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A fascinating in-depth study of the planning for the D-Day landings which set the first Allied troops on the road to Berlin. Dr Norman served with the US 12th Army Group staff during the Second World War under General Omar Bradley, which put him in an expert position to tell the story of the exhaustive preparations that went into the Normandy invasion on 6th June 1944.'"Overlord" was unquestionably, as of this writing, the largest overseas military operation ever undertaken. In the pages which follow, Dr. Albert Norman presents, insofar as it can be compressed within one easily readable volume, a careful history of the planning which made its achievement possible and of the operation itself.Dr. Norman's topic is absorbing, both for its historical interest and for the lessons it holds for those who, perhaps unfortunately, must be concerned with the possibility of "Overlords" yet to come. It holds yet another and even more important interest. The staff groups which contributed to the success of "Overlord" and the ultimate defeat of Germany were the exemplification of an idea of allied unity, developed by General Eisenhower and perfected to such an extent that it has become the symbol of successful international cooperation.'--General Walter Bedell Smith
Given the constrained environment the US Armed Forces operate in would it be possible or even strategically feasible to relieve a cut-off force. This study investigates this scenario by using the historical example of Wake Island.Wake Island is an insignificant strip of coral located in the central Pacific. However, it gained strategic significance during pre-war planning. From its location, Wake Island could dominate the sea-lanes through the central Pacific.After the beginning of hostilities in 1941, the Japanese attacked Wake Island by air for three days before attempting an amphibious assault on 11 December. Miraculously, the defenders repulsed the Japanese. The only time during the Pacific War that an invasion attempt was defeated. Humiliated by the defeat, the Japanese returned on 23 December with a larger force. The defenders, again, put up a stubborn defense but eventually were overwhelmed.After the defenders defeated the Japanese on 11 December, the Navy's senior leaders were forced to decide on the fate of the men on Wake Island. In the final analysis it was determined that the strategic loss of any of three aircraft carriers operating in the Pacific outweighed the tactical gain of relieving the beleaguered island.
Attaining air superiority over the German Air Force in 1944 did not in and by itself win the war in Europe, but it did make possible those operations that did. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain air superiority over the Continent from 1943-1944, the successful ground invasion at Normandy never would have taken place. Consequently, with his air force in control of the skies over the battlefield, Hitler would have been in a much better position to consolidate his territorial gains and negotiate a favorable peace with the Allies.The thesis of this paper is that the Luftwaffe was Germany's strategic center of gravity in 1944 and it was the recognition of this, combined with the Allied leadership's use of air power in accordance with the principles of war, that gave the U.S.-British alliance its war-winning strategic advantage. Defeating the Luftwaffe and winning air superiority over the skies of Europe stripped Germany of the ability to protect itself and was the key event that led to the eventual collapse of Germany's armaments industry and military.
On 16 December 1944, the German Army launched an offensive in the Ardennes to split Allied forces and retake the ports of Antwerp and Liege. The German advance split the XII Army forces and left the 101st Airborne Division surrounded at Bastogne. To relieve the encircled units in the Ardennes and defeat the German offensive, Third Army conducted an impressive counterattack into the flank of the Germans. The flexibility to turn ninety degrees during the worst winter in thirty-eight years and relieve the encircled forces stands out as one of the greatest operational maneuvers in history. While this operation is unique, the actions of the commander and staff that planned and executed it deserve closer analysis to determine what enabled them to orchestrate this maneuver. It is especially remarkable, when taken in context, how rapidly the Army changed during the previous four years.The US Army anticipating eventual war in Europe began a transformation which included drastic changes in force structure and doctrine. The primary transformation in doctrine was the revision of Field Service Regulation 100-5. The 1941 edition of 100-5 superseded a tentative version published in 1939 which was the first major revision of warfighting doctrine since 1923. It was with this manual that the Army went to war. It was also the manual used to train and teach new and reserve officers who had little experience in the study and practice of war. How important and to what extent did Patton's Third Army apply the doctrine in conducting the Battle of the Bulge?Particularly relevant to serving officers today is to analyze the operations of Third Army in terms of doctrine that existed in 1944 and today's current doctrine. An examination of similarities and differences between the doctrines may allow development of possible conclusions on the ability of future forces to conduct decisive maneuver in compressed time and space.
History is replete with examples of lost opportunities to decisively defeat an enemy's army on the field of battle. All too often, tactical success has not been followed by actions to ensure operational success. This failure may be attributable to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of operational encirclement. Two case studies highlight these dynamics. The Battles of the Falaise Gap in 1944 and the Ruhr Pocket in 1945 both illustrate the difficulties operational commanders face in conducting this type of operation. In the first case, Allied commanders failed to anticipate the opportunities presented by poor operational planning and tactical execution by their German adversaries and missed an opportunity for a quick and decisive victory. In the second, Allied commanders succeeded in learning from their previous mistakes at Falaise to achieve decisive operational results during the encirclement of the Ruhr.This monograph examines the dynamics of operational encirclement and determines what critical factors impact success or failure in achieving decisive results. It concludes that the three most critical factors which directly impact the success or failure of an operational encirclement include: the development of a flexible campaign plan, the establishment of an efficient and effective command and control infrastructure, and an ability to properly read the events on the battlefield. Based on these factors several planning considerations are identified as useful in the planning and execution of operational encirclements.
"The S.S. Lulworth Hill, a freighter bound home for England...was torpedoed by a German submarine on March 19, 1943, off the west coast of central Africa. The ship's first officer and 13 crewmen reached life rafts. Fifty days later, when a British destroyer steamed into view, two men still lived. One survivor died shortly after the rescue. The remaining man, who was the ship's carpenter, tells the story.Kenneth Cooke, ends his preface with a line that might have been written by Conrad: "And there is no one left now to tell me I have remembered badly." It is the musing of a man who sat helpless while sharks ate the bodies of twelve raftmates, and who calculated the dwindling strength of those left alive, as they openly calculated his, in the hope of gaining extra rations. After 17 years, the inexplicable and awesome fact of his survival still obsesses Cooke. No one who reads his book will need to ask why.After the 14 men reached their raft, the first officer calculated the food supply to last for 30 days...What follows is a catalogue of torments. Tongues swelled and turned black. Sea water and the equatorial sun cut running sores. The feet of a wounded man turned gangrenous. By the 19th day, Cooke, who kept the log, recorded the first death. The body was rolled into the sea; cannibalism was a temptation.Now and then a flying fish landed in the raft, and Cooke speared a few other fish with a homemade harpoon. Once it rained briefly, and the men greedily licked moisture from the raft's canvas. Otherwise there was no relief. More men died. The strongest man on the raft went mad, locked two other men in his arms and jumped to the sharks. Cooke, crazed by the groans of a man whose ribs were broken, kicked the fellow to quiet him.To the author, the book is a riddle: How was he alone able to survive?...The only conclusion is that some men, for some reason, cling hard to life, and that the sea, as Cooke wrote truthfully, does not care."-Time.
Threats to our nation's resources and forces are becoming increasingly lethal and mobile. Therefore, our ability to locate and interdict these threats is more important than ever. Search theory is one tool that is vital to countering the increasing threat. This research presents a multi-agent simulation, built around the allied search for U-boats in the Bay of Biscay during World War II, which extends several classic search theory algorithms. Comparison of techniques is based on the effectiveness of finding high-valued, mobile assets. A JAVA-based multi-agent simulation model is designed, built and tested, and used to demonstrate the existence of differing emergent behaviors between search patterns currently used by the United States military.
Searching For Competence: The Initial Combat Experience Of Untested US Army Divisions In World War IIby Major Benjamin L. Bradley
The initial combat experience of the 90th Infantry Division in World War II demonstrates the leadership and training problems faced by many new divisions throughout the war.Like all newly activated World War II Divisions, the 90th had a turbulent two-year training period fraught with problems of resources and personnel. During the interwar years, the Army's readiness was allowed to stagnate below such an acceptable level that when crisis called there was little to build upon. Consequently, the larger priority of rapidly fielding 90 divisions outweighed considerations for how well those divisions were trained. Thus, the 90th Division was forced into combat by the exigencies of war with many factors working against it: untested officers, unfamiliar doctrine, limited training on advanced combat skills, and the detrimental effects of constant personnel turnover, including commanders.As the 90th went ashore on Normandy, a period of ineffectiveness ensued as soldiers were forced to learn the lessons of training under fire and unsuccessful leaders were replaced. Furthermore, the 90th Division's period of ineffectiveness seemed extraordinary because it occurred under the spotlight of the Normandy invasion where insufficient planning for the difficulties of hedgerow combat severely slowed the expected pace of advance. Undoubtedly, the performance of the 90th Division's senior leadership was abysmal, but its uncoordinated attacks were the product of training deficiencies experienced by all new divisions. Additionally, critical evaluation reveals the 90th's early contribution much higher than historically credited and far from the total failure some have labeled it.
In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints. There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's operations during the Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The answers to these questions will be of great value to the United States Armed Forces as they restructure themselves for the 1990s.
The only war correspondent who accompanied the Allied Dieppe raid tells the story of the brave, heroic but ultimately futile assault landing which would lay the foundation for the success in Normandy two years later.Alexander Berry Austin was a noted war correspondent who worked for the London Herald during the Second World War. He was exceptionally dedicated and would often "embed", to use a modern term, with Allied units during the most dangerous and demanding fighting including the Battle of Britain, the Dieppe raid, the Allied landings at Bizerte and the Salerno landing during which he lost his life to a German landmine. During the preparation for "We Landed At Dawn" he trained extensively with the elite Commando units that were due to make the ambitious invasion attempt.
Includes The Americans in the First World War Illustration Pack - 57 photos/illustrations and 10 mapsIN THE ROAD TO ST. MIHIEL, Christ Stamas takes "the road back" and with a retrospective eye views his personal experiences in "No Man's land" during the cataclysmic years of World War I.
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the command and control relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan serves as a case study in practice and doctrinal application. Against the backdrop of World War II, Operations in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this thesis provides an analysis of the complex issues arising from the necessity to fight jointly.
Desert survival presents unique problems not met in other non-temperate areas. Recognizing this, the Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center commissioned Dr. Richard A. Howard to assemble and analyze desert survival experiences of World War II, for the purpose of increasing our knowledge of desert survival techniques and procedures. To know what World War II survivors did, what they thought, and what they recommended after having experienced desert survival conditions is of paramount importance. Sun, Sand and Survival relates and evaluates these experiences.Dr. Howard, ADTIC consultant, has had long experience in the survival training of military personnel. He is the author of the ADTIC Publication T-100 999 Survived which analyzes 1,000 tropical survival experiences. Dr. Howard's desert study analyzes 382 successful desert survival episodes and mention is made of an additional 142 individuals who were lost. The stories show how men without desert background or mental conditioning met their desert problems. They include examples of men who left their group and were never heard of again. In the light of our present knowledge of the water requirements of the human body, we know that many could have survived had they had a better understanding of the requirements imposed by the desert. More survivors would have returned in better health and endured less discomfort if advance knowledge had been readily available.
This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.
Soviet Actions In Afghanistan And Initiative At The Tactical Level: Are There Implications For The US Army?by Major John D. Frketic
This monograph examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979-1988) in terms of Soviet Army tactics and organization for combat. Throughout the decade of the 1970's, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. In the 1980's a re-evaluation of Soviet thinking occurred which saw greater flexibility at the operational and strategic levels If the experience in Afghanistan has shown that set-piece tactics will not work in all types of warfare, and the Soviets are able to incorporate higher levels of initiative and flexibility into their tactical doctrine, then the U.S. may be required to refocus its training away from the stylized Soviet enemy.This study begins with a background discussion of Soviet historical involvement in Afghanistan to include counter-insurgency experience in their southwestern border area. It then covers the actual invasion and units employed with emphasis on their pre-deployment status and subsequent performance. The following section divides the war into four phases to ease understanding. The monograph subsequently looks at lessons learned and principles reaffirmed from both the Soviet and U.S. perspective. A key feature is the need the Soviets apparently feel for Western style initiative and flexibility at lower command levels (battalion, company and platoon), and how this is inconsistent with their culture and system of command and control.
The short but heroic narrative of a member of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division in the bloody bitter battle at Kunu-ri during the Korean War."I was a combat soldier in Korea during the early stages of the Korean conflict from 11 November, 1960, through October, 1951. Although the time spent there appears relatively short in the minds of many war veterans, to a combat soldier it cannot be disputed that an hour in the line could be considered a lifetime, a minute, or an eternity. I spent such an eternity with the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry (Tropical Lightning) Division in the frozen wastes of North Korea.There were numerous times when I was equally happy and sad, but no one time or incident brought greater happiness than the time I was complimented by numerous combat veterans of the 3rd Battalion for the courage, command ability, and control displayed under direct fire for the first time at Kunu-ri. The compliment concerned my organization of scattered elements of the Command and the direction of the retreat or withdrawal of the Battalion Commander (Lieutenant-Colonel Blair); elements of his staff, including the Operations Officer (Captain Newell, now Major); the Adjutant (Captain McWee), plus approximately sixty enlisted men from an enemy trap in the North Korean town of Kunu-ri, on the night of 30 November, 1950, at approximately 2330 hours (11:30 P.M.).I was proud to know that I had stood the test under my first baptism of enemy fire. I was proud because I knew then that I was a real combat soldier, not a cowardly or superficial one."
Includes 204 photos, plans and maps illustrating The Holocaust"Fourteen officers of the SS (Elite Guard) were sentenced today to hang for at least a million killings. The sentences wound up the biggest murder trial in history.The men were leaders of the "Einsatz Kommandos"...special extermination squads sent...to do away with peoples classified by the Nazis as racially undesirable."--NUREMBERG, APRIL 10 (1948)--(ASSOCIATED PRESS)After the first Nuremberg trials of the remaining Nazi leaders in 1945-6, the Allies spent much time and effort in searching out the men responsible for the Holocaust, the full scale of which was only then becoming apparent. In the most important case of his career, Judge Michael A. Musmanno (Captain USN), presided over the trial of the leaders of the Einsatz Kommandos, death squads trained to hunt and kill "Untermenschen" or those deemed undesirable by Hitler. Blazing a bloody trail across the conquered areas of Poland, the Ukraine, White Russia and the Baltic states, the Einsatzgruppen shot innocent men, women and children by the tens of thousands. Finding that shooting was an inefficient way to complete their horrendous executions, the Einsatz Kommando leaders pioneered the use of mobile poison gas trucks which would lead to the evolution of the death camps at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Belzec and Sobibor and the industrialised murder of the Holocaust. In this riveting and horrifying book the author looks back on a trial that serves as a testament to the depths of man's inhumanity; at times almost surreal in its horror it is a story that should be read and re-read.
"Many impressive books have been written about German horror camps where, from 1939 until 1945, human beings were subjected to degrading experiences, or were destroyed like swarms of helpless insects.EThe camp where I stayed for several years has received less publicity than the larger and more smoothly run DACHAU and RAVENSBRÜCK camps where mass extermination was carried out with cold efficiency.Our camp was called BRZEZINKI, in German BIRKENAU. Some prisoners nicknamed it RAJSKO. In literal translation this means "HEAVEN-LIKE".In Brzezinki-Birkenau, mass murder was carried out on such a fantastic scale that the executioners had set up five crematories. Almost all the inmates were destroyed and only a few lived long enough to greet their liberators. Except for one book written by a Polish woman thus far, no report has been graved on flintstone by any of the liberated Polish Jobs.I am not a writer and my story will be a plain and frank account of things which I have witnessed and experienced in nine prisons and in three concentration camps, from which I was miraculously saved by God. It is not my aim to evoke your pity, nor to arouse your wrath against the Germans. I wish only to help you to realize what happens when man rejects God and when his passions become his sole master. He will then commit every kind of inhuman crime, whereas if he follows the Golden Rule he will withstand the most ruthless pressure and even in the midst of inhuman sufferings will desperately cling to his faith.I wish to stir the conscience of statesmen so that they may unify their efforts in preventing a repetition of the crimes committed in the name of an omnipotent and evil deity--the STATE."-Foreword
First published in 1926 and respected ever since for its measured view of the most famous battle in the American West, The Story of the Little Big Horn asks questions that are still being debated. What were the causes of the debacle that wiped out Custer's command? Was it due to lack of a definite battle plan? To lack of correct information about the number, organization, and equipment of the Indians? To Custer's hot-headedness and thirst for glory? To Reno's alleged cowardice? To Benteen's delay in providing reinforcement? In his factual but dramatic account, W. A. Graham suggests that an awesome concatenation of attitudes and circumstances ensured the defeat of the Seventh Cavalry. On that Sunday in June 1876, the Indians were simply better (though not braver) soldiers.-Print ed.
CENTENNIAL TALE; Memoirs Of Colonel “Chester” S. Bassett French: Extra Aide-de-Camp to Generals Lee and Jackson, The Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865by Colonel “Chester” S. Bassett French Glenn C Oldaker
Colonel S. Bassett French, was born in Norfolk, Virginia, on March 31, 1820. He was educated at the Classical School of George Halson in Norfolk and at Hampton-Sidney College. He studied law with Robert Y. Conrad of Winchester, Va. and was licensed to practice law in 1840. Colonel French was Commonwealth Attorney in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield for several years and was Assistant Clerk of the House of Delegates of Virginia, being on very intimate terms with the distinguished and able legislators and statesmen of Virginia during those years, a fact which these memoirs clearly confirm. He was Secretary to Governor John Letcher, by whom he was appointed as special agent to the Confederacy, and in this capacity he was with Lee and Jackson in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865, bearing the Commission of Extra Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of which is herewith presented.These memoirs give us a keen insight to the characters of Lee, Jackson, Stuart, A. P. Hill and others not found in the writings of many authors who have published their fond recollections of those great "Virginia" soldiers and generals. The stories about them will be cherished. Revealed here, too, is the character of the writer, Colonel "Chester," "the jauntiest little man (130 pounds) in the Army of Northern Virginia, as Dr. Todd said of him when the train to Richmond was captured by the Yankees at Ashland. His escapades and escapes (he always escaped), his fondness for fine feeding, his rebukes from Lee and Jackson, his heart-warming associations with men and women in the experiences of war and the wit and wisdom of his active mind excite our admiration and thrill our hearts and souls. When the record ends and the book is closed, one must stop for a while and muse, "Surely, here was an unusual man."
The commander must remain ever vigilant against surprise, for attacks born of the unexpected have the potential to alter quickly and irreversibly the relative combat power of opposing forces. A commander is better prepared to meet this threat when he is familiar with those factors which have contributed to surprise during past conflicts. This thesis investigates the surprise phenomenon through a case study of the battle at Shiloh Church.General Ulysses S. Grant, during the American Civil War, bivouacked his army near Shiloh Church on the Tennessee River's west bank while he awaited General Don Carlos Buell and the Army of the Ohio. On Buell's arrival the combined armies were to attack Corinth, Mississippi, where the Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney Johnston were known to be entrenched. Realizing the combined strength of the two Union armies would eventually prove overwhelming, Johnston decided to attack Grant's position before Buell could reinforce. He therefore attacked early Sunday morning, 6 April 1862. Apparently unaware that an attack was imminent, Grant had encamped his army with little regard for defense. The Confederates enjoyed success and forced the Union army against the Tennessee River. However, Buell reinforced Grant that evening, and on the following day the Union armies counterattacked and drove the Confederates back toward Corinth. Thus, the battle ended on a rather indecisive note.Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are:1. Although the Union forces below division level anticipated the Confederate attack. Grant and his command echelon were completely surprised.2. Surprise was achieved because the Union had violated several principles of war, chiefly: objective, offensive, maneuver, unity of command, and security.3. The Confederates were not without fault, for, had certain mistakes been avoided, their army might have won a total victory.
This study is a historical analysis of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Cleburne's Division earned a reputation as one of the best divisions in either army. This reputation also carried with it lofty expectations. This study analyzes how Cleburne's Division performed at Chickamauga and what the effects of its actions were on the overall outcome of the battle.The Battle of Chickamauga has suffered its share of historical neglect. Fought in the forests and mountains of northern Georgia and southeastern Tennessee, the battle has not been immortalized by any stirring fictional works, nor has it inspired any feature films, but the story of the men who fought there is worth studying.Cleburne's Division did not distinguish itself at Chickamauga. It launched a confused, disjointed night attack to close out the first day of the battle, but determined leaders succeed in capturing their objectives. Day two of the battle saw Cleburne's Division attack four hours late. It was quickly repulsed while suffering horrific casualties. While the Confederate left wing routed the Union Army, Cleburne's Division nursed their wounds before finally advancing at sunset, as the Union withdrew from the battlefield.
Historians have largely agreed that Pemberton should shoulder the blame for the poor Confederate performance during the Vicksburg campaign. General consensus exists among American Civil War historians that Pemberton proved a confused, indecisive, and incompetent commander and his poor leadership led to the Confederate defeat. However, an examination of the Vicksburg campaign conducted at the operational level of war shows that throughout the campaign, Pemberton led a capable and competent defense not just of Vicksburg, but of the Mississippi Department he commanded. He relied on an operational approach that involved fighting from prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain deep in his own territory and anchored by natural obstacles. To attack such a position, Pemberton knew an opponent would need a large force operating over an extended line of communications (LOC). Pemberton intended to interdict his opponent's LOC using a strong cavalry force, thus preventing the enemy from achieving the offensive momentum necessary to break through Vicksburg's defenses. This was a sound operational approach. However, it failed because of an ineffective Confederate command structure that, among other failures, denied Pemberton the resources, particularly adequate cavalry forces, required to implement his operational approach.
Stonewall Jackson At Chancellorsville: The Principles Of War And The Horns Of A Dilemma At The Burton Farmby Major Jeremiah D. Canty
The Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863 and particularly the Flank March and Attack under Jackson served as a metaphor for the operational victories the South gained while at the same time signifying why the South could not hope to win strategically based on a policy of accepting greater levels of risk than its Northern opponent.In the spring of 1863 the Federal cause had just recovered from the disasters of the previous year with a resurgent army and leadership...General Hooker headed south to try his hand against the nemeses of the North; General Lee and General Jackson. Initially, Hooker was very successful and essentially "turned" Lee's position at Fredericksburg...Lee, facing defeat in detail as he attempted to hold off two possible Federal thrusts, was galvanized into action that seemed to defy the military principles of the day. Dividing his already heavily outnumbered army Lee attacked the eastern most elements of Hooker's army that was south of the river. The unexpected thrust unnerved Hooker who withdrew back into the Wilderness to fall back on defensive positions in anticipation of further Confederate attacks. Lee and Jackson realized they had no choice but to attack the Federals and decided on yet another division of the army, in further defiance the principles of war. Even though Hooker correctly appreciated Lee's intent he failed to take adequate precautions against a Confederate move from the west. In spite of being observed on several occasions the Second Corps of "Stonewall" Jackson arrived on the flank of the Federal army and delivered one of the most crushing blows of the war. Lee and Jackson's ability to absorb levels of risk that were not feasible for Hooker to accept gave them a distinct advantage over the Federal commander and thus acted as a significant force multiplier.
One of the most valuable by-products of the commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of our War between the States, or Civil War, has been the bringing to light of narratives of personal experiences in the war written by surviving veterans of the Confederate and Union armies. Such narratives, though sometimes somewhat at variance with the formal, official reports made by commanding officers, provide an impressive and often vivid picture of the ups and downs of actual army life as experienced by the man in the ranks. He may not have had at all times a very clear idea of the strategy involved in the movements he was making, but he knew exactly how he was personally affected by these movements, and his warm-blooded and uninhibited account of the campaigns and battles in which he was engaged provides some of the most important and valuable raw material for the historical researcher and writer.A particularly engaging narrative of this kind is that of Sergeant Newton Cannon of Williamson County, Tennessee. He came of distinguished ancestry...His grandfather, Newton Cannon, had been a militia colonel in the Creek War, later serving as a member of Congress and as Governor of Tennessee. His father had served in the Seminole War in Florida, where he was wounded; and, as Mr. Cannon took pride in recalling, his own son, Newton Cannon, Jr., served in the Spanish-American War, and his younger son took part in World War I.A month before his sixteenth birthday in 1862, Sergeant Cannon enlisted in Company I of the 11th Tennessee Cavalry of the Confederate Army, which was organized in Williamson County by his double first cousin, Captain Thomas F. Perkins, Jr. He served throughout the war with this company, seeing active service under General Nathan Bedford Forrest and General Joe Wheeler, and he was the company's First Sergeant when, with the remnant of Forrest's command, he surrendered and was paroled at Gainesville, Alabama, in 1865.
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