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Osama bin Laden was the most wanted man in American history--an enemy who brought the United States what President George W. Bush called "a day of fire," and ushered in a new era of terrorism. It took a decade of blood and sacrifice, of determination and frustration, but finally, in a nighttime raid at the end of a dirt road in Pakistan, the hunt for Bin Laden ended with a gunshot. It was a dramatic climax to a long and painful chapter. But now what? The terrorist threat that has defined American policy since the attacks of 9/11 did not die with Bin Laden in his walled compound near Islamabad. Radicals still wish us harm, and we must fight on. In this provocative collection of essays edited and introduced by Pulitzer Prize winner Jon Meacham, a group of penetrating analysts and leaders look ahead to the world after Bin Laden--to the future of Al Qaeda, of Afghanistan, of Pakistan. We explore the political, military, and cultural implications of the post-Bin Laden war on terror. From Richard N. Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations to former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, from historian and journalist Evan Thomas to former U.S. Army officer Andrew Exum, Beyond Bin Laden gives readers intelligent, deeply informed, and urgent glimpses of what comes next. Contributors include: * Jon Meacham, executive editor, Random House * James A. Baker III, former Secretary of State * Karen Hughes, former counselor to President George W. Bush and former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy * Richard N. Haass, president, Council on Foreign Relations * Bing West, author, The Wrong War, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs * Andrew Exum, fellow, Center for a New American Security * Daniel Markey, senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations * Evan Thomas, award-winning historian and former editor-at-large, Newsweek.
Haass (vice president and director, Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution) provides guidelines on how to manage relationships, set goals, and translate them into success. His insights into delicate working relationships will benefit those in government, the corporate world, and the non-profit sector, as well as students of public administration and business. This is a revised edition of Houghton Mifflin, 1994. This edition includes anecdotes from the Clinton administration. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
The widespread use of economic sanctions constitutes one of the great paradoxes of contemporary American foreign policy. Sanctions are frequently criticized, even derided. "Sanctions don't work" is an oft-heard refrain. At the same time, economic sanctions are fast becoming the policy tool of choice for the United States in the post-Cold War world. The evidence of the latter contention is widespread. The United States now maintains economic sanctions against literally dozens of countries. One recent study listed no less than 35 countries that had been targeted by new American sanctions from 1993 to 1996 alone.1 What is critical, however, is not just the frequency with which economic sanctions are used but their importance.
A rising China, climate change, terrorism, a nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, and a reckless North Korea all present serious challenges to America's national security. But it depends even more on the United States addressing its burgeoning deficit and debt, crumbling infrastructure, second class schools, and outdated immigration system. While there is currently no great rival power threatening America directly, how long this strategic respite lasts, according to Council on Foreign Relations President Richard N. Haass, will depend largely on whether the United States puts its own house in order.Haass lays out a compelling vision for restoring America's power, influence, and ability to lead the world and advocates for a new foreign policy of Restoration that would require the US to limit its involvement in both wars of choice, and humanitarian interventions.Offering essential insight into our world of continual unrest, this new edition addresses the major foreign and domestic debates since hardcover publication, including US intervention in Syria, the balance between individual privacy and collective security, and the continuing impact of the sequester.
America must confront an increasingly turbulent world in the near future, as the destabilizing forces of globalization, rapid technological change, demographic imbalance, and financial meltdown merge to create a kind of global Wild West. This world will be a dangerous one, characterized by a resurgence of nationalism and regional conflict, and how we respond will directly affect both our future prospects and the long-term stability of the international community.In Restoration, Council on Foreign Relations president Richard N. Haass outlines an approach to foreign policy that turns the challenge of this dysfunctional world into an opportunity for renewed American leadership. Weakened by a decade of costly wars, political dysfunction, and fiscal irresponsibility, we have seen our ability to lead severely curtailed. To begin with, we must get our house in order by sharply limiting our interventions in other countries in favor of rebuilding our domestic institutions and tackling our fiscal problems. Today's world has moved from the bipolarity of the Cold War to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War to what Haass calls the "non-polarity" of the current moment; therefore, the US has to recognize its limits and reorder its priorities accordingly. The days of wars of choice and other indiscriminate military actions are over, and the price of folly is higher than it used to be; when a non-polar world breaks apart, it's much harder to put the pieces back together.Haass's doctrine of Restoration consists of two parts. First, America should focus on strengthening its domestic situation so as to protect itself from the anarchy of a globalized world, whether it's global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, or climate change. Haass proposes a number of policies to realize this, including entitlement reform, free trade, more open immigration policies, and public-private partnerships. Second, America must let go of the idea that it can change other countries through unilateral military action. Achieving this will allow us to cut down on the bloated and ineffective defense budget, improve our international reputation, and put our resources where the action will be (the Asia-Pacific instead of the Middle East).By getting its own house in order, the United States has an opportunity to fill the global leadership vacuum and eventually achieve a more expansive and humane foreign policy. Restoration lays out a bold vision for how the US can come to shape world events, rather than being shaped by them.
Buttressed by input from scholars, diplomats, and observers with an intimate knowledge of U. S. foreign policy, Honey and Vinegar examines "engagement" -- strategies that primarily involve the use of positive incentives. The book contends that although engagement has received little scrutiny relative to other, more punitive foreign policy approaches, it has great potential as a tool for modifying the behavior of regimes with which the United States has significant disagreements. Heightened awareness of the costs associated with the use of sanctions or military force has catalyzed a search for policy alternatives. In this quest to find other appropriate policy options for pursuing foreign policy goals, strategies of engagement warrant serious consideration. As argued in these pages, the use of incentives, rather than penalties, may be particularly well suited to the post Cold War world, where globalization has made the economic isolation of any country difficult to achieve. At the same time, the collapse of the,Soviet Union has meant that American carrots may be especially savory to many regimes once reliant on Soviet support. Paradoxically, engagement can be a good choice, even when it fails, in that it can open the door for other policy options. For instance, the two years in which America tried to engage Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War worked to the advantage of the United States later. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, American efforts to build a military coalition to oppose Iraq were facilitated by the sense in the region that the United States had earlier pursued a conciliatory policy, but to no avail. Contributors to this volume have provided seven cases exploring episodes of engagement: relations between the United States and China; Europe's "Critical Dialogue" with Iran; U. S. engagement with Iraq from 1988 to 1990; U. S. efforts to engage North Korea; the combination of U. S. persuasion and coe
First published in 1994, this volume addresses the debate over US intervention around the world, including recent cases, the politics of force, learning from history, the future of intervention. An afterword addresses the use of force by the US since 1994. Appendices present relevant documents and remarks by such figures as Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, and Bill Clinton.
In this dramatic new perspective on international affairs, Richard N. Haass, one of the country's most brilliant analysts and able foreign policy practitioners, argues that it is hard to overstate the significance of there being no major power conflict in the world. America's great military, economic, and political power discourages traditional challenges; no ideological fault line divides the world into warring blocs. India, China, Japan, Russia, and Europe all seek a prolonged period of stability that would support economic growth. The opportunity thus exists for unprecedented cooperation among the major powers. This is good, because they share vulnerabilities. Globalization, which promotes trade and investment and eases travel and communication, also facilitates the spread of viruses (human and computer alike), weapons, terrorists, greenhouse gases, and drugs. And the United States, for all its strength, cannot defeat these threats alone. But opportunity is not inevitability. The question is whether the United States will be able to integrate other countries into global efforts against terrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons, genocide, and protectionist policies that jeopardize global economic prosperity. This compelling book explains why it must and how it can.
Haass (president, Council on Foreign Relations) believes that with the end of the Cold War the United States encounters a historical moment in which it has the chance to define an era of world integration marked by unprecedented peace and prosperity. This opportunity, he suggests, rests as much upon international acceptance of American power and purpose as it does upon pure military strength. He sets forth policies that he believes will maintain and strengthen this acceptance while addressing issues of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, economic integration, and relations with other major powers. As his discussion of Iraq makes clear, he believes the current US approach is inadequate to grasp the opportunity before it.
Drawing on insights from the Brookings Institute, the Council of Foreign Relations, George Bush's administration, and the National Security Council, Haass offers his view of the world after the Cold War and advice on how the US should proceed through it. He says the US will have to resist isolationism, downplay unilateral action, and focus on putting together temporary alliances of countries to further their shared interests. Alas, such policy requires continued high levels of funding for the military, intelligence, foreign aid, and diplomacy programs where he works.
The forty-fourth U.S. president will face a series of critical, complex, and interrelated challenges in the Middle East that will demand immediate attention. George W. Bush's model of regime change and democratization will no longer suit the changing circumstances likely to confront the next administration. Fresh ideas, nonpartisan analysis, and clear-eyed recommendations are needed, and this authoritative book heeds the call.
When should the United States go to war? It is arguably the most important foreign policy question facing any president, and Richard Haass -- a member of the National Security Council staff for the first President Bush and the director of policy planning in the State Department for Bush II -- is in a unique position to address it. Haass is one of just a handful of individuals -- along with Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Bob Gates -- involved at a senior level of U. S. government decision making during both Iraq conflicts. He is the first to take us behind closed doors and the first to provide a personal account. The result is a book that is authoritative, revealing, and surprising. Haass explains not only what happened but why. At first blush, the two Iraq wars appear similar. Both involved a President George Bush and the United States in conflicts with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. There, however, the resemblance ends. Haass contrasts the decisions that shaped the conduct of the two wars and makes a crucial distinction between the 1991 and 2003 conflicts. The first Iraq war, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of neighboring Kuwait, was a war of necessity. It was limited in ambition, well executed, and carried out with unprecedented international support. By contrast, the second Iraq war was one of choice, the most significant discretionary war undertaken by the United States since Vietnam. Haass argues that it was unwarranted, as the United States had other viable policy options. Making matters worse was the fact that this ambitious undertaking was poorly implemented and fought with considerably more international opposition than backing. These are the principal conclusions of this compelling, honest, and challenging book by one of this country's most respected voices on foreign policy. Haass's assessments are critical yet fair -- and carry tremendous weight. He offers a thoughtful examination of the means and ends of U. S. foreign policy: how it should be made, what it should seek to accomplish, and how it should be pursued. War of Necessity, War of Choice-- part history, part memoir -- provides invaluable insight into some of the most important recent events in the world. It also provides a much-needed compass for how the United States can apply the lessons learned from the two Iraq wars so that it is better positioned to put into practice what worked and to avoid repeating what so clearly did not.