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Urban terrain presents significant tactical challenges to attacking armies, limiting weapons effects and mobility while disrupting formations and command and control. The human terrain in cities creates a tactical dilemma, placing large civilian populations in close proximity to the fighting. The issue of restraint in urban warfare has been described as a modern phenomenon, with urban warfare in World War II characterized as unlimited. In April 1945, however, the Canadian Army limited its firepower while attacking the city of Groningen, Netherlands to limit damage and civilian casualties. This thesis examines the reasons for these restraints and the methods used to balance those restraints with accomplishment of the mission. The Canadians limited their use of force for political reasons based on intent from the British. They accomplished their mission due to intelligence gained from the friendly population, local fire superiority gained by tanks and flamethrowers, and the ineffectiveness of the poorly organized and equipped German defense. This thesis provides a historical case study of the reasons for restraint in urban warfare and the tactical challenges associated with such limitations.
The military strategy utilized by two great World War Two U.S. Navy leaders will provide an insight into the evolution of the strategy process. This paper will examine two Pacific Theater leaders involved in the early employment of a relatively new naval weapon system, the aircraft carrier. Carrier air power was virtually untested at the beginning of the second world war and eventually developed into a most formidable battle tool. The Battle of Coral Sea provided a basis for carrier tactics employed in later engagements such as the Battle of Midway. The military strategy of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance will be examined with respect to the Battle of Midway. Midway was the first major decisive naval battle where the outcome was decided on the basis of aircraft carrier operations alone. The battle was fought against a numerically superior force during the period that the Japanese Navy was strongly on the offensive.Next, the military strategy of Admiral William F. Halsey as utilized during the Battle for Leyte Gulf will be reviewed with a continuing focus on carrier air power. Leyte Gulf was a complex group of four battles involving carrier air as well as land based air power, surface engagements and invasion forces. The battle was fought against a Japanese on force with relatively few remaining carrier air resources. Also, it was fought from an American offensive position, as U.S. forces pressed toward Japan through the Philippines.Finally, an analysis of the strategy used by these two great warriors will be made within the context of the ACSC strategy process model in an effort to increase the understanding of the process of strategy and its derivation. A brief look at selected principles of war is also included in an effort to correlate abstract thought strategy and the conduct of war with actual warfighting experiences.
As the United States enters into the 21st century, it will face new and different challenges that will be more complex than those encountered in the past. Evolutions in doctrine, training, and equipment modernization, influenced by informational and technological advances, will enhance U.S. ability to accomplish national objectives. Valuable lessons learned can be realized by studying past operations that failed to understand the threat and capitalize on friendly capabilities. The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 is one such event. This short but violent naval engagement, a daring Japanese night surface attack conducted at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign on 9 August 1942, was a significant tactical victory for the Imperial Japanese Fleet and has been called the worst blue water defeat in the U.S. Navy's history. This paper will address the shortcomings at Savo Island, particularly in terms of intelligence, command and control, training, force protection, and leadership and discuss these concepts as they apply to current and future operations in the 21st century.
In the late 1930's, an aggressive and innovative rearmament program in Nazi Germany gave rise to the tactics of vertical envelopment. Pioneering the use of gliders as troop carriers, parachutists, and the air landing of reinforcements to exploit tactical success, the German Wehrmacht used the new technique of airborne warfare with startling success as part of the Blitzkrieg campaign against the Low Countries and France in 1940.-When the tactical doctrine used to seize bridges, strong points and road junctions in Fall Gelb was transferred to the seizure of an entire island that was heavily defended in 1941, however, the German airborne effectively committed suicide.-In ten days in May 1941, half the airborne forces in the entire German army were killed or wounded on Crete. Hitler wrongly ascribed the disaster to a playing out of the surprise factor, and banned further parachute operations until 1943.-The right conclusions were arrived at by the commander of the German airborne himself, General Kurt Student, in post-battle analysis. His own insistence on faulty tactics was devastating...The German innovation of vertical envelopment in the 1930's was as revolutionary to modern military tactics as the simultaneous development of the integrated combined arms offensive known today as the Blitzkrieg. In putting Billy Mitchell's ideas into practice, Luftwaffe General Student demonstrated vision, innovative thinking and practical military skill. Poor intelligence and reliance on his "spreading oil drops" tactics for the deployment of his paratroopers, the Fallschirmtruppe, on Crete, however, led directly to their removal as a significant weapon from the German arsenal in World War II.
In the history of modern warfare, Weserübung Nord, the German invasion of Norway in 1940, occupies a distinguished station as the first campaign "jointly" planned and executed by ground, sea, and air forces. This paper examines the origins, concept, and planning of Weserübung Nord, as well as the execution of the landings. Brief attention is given to the defense of the landings against Allied counterstrokes and to issues associated with unified planning and direction. The origins of the campaign are found in the German naval experience in the First World War, interwar naval strategy debates, and the persona of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who was determined to secure a decisive role for the German Navy in the Second World War. Raeder capitalized on the fortuitous opportunities the Russo-Finnish War and the Norwegian traitor Vidkun Quisling presented to win Hitler over to his naval plans. Raeder and the Navy heavily influenced the concept development and planning of the campaign in concert with the High Command of the (German) Armed Forces, which also had a vested organizational interest in a military solution of the Norwegian issue. In executing Weserübung Nord, the German Armed Forces encountered major problems only at Oslo and Narvik. However, the operational-level success of the campaign tends to draw attention away from fundamental problems regarding unified planning and direction which emerged during the preparation and execution of the campaign."When the first [German] mountain troops in parachutes were dropped behind Narvik, it occurred that one fell directly in the water. The General [Dietl] came up to him as a petty officer was pulling him out of the water.""So soldier, how do you end up here?""With the help of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Herr General," shouted the man quick-wittedly, "the Army sent me up here, the Air Force transported me, and the Navy pulled me out of the water."-General Dietl: das Leben eines Soldaten
How Did The Advancement Of Weapons Technology Prior To World War One: Influence The Rapid Evolution Of German Infantry Tactics And Command And Control From 1914 To 1918?by Major Daniel T. Lathrop
The fact that there has been significant evolution in infantry tactics during the past century is taken for granted. Also, it is well documented that the predominant advancements in tactics took place between 1914 and 1918, during World War One, rooted within the German army. However, the cause and effect that initiated this rapid evolution is somewhat unclear. Was this advancement solely due to the inspiration of one or more German commanders of the time? Was this advancement in tactics a Revolution in Military Affairs? Or, was this merely an evolution in tactics resulting from advancements in fire power due to technology improvements in infantry weapons such as the machine gun, infantry rifle, field artillery, etc.Prior to World War I the German army had studied and toyed with new tactics off and on. By 1914 they were still practicing traditional tactics against the Allies. The use of these tactics against the massive destructive capability of modern weapons available to both sides at the start of the war caused enormous numbers of casualties. The German army, in comparison to the Allies, was limited in numbers of soldiers and material and could not afford to continue to keep up with the high attrition rate. Necessity being the mother of invention, the Germans acted aggressively in finding a way to defeat the advanced firepower that emerged during the war. Through experimentation and training they developed the famous "Storm Troops" that momentarily broke the deadlock near the end of the war. After World War I these new tactics were taken up by other forces around the world and eventually led to German Blitzkrieg tactics of World War Two.
Since the end of the Cold War, the worldview is that the US is presently the only superpower. The expectation, within the Department of Defense and the world's other military institutions, is that this status will exist for the next twenty years or until the year 2020. Even as the world's only superpower, the U. military has adopted a formal approach to joint and coalition warfare as the methodology to fight future military conflicts. This is for two reasons. The first reason is to gain world and national political consensus and legitimacy for any operation requiring the use of US military forces. The second reason is even the military resources of the US are limited and we must conduct military operations as part of a joint coalition force in order to reach our and the coalition's political endstate.This monograph asks the question: Can tactical victories guarantee the accomplishment of the coalition's operational aim? This monograph will use the example of the Afrika Korps in North Africa to answer this question. The purpose of the monograph is to show the outcome when a more militarily capable member of a coalition dictates the conduct of military operations. This consideration is relevant to the US Army due to our superpower status and our military capabilities relative to the rest of the world's military organizations. The monograph will show that Rommel's reliance on the tactical level of war and his lack of an operational understanding of what he was attempting to accomplish lead to their defeat in North Africa. Rommel's conducted tactical operations because he was not trained for or capable of conducting operational art. Because of this, he failed to support the strategic and operational aims of the political and military leadership. He lacked the cognitive creativity and therefore, the tension to support his government. Rommel's opportunism led to many victories on the battlefield but ultimately had an adverse effect on the Axis war effort.
In terms of Clausewitz' paradoxical trinity, the German counter insurgency in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union 1941-1944, did not achieve a sense of balance. The second two legs of the trinity, the play of chance and probability and the element of subordination, were subverted by primordial violence and enmity.Clausewitz offers his paradoxical trinity as a viable framework for analyzing the inherent complexities of warfare. The three interdependent, dynamic aspects of the trinity must be balanced against each other if a successful plan for war is to prevail. Additionally, Clausewitz addresses the dynamics of insurgencies and counter insurgencies. With these two analytical frameworks, an examination of a specific campaign becomes plausible.The German efforts to thwart the partisan uprising in the occupied territories of the Eastern Front from 1941-1944 reflected the interplay of the Clausewitz triad. Primordial violence was imbued in the German people as a result of National Socialist indoctrination. The play of chance and probability reflected the largely successful active and passive measures employed by the German armed forces behind German lines in the east. The element of subordination was manifested in the pernicious Nazi policies and directives that inevitably dictated the conduct of the armed forces.As a result of Hitler's imbalanced, irrational eastern strategy and sequent war on the partisans, primordial violence, enmity, and hatred superseded the other two legs of the trinity. Hitler's unlimited political and military objectives ultimately were incompatible with the German Army's ability to pragmatically prosecute the eastern war and pacify the population that supported the partisan resistance.
The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/or treated as a non-event in the Western historiography of World War II. The political climate during World War II and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the history and understanding of this revolt. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s removed the veil of secrecy from much of Eastern Europe's wartime history, and Western historians are exploring the new resources available, but coverage of Slovakia's story and uprising remains very limited. This work aims to fill some of the void.Fully understanding the uprising requires an analysis of a number of different viewpoints in order to avoid capture by the political views of the parties involved: the Slovaks, the Germans, or the Soviets. Each group had different plans and goals: the Slovaks found themselves precariously between the Allies and Germany, the Germans fought to maintain their strategic position in central Europe while the Soviets hoped to expand their influence through eastern and central Europe. Each group naturally interpreted events differently and acted accordingly. Ultimately the Germans crushed the Slovak rebellion.Events surrounding the uprising remain cloudy to this day. The Slovaks won only short-term political gains, but their Jewish and ethnic German populations paid a heavy price. The Germans won their last significant victory in the war and maintained their presence in Slovak territory until the very end. The Soviet Union suffered significant casualties, but saw Communist influence increase in the region. Recriminations swirl around the lack of Allied support and the duplicity of Stalin. Western historians have excluded coverage of the uprising in part to avoid embarrassment. Significantly, the Slovaks remain at odds among themselves about the importance and the meaning of the uprising.
As a result of the Allied bombing campaign against Nazi submarine bases during the Second World War, the cities of Brest, Lorient, and Saint Nazaire were nearly completely destroyed. Despite thousands of bombing missions, all three submarine bunkers still stand today. This monograph examines the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign against German submarine bases in Brittany by analyzing the campaign through the use of a design methodology. Research is broken down into three frames: the operational approach, the operational environment and the problem frame. The first frame provides an account of the bombing missions and effects. Next, an overview of the operational environment is conducted by exploring the historical context of Brittany, German construction efforts and Allied institutional barriers. The study concludes by examining the problem frame, which entails how the Allies perceived their operational problem and developed an approach based on their understanding. Ultimately, the Allies failed to accurately identify their problem and developed an ineffective approach towards defeating the threat. Had the Allies incorporated design thinking into their planning and execution, they may have developed an effective campaign towards defeating the Nazi U-boat threat rather than solving the wrong problem.
Critical German Submarine Operations Versus Allied Convoys During March 1943: An Operational Analysisby LCDR Bruce E. Grooms
German submarine operations against allied convoys, during March 1943 is critically analyzed from an operational perspective. The theater commander's operational scheme is dissected for the purpose of identifying lessons which can be applied to the planning and execution of today's theater operations. A brief historical account of the early phases of the war and the events and decisions which preceded the critical convoy battles will be followed by an analysis of the operational scheme employed by Admiral Dönitz. German victory during the spring offensive clearly demonstrated numerous operational successes, a reasonably well conceived operational plan, and proof positive of the potential for a larger scale victory. Yet history recorded Germany's ultimate defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic. This analysis identified three significant flaws which led to the German demise; first, strategic guidance and operational means were inadequately reconciled which prevented the proper execution of the operational plan; second, operational intelligence and reconnaissance were inadequately exploited; third, Germany failed to coordinate and execute joint operations between service arms, specifically the lack of air assets in support of vital U-boat operations. Clearly one must conclude a reasonable operational plan has marginal chance for success when strategic guidance and joint coordination are incompatible with theater objective accomplishment.
The purpose of this study is to identify relationships between Nazi Macroeconomic policy and its ability to enable genocide. This study uses primary source documentation from newspapers, historical documents and published works to examine Nazi ideology as it relates to economics and macroeconomic policy. Accompanying this research is an analysis of steps the United States could have taken to stop or deter Nazi economic policy using the Mass Atrocities Prevention and Response Handbook's economic planning guidance.
The development of airpower can be traced to three key elements: thought, organization and technology. The Luftwaffe of World War II is no different. This paper will examine the Luftwaffe's thought, organization and technology as it pertains to maritime operations, or as the modern United States Air Force (USAF) calls it, Countersea Operations. These maritime operations will include direct support of the Kriegsmarine and independent Luftwaffe operations against the Allies. Luftwaffe thought will show that doctrinally the Luftwaffe was not as prepared for the maritime role its leaders thrust upon it, but flexibility and the application of the tenets of airpower provided the basis for adaptation. Also included will be an examination of the fierce rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine senior leadership and how this interfered with the conduct of countersea operations. Luftwaffe organization during World War II provided a more than adequate basis for conducting the countersea campaign. The adaptability of the operational and support structure allowed the Luftwaffe to accomplish a variety of missions, even as their aircraft and weapons were proving deficient. Finally, the Luftwaffe was at the forefront of innovation in the field of aviation technology, including airframe and weapon development. Once again, interference by senior leadership and equipment teething problems combined with increasing Allied attacks cost the Luftwaffe precious time.
With the collapse of France in 1940, American (US) and British (UK) leadership became keenly aware that the continued security of their nations required the defeat of the Axis powers, particularly Germany. The Allies chose a strategy utilizing a combination of various military actions, most notably a combined bomber offensive (CBO). The CBO would be carried out through a combination of US daylight precision and UK night area bombing.The purpose of this paper is to show why the Allies chose this strategy and evaluate its success. To accomplish this task, the paper will first describe the events that brought about the conflict and the strategy. Crowl's Questions are used as a framework to analyze the factors that influence strategy development and adoption and will illustrate why Allied leaders chose this path. This is followed by a detailed description of the campaign. The principles of war (mass, objective, offensive, maneuver, surprise, security, simplicity, unity of command, and economy of force) are accepted as proven methods for employing forces in combat and are used to evaluate the CBO's effectiveness The paper closes with a summary of the findings and doctrinal implications.The paper will show the Allies adopted US daylight precision and UK night area bombing based on leadership's belief that it could most effectively reduce Germany's means of war and hasten its earliest possible defeat. The Allies successfully achieved this objective primarily through adherence to the principles of mass, objective, offensive, and maneuver.
This research paper examines how special operations were conducted in Yugoslavia during WWII; how did the operational art conducted fit into Allied grand strategy; and how effective were these operations? These operations were conducted using multinational, coalition forces, and for this reason the lessons from this examination are relevant to warriors today.Conducting military operations almost always involve a scarcity of forces. This scarcity forces difficult decisions in development of strategic goals and conduct of operations. This difficulty is further compounded when coalition forces involve multiple nations, each with their own priorities. This is the situation that existed in WWII. The US wanted a concentrated invasion of NW Europe, while Britain and Russia were interested in a multi-front battle of attrition against the Axis, featuring a Balkan invasion. There were inadequate forces to commit to an invasion of the Balkans, but there was an opportunity to divert Axis strength from other fronts. This paper will look at Allied operations in Yugoslavia (typical Balkan operations) and analyze: 1.) the unique contextual factors influencing special operations in the Balkans during WWII, 2.) operational art factors of this unconventional employment of airpower in the politically divided region, and 3.) the success and/or failure of military planners and commanders in deriving military from strategic objectives and in attaining these objectives.The analysis and conclusions will examine the logic and congruence of these operations to the respective strategy and will highlight contextual influences (aircraft and equipment capabilities, weather, logistics) on the success of these operations to meet the strategic objective.
Operation Rösselprung And The Elimination Of Tito, 25 May 1944: A Failure In Planning And Intelligence Supportby Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre
Operation RÖSSELPRUNG was a Second World War German operation conducted in Bosnia, which aimed at eliminating the leadership of the Partisan movement, namely Marshal Josip-Broz Tito. It was a direct action raid, which involved an airborne (parachute and glider) assault by 500 SS Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Battalion on the suspected site of Tito's Headquarters and a subsequent linkup with the German XV Mountain Corps converging from all directions.Operation RÖSSELPRUNG failed due to mediocre intelligence support and inadequate tactical level planning. Intelligence shortfalls were rooted primarily in poor German inter-organization relations and cooperation, including the sharing of intelligence, which resulted in missed opportunities and a failure to pinpoint Tito's location with sufficient precision. Given the quality of intelligence provided, the plan for the airborne assault did not include sufficient flexibility for the execution of contingencies.There are three major conclusions from the failure of this operation that can be applied to contemporary operations of a similar nature:The first deals with tactics to be employed in the face of uncertain intelligence. The degree of intelligence certainty is critical in determining both the size of the force and the extent of the objective area in a direct action raid.The second is the requirement for contingency planning. Contingency planning provides commanders with flexibility once an operation has commenced to deal with the unexpected, and is especially vital in the face of uncertain intelligence.The third, and probably most critical, concerns the importance of interagency intelligence cooperation. It is vital that different intelligence organizations that are pursuing a similar goal, especially in the same theatre of operations, cooperate to the greatest extent possible.
During the World War II campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues largely neglected by historians.This study analyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine, operational setting, and historical information.Historical military police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting.Historical information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Array military police overall effectiveness and value in Operation Iceberg.
The U.S. National Security Strategy is the basis of a preventive solution through global engagement, which fosters international interoperability and cooperation to defeat complex asymmetric threats. The study examined how U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) can advance this interoperability and cooperation, and identified three evolving roles; Strike Force, Warrior Diplomats, and Global Scouts. As they transition into the 21st century, the central research question is: will U.S. Army Special Forces need to redefine themselves in terms of mission, doctrine, training, or organization as a result of their evolving roles conditioned by an asymmetric threat environment?The study examined the relevance of core, collateral, and emerging missions. It concluded that basic SF doctrine remains sound, but the changing environment and evolving roles of SF will call for a certain amount of refinement. Tactics, techniques, and procedures will change as new technologies are introduced into SF organizations, but emphasis on the human element remains essential, and SF core competencies and warrior skills must be preserved.The study concluded with recommendations to preserve the relevance and efficiency of SF as the premier mechanism for extending U.S. influence in a world of increased global interaction, required to meet security needs.
The Falaise Pocket. World War II Allied Encirclement Of The German Armies.: Failure Or Success Of The Allied Leadership And Planning?by Major Braden Delauder
By Aug. 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early Aug., Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the 'Ultra' intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket.To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of Aug., Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket.I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn't Eisenhower get involved?The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket's gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.
Precision bombing of military targets was a reality in World War II by the end of 1943. By February, 1945, the war in Europe was nearly over. Why, then at that Tate date, was the city of Dresden destroyed by allied firebombing? In addressing this quest ion, the Dresden case study examines the evolution of bombing practices on both sides during the war in Europe. Both British and American bombing policies are scrutinized. Objectives, both military and political served by the Dresden bombing, are explained. Public reaction to the bombings in the U.K. and the U.S. are discussed as well as the reaction of both Governments to those reactions. Finally, the study examines the doctrine of Just War, draws conclusions and provides commentary.
British and Allied memoirs and histories have contributed to the rise of three myths concerning the discovery and employment of radar. These myths are as follows. The first myth is that Sir Robert Watson-Watt is the father and sole inventor of radar. The second is that Germany's discovery and realization of radar's military worth occurred after 1940 following exposure to British systems. The third myth gives radar the pivotal role in the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain.To deflate these myths the origin of radar is traced from James Maxwell's discovery of radio waves to early radar theorists and inventors. Their role in the story of radar illuminates and contributes to the deflation of the radar myths.Both the rebirth of the Luftwaffe and evolution of the R.A.F. during the 1920's and 1930's shows how each service independently arrived at the development of radar technology for different reasons. In 1939 Germany possessed some of the world's best and most enduring radar designs, as well as essential navigation and bombing aids. England's Chain Home radar was a dead end technology with serious shortcomings, but was skillfully melded to an innovative command and control system. The illumination of German radar achievements and a balanced analysis of British defensive systems essentially deflates the radar myths.
Aviation physiology is a highly relevant field to flyers of unpressurized aircraft that flew at altitudes in excess of 25,000 feet. Crew members had to contend with severe environmental factors while flying long bombing missions during WWII. The limits of human physiology must be the main concern of any battle plan involving flyers and fatality/mortality rates should be the primary focus in evaluating the success or failure of such a plan. The purpose of this research project is to determine if human factors were overlooked intentionally or by accident. If they were overlooked unintentionally, then what was done to resolve the physiological problems of the aircrews? The project will also underscore the continued need to address the human machine during any plan in today's demanding aviation environment.Chapter one explores whether or not the limits of the human being was taken into account when the WWII bombing planners developed AWPD-1. It provides an insight into why AWPD-1 was created without regard to the aircrew members, and how this neglect could have possibly been remedied. Chapter two examines the machines of the day, in particular the B-17, to see if it was ready to carry out the assigned missions envisioned by the war planners. The early wartime experience of the B-17 by the Royal Air Force was disappointing, but nevertheless it was looked upon by the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) as the ultimate bomber that could complete any assignment. This chapter also provides some insight into a "typical" mission the B-17 aircrew had to endure and the aircraft's ability to carry out the assigned bombing missions. Chapter three deals with the physiological problems experienced by the aircrews and what was done to alleviate them. Chapter four focuses on the non-combat accident rates of the Eighth Air Force, what they meant, and how the leadership reacted to them.
The Enemy Objectives Unit In World War II:: Selecting Targets for Aerial Bombardment That Support The Political Purpose Of Warby Major Brian P. Ballew
In June of 1942, Eighth Air Force deployed to the UK and began preparation for a bombing campaign. However, during the initial planning efforts it became apparent the staff lacked the expertise needed to analyze and recommend bombing targets. Colonel Richard Hughes, the Chief Planner for American Air Forces in Europe, recognized this deficiency and requested a team to assist with target selection. The Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), a team of civilian economists, began arriving in London in September 1942 to support the Eighth Air Force.While formally assigned to the US Embassy in London, for practical purposes the team worked for Colonel Hughes. Using their economic expertise, EOU members studied the German industrial complex to identify vulnerabilities and then recommend to planners and senior leaders those industries the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe should target. Taking an effects-based approach, the team sought to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of US airpower to produce the greatest effects on Germany's war economy.The EOU's target selection methodology required intelligence data on enemy targets, an awareness of United States Army Air Forces bombing capabilities, and most importantly an understanding of military and political aims. To ensure selected targets aligned with military and political aims, the EOU regularly collaborated with air planning staffs and senior leaders. Three case studies highlight the interaction and collaboration that occurred between the EOU and Army Air Forces planners and leaders: prioritizing targets for Operation POINTBLANK, development of an Oil Plan following "Big Week" in Feb. 1944, and the recommendation to strike bridges versus marshaling yards prior to Operation OVERLORD. Each of these case studies demonstrates that the integration and cooperation between the EOU and air force leaders and planning staffs ensured that targets selected for aerial bombardment supported political and military objectives.
The American primary tank in the Second World War was inferior to its German counterpart for all but the final months of the war. The U.S. tank evolved and demonstrated its superiority to the world in Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. This monograph examines the evolution of America's primary tank in the years between 1945 and 1991 focusing on three periods: the Second World War, the Korean War, and the 1973 Arab Israeli War. Each period examines the adversary, America's industrial capabilities, and the combat environment. Describing the adversary highlights there is a tangible threat to U.S. armored forces. In the face of this threat, the United States remained capable of building new more complicated and more expensive tanks, which demonstrates the industrial endowment required to meet the demands of the threat. An examination of the combat environment reveals why the U.S. Army and its armor force seemed so fixated on Europe as the next war's first battlefield.Ultimately, this paper serves to demonstrate that a tank series, such as the M1 Abrams family, is a required component in the U.S. Army's combined arms arsenal. As such, it is important that the aging Abrams, having served the Army in Operation Desert Storm and the Global War on Terror, continue to evolve in preparation for the next war.
This study investigates the German spring offensive of 1918 to determine how the Germans achieved tactical success, yet failed to reach their strategic objective. The study covers the development of new German infantry tactics during limited offensive operations and conduct of the "elastic defense" on the western front It investigates the development of artillery tactics on the eastern front, and the incorporation of these artillery and infantry tactics into larger scale offensives at Caporetto. The study describes the preparation of both the infantry and artillery units for the "Michael" offensive. The relationship between the infantry and artillery tactics combined with the British defense is the key to determine the causes for success and failure.The German tactical system used in "Operation Michael" was a brilliant adaptation to the lethality of the World War I battlefield. The German techniques were superb tools for conducting a breakthrough of a defensive zone. However, the lack of German mobility following the breakthrough foiled the German strategic goal to envelop the British Army.German techniques and lessons learned in this offensive have direct application to U.S. Army infiltration doctrine.