- Table View
- List View
Includes Civil War Map and Illustrations Pack - 224 battle plans, campaign maps and detailed analyses of actions spanning the entire period of hostilities."First published in 1907, Military Memoirs of a Confederate is regarded by many historians as one of the most important and dispassionate first-hand general accounts of the American Civil War. Unlike some other Confederate memoirists, General Edward Porter Alexander had no use for bitter "Lost Cause" theories to explain the South's defeat. Alexander was willing to objectively evaluate and criticize prominent Confederate officers, including Robert E. Lee. The result is a clear-eyed assessment of the long, bloody conflict that forged a nation."The memoir opens with Alexander, recently graduated from West Point, heading to Utah to tamp down the hostile actions of Mormons who had refused to receive a territorial governor appointed by President Buchanan. A few years later, Alexander finds himself on the opposite side of a much larger rebellion-this time aligned with Confederates bent on secession from the Union. In the years that follow, he is involved in most of the major battles of the East, including Manassas, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. Alexander describes each battle and battlefield in sharp detail."Few wartime narratives offer the insight and objectivity of Alexander's Military Memoirs of a Confederate . Civil war buffs and students of American history have much to learn from this superb personal narrative"-Paperback Edition
Includes 39 maps and plansThe Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, Aug.-Sep. 1863, is an excellent vehicle for a Staff Ride. Because of the size of the forces involved and the difficulty of the terrain encountered, it represents an opportunity to raise many challenging teaching points relevant to today's officer. Second, the nation has wisely preserved most of the primary battle area in the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park and has marked most unit positions for detailed study by visitors. These markers are linked by an extensive trail network that permits access to all significant areas of the field. Thus, the park is an excellent physical laboratory for the study of conflict at the tactical and human level.The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 Sep. 1863, provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this great Civil War battle.Part I describes the organization of the Federal and Confederate Armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support.In part II, the Chickamauga campaign is discussed, placing the battle in historical perspective and illustrating how the battle fits into the overall context of the Chickamauga campaign.Part III furnishes a suggested route to follow in order to get a firsthand, concrete view of how the battle developed. By following this route, various phases of the battle can be discussed and significant points made concerning the evolving battle. Also in part III are various vignettes by participants in the battle that describe the fight and offer insights into the emotional disposition of the combatants.Part IV furnishes current information on the Chickamauga site, sources of assistance, and logistical data for conducting a Staff Ride. In addition, appendixes give order of battle information for the two armies, meteorological data, and a list of Medal of Honor recipients in the battle. A bibliography is also provided.
Includes more than 14 maps and IllustrationsArmies of the North and South fought the Battle of Wilson's Creek about ten miles southwest of Springfield, Missouri, on Saturday, 10 Aug. 1861...While the action at Wilson's Creek was small compared to that at Gettysburg or Chickamauga, it remains significant and useful to students of military history....The Union defeat in battle and the death of General Nathaniel Lyon, so closely following the disaster at First Bull Run, caused the North to adopt a more serious attitude about the war and to realize that victory would come only with detailed planning and proper resourcing. Thus, the Union reinforced Missouri with soldiers and weapons during the fall and winter of 1861-62, while the Confederacy applied its scanty resources elsewhere. Although the exiled pro-Confederate state government voted to secede and sent delegates to Richmond, Virginia, Missouri effectively remained in the Union. Any questions about Missouri's fate were settled at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March 1862, when Union forces turned back the last significant Confederate threat to Missouri.Wilson's Creek was a "first battle" for most of the soldiers who fought there. First battles often provide armies with special insights into the application of military art and science, and Wilson's Creek was no exception. The Mexican War model of organization and combined arms battle was generally confirmed, but some key observations relating to technology and command and control emerged as well...In addition, artillery proved decisive at several key moments during the fighting. Cavalry, on its part, proved to be much less valuable, and this fact hinted at lessons to be learned later in the Civil War. Ultimately, the infantry of both sides played out the drama, and many of the most useful insights came from that branch.
Comparative Analysis Of The Military Leadership Styles Of George C. Marshall And Dwight D. Eisenhowerby Major James R. Hill
In a constantly changing world threatened by ever increasing terrorist acts, American interests, both at home and abroad, require protection provided by great military leaders. In order to produce military leaders who can successfully meet the future challenges America faces, it is important to develop and refine them early and help them understand how to create and refine a successful leadership style. The process of developing leadership styles, however, is not easy and it requires a prodigious amount of determination, time, planning, training, mentoring, and refinement. One way to help develop leaders is to show them examples of previously successful leaders, leaders such as George C. Marshall and Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower. Marshall and Eisenhower were two talented and exceptional leaders and are great examples of American military leadership. Their leadership styles were indispensable during World War II, and it is important for leaders today to examine why their leadership styles were so successful.
This study is a historical analysis of selected special operations missions in the American Civil War. The analysis is intended to determine if there are lessons to be learned from these operations that are applicable to present special operations forces.Selected Civil War direct action and unconventional warfare missions are examined in detail from the planning stage through mission completion and analyzed at the tactical level from the perspectives of special operations applications of the principles of war and the SOF imperatives. Union and Confederate special operations are examined for effectiveness against modern doctrine from the operational and strategic levels.The study reveals that many of the lessons learned from a historical analysis of Civil War special operations missions are equally important to success today. The modern special operator who conducts a review of similar operations from the past or who has a good historical background in these missions has a great advantage when conducting special operations today.
Today's Army faces an environment much different from that which it prepared for in the Cold War. Massed armor battles on the plains of Europe, for which the Army was trained and equipped, have become much less likely while involvement in smaller and more limited conflict has become more probable. Future conflict is more likely to resemble Grenada, Panama, or Somalia than Desert Storm. As world demographics shift from rural to urban areas, the cities will increasingly become areas of potential conflict. They cannot be avoided as a likely battlefield, and have already played a prominent part in Army combat operations in the last decade.If the Army is to keep pace in this changing environment it must look to the cities when developing doctrine, technology, and force structure. The close battlefield of Mogadishu or Panama City is much different from the premier training areas of the National Training Center or Hohenfels. Yet aviators have been presented the dilemma of training for the latter environment and being deployed to the former. For most aviators facing urban combat, it is a matter of learning as they fight. To avoid the high casualties and collateral damage likely in an urban fight against a determined opponent, however. Army aviation must train and prepare before they fight.Attack helicopters are inextricably woven into the fabric of combined arms operations. But for the Army to operate effectively as a combined arms team in an urban environment, both aviators and the ground units they support must understand the capabilities and limitations attack helicopters bring to the battle. This paper presents an historical perspective of how attack helicopters have already been used in this environment. It also discusses the factors that make city fighting unique, and the advantages and disadvantages for attack helicopter employment in an urban environment, as well as implications for future urban conflicts.
This study is an historical analysis of the background and demonstrated leadership attributes of 332 World War II German corps commanders on the Eastern, Italian, and Western Fronts. Overall characteristics are determined based on each officer's experience and performance based on available historical records. These records focus on age, nobility, background, education, branch, previous command and staff positions, membership in the General Staff, demonstrated military achievement, promotion, and subsequent higher command.Among the many conclusions which could be drawn from this investigation are: most successful corps commanders possessed an excellent educational background, performed well in previous significant command and staff positions, and demonstrated the capability for independent action; and, political factors played a minor role in the selection of officers for corps command.The study concludes that the Eastern, Western, and Italian Fronts all had competent German corps commanders conducting operations; no Front had a preponderance of successful commander's to the detriment of the other two.
This study determines the extent of American pilot participation as members of the Royal Air Force, flying in the Battle of Britain. It also examines the recruiting mechanism by which the Americans became involved in the war and documents their contributions as combat pilots during the battle itself.Research reveals that, while many American citizens were recruited to fly for Britain during the summer of 1940, only six Americans are known to have actually participated in the Battle of Britain, fought between 12 August and 15 September 1940. These men not only demonstrated America's determination to support her allies, but materially contributed to Britain's cause by destroying two and one half enemy aircraft, probably destroying five others, and damaging two more during their brief RAF careers.
Achieving Operational Flexibility Through Task Organization:: How The American Forces In Europe Beat Nazi Germany By Making The Difficult Routineby Lt.-Col. Brian North
On the eve of World War II, the U.S. Army was a small cadre force without deployable combat divisions. Because of years of preparation and planning during the interwar years, the Army completed the transformation into a huge organization with multiple army groups spread across the world in less than four years. This new army displayed remarkable battlefield flexibility. Doctrine and training guided senior leaders in the European Theater of Operations to ensure overwhelming combat power at the point of attack. They constantly shifted their divisions, a limited asset on the continent for the majority of 1944, between corps headquarters immediately prior to major battles. Many divisions changed corps assignments four times in a three-month period and corps moved between armies on a regular basis with no apparent difficulty. Changing task organization in the face of the enemy is a complex undertaking, affecting command relationships, logistics, and every other staff function. Despite the potential for introducing unwanted friction, the shifting of units from one headquarters to another was a common practice in the European theater in 1944. How were these newly formed units able to display the flexibility to integrate effectively while engaged in combat?This monograph proposes operational flexibility resulted from a unique American way of war developed during the interwar period by veterans of the First World War. Three factors -- common doctrine, carefully selected leaders, and an effective organizational structure -- provided senior commanders the organizational flexibility they required in combat. Without this flexibility, the Army would have had difficulty executing its breakout from the Normandy bridgehead, pursuing the retreating German forces across France, and quickly thwarting the Nazi offensive in the Ardennes at the end of 1944.
This is a study of the actions of the senior Confederate commanders at the battle of Shiloh. The senior commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston and his second in command, General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, did not come to a complete agreement on how to fight the battle. This disconnect between the two generals was the main reason for the South's failure to achieve victory. The research method consisted of comparing the official records to other sources. These sources included books, biographies, telephone interviews, and one unpublished paper from the Shiloh National Military Park Library. Official records sometimes did not survive the test of scrutiny, particularly General Braxton Bragg's assertion of actions at the close of April 6. The most important lesson that a student of military history can learn from this study is that commanders at all levels must ensure that the commander's intent is clearly understood. Failure to do so almost guarantees confusion up and down the chain of command which will, most likely, result in defeat.
This study investigates the decisive factors that affected the Chickasaw Bayou Campaign, General Ulysses S. Grant's first effort to seize Vicksburg.By December 1862 Grant's forces had fought into north central Mississippi. Simultaneously, Major General John A. McClernand had convinced President Lincoln to allow him to command an independent amphibious force to operate on the Mississippi against Vicksburg. Grant hastily organized his own river expedition under Major General William T. Sherman to seize Vicksburg. The resulting campaign ended in the repulse of Union forces at Chickasaw Bayou.At the strategic level the threat of the amphibious force under McClernand decisively affected Grant's ongoing campaign. The Confederate reorganization of the western command structure was instrumental to Confederate success. At the operational level Confederate cavalry raids on Grant's line of communications caused Grant to retreat, enabling the Confederates to focus all efforts against Sherman at Chickasaw Bayou. At the tactical level, Sherman's forces lacked a sense of purpose and committed blunders throughout the battle. Confederate battle tactics were characterized by a strong sense of urgency and excellent generalship.Grant concluded from the campaign that fixed lines of communications were unnecessary in supplying his army. The Confederates were lulled into a false sense of security which ultimately contributed to their defeat at Vicksburg.
This monograph analyzed whether Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck used operational art to defeat British forces in the East African campaign of World War I. British forces were superior in quantity of men and equipment, but slow moving and heavily dependent on secure lines of communication. Lettow-Vorbeck's forces maintained an asymmetric advantage in mobility, knowledge of terrain, and responsive logistics. An analogy was suggested that the U.S. Army in the twenty-first century is similar to British forces in 1914, and the nation's future adversaries could potentially use Lettow-Vorbeck's unconventional warfare and asymmetric tactics woven together in a comprehensive campaign plan.This monograph reviewed the origins and characteristics of operational art. The Army's emerging doctrine, Student Text 3-0, Operations defines operational art as the "use of military force to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategic, campaigns, major operations, and battles" and serves as the entry point for discussion. A synthesis of Shimon Naveh and James Schneider's theories revealed five primary characteristics of operational art and was used as the criteria to evaluate the research question. The five characteristics were: operational objectives, operational maneuver, disruption, operational approach, and operational logistics. The East African campaign was analyzed from the perspective of Lettow-Vorbeck linking his strategic aim of forcing the British to commit forces to a secondary theater of operations to his limited resources. The four-year campaign was divided into three phases based on Lettow-Vorbeck's operational objectives and the correlation of forces. Significant tactical vignettes were examined as part of an overarching campaign plan. Finally, this monograph considered how the U.S. Army would fight an asymmetric enemy in a similar environment.
This monograph explores the problem of mission creep. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. has struggled to find its place in the new world order. As a result US military forces have increasingly found themselves involved in various operations other than traditional warfare. Often the political aims of these operations are difficult to identify and translate into military operational objectives and end states. Worse yet, the political aims themselves are prone to rapidly shift and evolve from those originally intended, leaving the military commander the difficult task of catching up with policy or even guessing at the political objectives. This uncertain environment sets the conditions for the delinkage between the political goal and military operations which may result in disaster. The monograph examines US operations in Somalia to provide the data for the analysis in order to determine the factors which contribute to mission creep. Examining US-Somalia policy from 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) to Oct. 1993 (United Nations Operations in Somalia II) this monograph analyses the evolution of national policy objectives and the military and political operations undertaken to achieve those objectives. An analysis of operational and tactical objectives and end states as well as military methods determines the factors which contributed to the failed US involvement in UNOSOM II. In addition, the monograph identifies the Somali geo-political, historical, cultural, and economic factors which influenced US operations. This monograph concludes that contradictory and uncoordinated national strategy and political policy resulted in poor operational planning and execution. There were also significant factors at the operational level which contributed to the failed US intervention.
Includes 3 maps and more than 10 illustrationsThe preponderance of conflicts fought over the last seventy years have included or been centered on irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. Indeed, the helicopter's first significant trials in combat took place during the Algerian War 1954-1962, the Vietnam War 1955-1975, and the Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989. During these wars, French, U.S., and Soviet militaries used significant numbers of helicopters to fight insurgents and guerrillas, and each country lost their respective conflict. As conventional organizations, these militaries used helicopters to seek military dominance, often blind to or in spite of politico-strategic goals like legitimacy. The helicopter's firepower and mobility tactically decimated insurgents, but the nature of irregular warfare rendered tactical dominance indecisive. Helicopters were indecisive or bad at enabling legitimacy, population control, and isolation, key tenets of successful COIN. Convinced that helicopter enabled military dominance could win, the French, U.S., and Soviet militaries were unable to balance the pursuit of military and politically objectives. Airmobility distracted leaders from focusing on the political aspects of counter-insurgency.
This study addresses Henry L. Stimson, as Secretary of State under President Herbert Hoover, and his influence on American foreign policy toward Japan following the Japanese military action in China that has become known as the Manchurian Incident. Specifically examined are the questions of when and why Stimson's attitude toward Japan changed from one of support for the civilian government in their effort to control the military to one of leading a determined effort toward international moral condemnation of Japan. As background, the study examines in detail, the U.S. and Japanese foreign policies the decade prior to 1931, the character of Stimson, and then Stimson and Japan during the period, 1931-32. Research, using especially Stimson's personal diaries, suggests that the cumulative effect of probably five separate events contributed to the change in attitude rather than a single instance. And coupled with these five events, Stimson's friendship and confidence in Japanese leaders hindered his decision to adopt a stronger position against Japan sooner than he ultimately did.
In October 1944, US forces executed amphibious landings on the Japanese-occupied island of Leyte in the central Philippines. Japanese naval forces, severely outnumbered by the US Third and Seventh Fleets, attempted to stop the invasion by attacking US amphibious shipping in Leyte Gulf. Due to the divided US area commands in the Pacific theater during World War II, the Third and Seventh Fleet commanders, Adm. Halsey and Vice Adm. Kinkaid, reported to separate superiors, Adm. Nimitz and Gen. MacArthur, even though both fleets were supporting the operation. Although the Japanese were soundly defeated, one of the Japanese forces, under Vice Adm. Kurita, nearly reached its objective. Many historians have criticized Halsey for ordering his carrier force to close with a Japanese carrier force that was acting as a decoy, thus leaving the US forces in Leyte Gulf unprotected. Although Halsey was effectively decoyed, the divided US naval chain of command amplified problems in communication and coordination between Halsey and Kinkaid. This divided command was more important in determining the course of the battle than the tactical decision made by Halsey and led to an American disunity of effort that nearly allowed Kurita's mission to succeed.
Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford to ignore history when planning in today's complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinal changes and adaptation during Britain's Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. The Boer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The French experience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism as its primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in both case studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. The conclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and French counterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment.
9/11 And Canadian Special Operations Forces: How ‘40 Selected Men’ Indelibly Influenced The Future Of The Forceby Lt.-Col Stephen J. Day
In less than two decades, Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) grew from a 100-man hostage-rescue unit to a 2,500-person Command capable of prosecuting missions across the special operations spectrum. The seminal event causing this transformation is examined within this monograph. The common narrative explaining the rise of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) states that 9/11 is the seminal event. Herein, a new narrative is proposed. One that posits the 2001-02 deployment of a 40-man CANSOF Task Force to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is the seminal event. This Task Force's disproportionately positive impact on the Canadian national scene caused key national actors to take note of the strategic utility of special operations forces. Twenty-four interviews with defence and security subject matter experts from the political, federal public service, military and academic domains, as well as two leading Canadian national journalists provide unique insights into CANSOF's ascendancy. Analyzing published defence policy since World War II and Canada's 20-year experience with her national counter-terrorism task force prove two key points. First, defence policy is extant, consistently expressing the requirement for an irregular capability for the conduct of operations in asymmetrical environments. Therefore, 9/11 did not change Government of Canada (GoC) expectations per se. Second, the one-year CANSOF OEF commitment produces a highly positive national strategic effect for the GoC. As a result, in less than a decade CANSOF transitions from a single, domestically focused, national counter-terrorism task force to where today CANSOFCOM is employed as a distinct element of national military power. This transformation from a single strategic resource to a strategically relevant, 'hard power' option currently provides the GoC with greater strategic choice when she looks to deploy military forces alongside her allies.
Study Of The Leadership Displayed By Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan Jackson During The American Civil Warby Major Perry C. Casto Jr.
Confederate Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson is considered one of the greatest tacticians who ever lived. His Valley Campaign of 1862 is a classic example of the effective use of maneuver warfare. While much has been written about Jackson's tactics, very little attention has been paid to his leadership of the soldiers who executed his tactical plans. The United States Army's recent emphasis on maneuver warfare has stressed the importance of leadership in the conduct of such warfare. This study is an analysis of Jackson's military leadership as he commanded units from brigade to corps level in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to determine if he met the requirements of a good leader as those requirements are defined by current US Army doctrine. The study uses current Army doctrine as the basis to judge the effectiveness of Jackson as a leader. It discusses Jackson's background and its effect on the character of his leadership, the leadership that he displayed during the Civil War, and then compares his actions to current doctrine. The study concludes that while some of Jackson's actions deviated significantly from today's doctrinally sound leadership practices, in the aggregate his leadership was congruous with current doctrine and contributed to his success as a field commander.
This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission. The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort. These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.
Rosecrans’ Staff At Chickamauga: The Significance Of Major General William S. Rosecrans’ Staff On The Outcome Of The Chickamauga Campaign [Illus. Ed.]by Major Robert D. Richardson
Illustrated with 23 maps and plans of the campaign and engagements at Chickamauga.Probably the most unpredictable variable in the "Fog of War" next to leadership, is the command and control process, comprised of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. Organizations include the formulation of staffs by the commander to accomplish the mission. Incorporated in the organization of the staffs are the roles, responsibilities, and functions. Large Civil War armies like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee required significant numbers of staff officers to support the armies logistically and to maneuver them operationally. During the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, these staff officers often played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the battle. The roles and functions performed by these staff officers evolved through the history of conflict. This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans' staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did not exist; therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and ad hoc positions. The study uses evolving doctrine from Command and General Staff College that defines an outstanding staff as one that informs, anticipates, coordinates and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation. This study concludes that Rosecrans' staff was significant to the outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga. Although none of the staff functions developed critical deficiencies during the campaign, their inability to relieve the commander of administrative burdens compelled him to abandon the battlefield.
This study reviews the life, battles, and campaigns of the Carthaginian General Hannibal while attempting to illustrate the leadership values and primary characteristics of Hannibal that contributed to his success on the battlefield. Hannibal won extraordinary victories against his opponents (primarily Romans), and usually against overwhelming odds, with a mercenary army composed of many different nations. This study demonstrates that Hannibal was one of the "Great Captains" of the past and, more importantly, that studying his life today has great relevance for modern soldiers. The leadership values of Hannibal are core values that to one extent or another can be found in all great leaders of both the past and present. This study concludes by identifying Hannibal's finest leadership values and characteristics, then demonstrating their relevancy by comparing them with current United States Army doctrine, and by showing these values through examples in the lives of nineteenth century and twentieth century U. S. military leaders. Thus the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the lives of leaders, such as Hannibal (who lived 2,000 years ago), have relevance to military leaders today and the application of their leadership values and characteristics can produce success on the battlefield.
This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The loss of Vicksburg in the American Civil War was a mortal blow to the Confederacy in that it split the south in two and resulted in the opening of the Mississippi River to the Union forces. During the Campaign for Vicksburg General Grant, leading a Union army engaged General Pemberton, commanding a Confederate army, and proceeded to win one of the most brilliant military successes in history. A distinct contrast in aggressiveness appeared to exist between Grant and Pemberton during this campaign; because once Grant landed his army in Confederate territory, he retained the initiative and kept Pemberton at his mercy. Pemberton was unable to overcome the difficulties he experienced and received little help from outside his command. Finally, because of despair among his men, he surrendered Vicksburg to the Union on July 4, 1863...Certain "actions" that can be taken by a commander relative to the principle of the offensive in the defense and certain "factors" which may prevent his taking these actions are identified and employed in the analysis. Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are: 1.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg applied the principle of the offensive against Grant's initial probes into Mississippi and against Federal cavalry raids into Vicksburg area. 2.) The Confederate commander at Vicksburg did not apply the principle of the offensive against Grant's army during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg (May 1 to July 4, 1863). Several of General Pemberton's subordinate commanders, however, did apply the principle during this same period. 3.) The primary reasons for Pemberton's failures with respect to the application of the principle of the offensive were his lack of intelligence resulting from his lack of cavalry and interference with his command decisions from higher authority.
This thesis considers the extent to which Soviet ascendancy over Germany by late 1943 can be attributed to a resurgence of operational art.Discussion begins with an overview of operational art and the development of the theory up to 1937. It explains the significant differences between Soviet and western terminology and discusses the writings of key Russian and Soviet theorists, as well as the opinions of contemporary historians.The thesis proceeds to examine two campaigns. First, the Soviet Winter 1942-43 offensives and German counteroffensives. This period saw the surrender of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad but ended in operational defeat for the Red Army. Turning to the campaigns of summer 1943 that began with Operation CITADEL, the thesis examines the struggle better known as the Battle of Kursk. This study includes the Soviet 1943 summer offensives and concludes in October 1943, by which time the Germans had suffered a significant operational and strategic defeat.The thesis analyses the extent to which the reemergence of operational art was responsible for the reversal in Soviet fortunes. It also discusses other factors that contributed to Soviet success and to German failures.
This is a historical narrative of the Third Infantry Division's experiences at the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead from 22 January to 2 June 1944. It identifies major contributing factors to the Third Infantry Division's battlefield success at the battle of Anzio-Nettuno. The battle is broken down into five distinct stages and investigated in a chronological manner. Potentially significant factors are evaluated in each stage of the battle and include terrain, weather, Allied air superiority, and the quality of military intelligence available to the Third Infantry Division's commander. Also compared for each side are the quality of senior leadership, previous combat experience, the quality and quantity of manpower replacements, and available artillery resources. This thesis concludes that the Third Infantry Division's battlefield success at Anzio-Nettuno appears to have been, to a large extent, a result of the quality and stability of the division's senior leadership, failures and missteps on the part of the higher German command echelons, the division's masterful employment of field artillery, and a highly effective training program.