- Table View
- List View
Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missionsby Beth Grill William Rosenau Alan J. Vick Karl P. Mueller Adam Grissom
United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.
Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democraciesby Peter Chalk Martin Wachs William Rosenau Mark Hanson Myles Collins
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, critics have charged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, while qualified to investigate terrorist incidents after the fact, is not well equipped enough to adequately gather and assess information to prevent attacks. More intrinsically, many believe that given a predominant and deeply rooted law enforcement and prosecutorial culture, the bureau may not be able to change operational focus toward dedicated counterterrorism intelligence gathering and analysis. To better inform debate, researchers analyzed the domestic security structures of four allied countries--the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia--weighing both their positive and negative aspects. (PW/PC)
Multinational corporations can be significant actors in zones of violent conflict. Corporate actions to shape their environment can sometimes mitigate conflict, but as the authors show in their case studies, corporate activities can help generate and sustain violence.
The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference By The Rand Corporation And The Center For Security Studies, Eth Zurichby Bruce Hoffman William Rosenau Doron Zimmermann
Certain Diaspora communities, frustrated by a perceived war against the Muslim world, have turned against their adopted homelands, targeting the government and its people by supporting terrorist attacks against Western countries through recruitment, fundraising, and training. The problem is exacerbated by the open borders of globalization. Emerging threats must be identified without alienating Diaspora communities and thereby playing into terrorist hands.
In the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf conflict, special operations forces (SOF) conducted reconnaissance operations to locate hidden targets when political and other considerations prevented the deployment of conventional ground units and air power alone was unable to locate and eliminate elusive objectives. In Vietnam, SOF teams crossed the border into Laos to search for truck parks, storage depots, and other assets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail that were obscured by jungle canopy and camouflage. In western Iraq, British and American SOF patrolled vast areas searching for mobile Scud launchers. In both cases, the nature of the terrain combined with adversary countermeasures made it extremely difficult for ground teams to achieve their objectives. There are a number of implications for future operations. Although new technology, such as mini- and micro-unmanned aerial vehicles, may make it easier to teams to reconnoiter wide areas, using SOF in this fashion is unlikely to achieve U.S. objectives. Concerns about casualties and prisoners of war are likely to limit the use of SOF to the most vital national interests. However, unattended ground sensors could play an enhanced role in future operations. Although most will be delivered by air, some will require hand emplacement in difficult enemy terrain, a mission well suited to SOF. SOF in a battle damage assessment role could help ensure that critical targets have been destroyed. Finally, SOF might disable, destroy, or recover nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
Subversion is a critical insurgent tool, but it has long been ignored by policymakers and analysts. This paper presents a set of case studies to explore the elements of subversion and discusses preliminary ideas for combating subversive activities in the context of the "long war" against violent Islamic extremism.
The most useful forms of outside support for an insurgent movement include safe havens, financial support, political backing, and direct military assistance. Because states are able to provide all of these types of assistance, their support has had a profound impact on the effectiveness of many rebel movements since the end of the Cold War. However, state support is no longer the only, or indeed necessarily the most important, game in town. Diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or other forms of assistance. This report assesses post-Cold War trends in external support for insurgent movements. It describes the frequency that states, diasporas, refugees, and other non-state actors back guerrilla movements. It also assesses the motivations of these actors and which types of support matter most. This book concludes by assessing the implications for analysts of insurgent movements.