U.S. military is ill-equipped to strike at extremists who hide in populations. Using deadly force against them can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U.S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a "continuum of force"--a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. These technologies are available but have received insufficient attention.
Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.
In studying the withdrawal from Iraq, RAND assessed logistical constraints, trends in insurgent activity, the readiness of Iraqi security forces, and implications for the size of the residual U.S. force and for security in Iraq and the region. This report presents alternative schedules: one consistent with the Obama administration's intentions, one somewhat slower, and another faster. It also identifies steps to alleviate constraints and risks.