- Table View
- List View
One of the most valuable by-products of the commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of our War between the States, or Civil War, has been the bringing to light of narratives of personal experiences in the war written by surviving veterans of the Confederate and Union armies. Such narratives, though sometimes somewhat at variance with the formal, official reports made by commanding officers, provide an impressive and often vivid picture of the ups and downs of actual army life as experienced by the man in the ranks. He may not have had at all times a very clear idea of the strategy involved in the movements he was making, but he knew exactly how he was personally affected by these movements, and his warm-blooded and uninhibited account of the campaigns and battles in which he was engaged provides some of the most important and valuable raw material for the historical researcher and writer.A particularly engaging narrative of this kind is that of Sergeant Newton Cannon of Williamson County, Tennessee. He came of distinguished ancestry...His grandfather, Newton Cannon, had been a militia colonel in the Creek War, later serving as a member of Congress and as Governor of Tennessee. His father had served in the Seminole War in Florida, where he was wounded; and, as Mr. Cannon took pride in recalling, his own son, Newton Cannon, Jr., served in the Spanish-American War, and his younger son took part in World War I.A month before his sixteenth birthday in 1862, Sergeant Cannon enlisted in Company I of the 11th Tennessee Cavalry of the Confederate Army, which was organized in Williamson County by his double first cousin, Captain Thomas F. Perkins, Jr. He served throughout the war with this company, seeing active service under General Nathan Bedford Forrest and General Joe Wheeler, and he was the company's First Sergeant when, with the remnant of Forrest's command, he surrendered and was paroled at Gainesville, Alabama, in 1865.
Includes 12 maps, 12 photos and 2 charts.THE seminal study of the Allied large scale airdrops of the Second World War in the European Theater."The first combat airborne missions in history were flown by the Germans in 1940. Recognizing the possibilities of such operations, the British and Americans followed suit. The first British mission was flown in February 1941, and the first American mission was flown from England to Oran, Algeria, on 8 November 1942 as part of the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. Other, later missions, principally in the Mediterranean region, provided the American troop carriers with an apprenticeship in airborne warfare. However, until the summer of 1944 no force larger than a reinforced regimental combat team was flown into action in any Allied mission. In World War II the only Allied airborne operations employing more than one division took place in the invasion of Normandy, the unsuccessful attempt to win a bridgehead across the Rhine at Arnhem, and the successful crossing of the Rhine at Wesel. Consequently the study of airborne missions in the European Theater of Operations is of particular importance for the light it throws on the planning and performance of large-scale airborne assaults."
Japan's decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo's decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace?Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan's decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Two successful and two unsuccessful senior Allied Army combat leaders are studied to discern whether there are important differences in the qualities and abilities, they demonstrated in combat. The methodology used was to examine materials on the leaders for examples demonstrating courage, determination, coup d'œil, presence of mind, strength of will, and sense of locality--qualities and abilities which Carl von Clausewitz thought important. Any other qualities or abilities which appeared important in the cases studied were also noted. The study, however, represents an initial exploratory look. It is qualitative and judgmental, not quantitative and empirical. It was found that the successful leaders demonstrated a balance of qualities and abilities while the unsuccessful ones either lacked a balance or demonstrated some fatal flaw. Further study by other researchers is recommended.
This paper traces the development of close air support (CAS) by the United States Marine Corps in World War II. The study examines how the Marines started developing their doctrine in the 1930s and adapted their (CAS) system based on the outcome of battles on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, as well as during operations in support of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of Marine CAS doctrine, liaison organizational structures, aircraft, and air-to-ground weapons. This study is pertinent because it describes how the Marines developed a very effective weapon that greatly increased the potency of its amphibious operations. Additionally, this was initially accomplished during a period of very limited financial resources (before the start of World War II) and then limited time resources (during the war crisis). This study also shows how the Marines worked to support the forces on the ground with the best CAS system possible despite the opposition.
This thesis evaluates leadership in the 761st Tank Battalion and the 92d Division, two black units during World War II. Leaders in each unit were evaluated on their ability to use the following leadership model: technical skills (job experience, technical competence, and the ability to correlate facts into meaningful information); conceptual skills (vision and the ability to task organize to accomplish the mission); and interpersonal skills (job related standards and the ability to foster mutual trust and respect) to influence combat effectiveness.The analysis showed that the leaders in the 761st Tank Battalion demonstrated skills in the leadership model effectively and especially were successful in demonstrating interpersonal skills. Its successful combat record supports that its leaders were effective. On the other hand, the leaders in the 92d Division failed to properly demonstrate the skills of the leadership model. The lack of interpersonal skills used by leaders in the division (developing trust and mutual respect) was the major cause of the unit's combat failures.This study showed that despite negative beliefs about Negro soldiers there were some leaders who effectively applied interpersonal leadership skills in the interest of mission accomplishment.
This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission.The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort.These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.
A revolutionary tradition did not exist in the Imperial German Army. But during the years 1918-1944 events occurred which produced such an impact on the moral fibre of the German Officer Corps that eventually a few of them participated in a conspiracy against Hitler. This work seeks only to throw light on those aspects of German military history that portray the gradual disintegration of the monolithic structure of the German Army that occurred prior to 20 July 1944.The study has been divided into four major parts: the revolutionary days following the defeat of World War I, 1918-1920; the development of the Reichswehr and the rise to power of Hitler, 1920-1933; the transition from Reichswehr to Wehrmacht, 1933-1938; and the period of active opposition to Hitler, 1938-1944. The analysis, generally, follows a chronological course, and results in an examination of those events which influenced the German officers who were the field commanders of World War II.In this tragedy, it would appear that the German Officer Corps was less to blame for its actions--or lack of action within the broader framework of the German nation--than has often been believed to be the case, primarily because the actions of the officers were often the result of factors beyond the control of soldiers. Such a conclusion may be at variance with that of other writers on the subject. The weight of evidence examined, however, will not support a different conclusion, particularly when one analyzes the conduct of tactical units at Field Army and lower echelons of command.In this century the soldiers of the German Army have undergone two severe tests. It remains only for history to establish the answer to this question: Has this been the German Army's guilt or the German Army's fate?
A study of General Walton H. Walker's career offers a lens through which to view the evolution of Army training doctrine, revealing its strengths and weaknesses over a period of nearly four decades. However, an understanding of the skills necessary to train units for combat cannot consist solely of a review of training doctrine. General Walker's career provides valuable insights into the real-world challenges a leader experienced training an Army unit, both in war and in peacetime. The resource constraints, political realities, and physical hardships that make Army training so difficult to accomplish with skill and foresight cannot be gleaned from classroom lectures or the pages of a journal or doctrinal publication. Further, an analysis of the breakout and pursuit Walker's XX Corps executed in Normandy, and later the performance of the Eighth Army during the first weeks of combat in Korea, reveal how General Walker applied contemporary training principles to develop combat formations that performed exceptionally well in combat. Finally, a review of current training principles demonstrates that Walker emphasized the same principles throughout his career that retain primacy in today's Army. This reveals Walker's lasting legacy: in addition to performing among the best of the Army's commanders in combat, Walker set himself apart as one of the leading trainers in U.S. Army history.
The U.S. Navy is building Virginia class submarines, and recently completed the conversion of four Ohio class submarines from Trident Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN's) to Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs). The Virginia class is the first nuclear powered fast attack submarine (SSN) that shipyards designed with SOF capability without requiring conversion. The SSGN conversion of the first four Ohio class submarines included substantial SOF capability. These construction and conversion projects represent a significant investment in SOF and amphibious capabilities, and they follow a long line of submarine conversions that began early in World War II. By analyzing three World War II operations, this monograph argues that knowing what actually happened in amphibious operations conducted and supported by American submarines in World War II provides valuable insight about the scope of capabilities, challenges and benefits of submarines for these kinds of missions in naval warfare. The first operation is an amphibious raid on Makin Atoll. The second involves the amphibious landings on the northwest Africa coast as part of Operation Torch. The final operation includes the landings on Attu Island in the Aleutian chain.
HALE’S HANDFUL...UP FROM THE ASHES:: The Forging Of The Seventh Air Force From The Ashes Of Pearl Harbor To The Triumph Of V-J Dayby Major Peter S. H. Ellis USAF
This study analyzes the evolution of Seventh Air Force's joint command and control relationships as well as the development of joint operational procedures and doctrine in the Central Pacific during World War II. As this was arguably the most "joint" theater in World War II, there are many lessons about the challenges of joint command and control and the development of joint combat procedures that are relevant to contemporary airmen.The Seventh Air Force was established in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was initially a defensive and training oriented command--protecting Hawaii from a possible attack by the Japanese and training replacement crews for units in the South Pacific. However, in the summer of 1943, the Seventh Air Force became an offensive, mobile combat command that, along with each of the other services, played a major role in the island-hopping campaign of World War II. Major General Willis H. Hale served as the commander of the Seventh Air Force during this transition period. This study uses him as a lens to explore the unique challenges his command met and overcame. Additionally, since the Pacific Theater was on the tail end of the "Europe First" resupply policy, the Seventh Air Force was chronically under-manned and under-equipped--hence the moniker "Hale's Handful."
An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943by Major Charles L. Crow
This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in the deliberate defense at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units.The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatibility of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of various accounts.The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.
One of the techniques to understanding the successful choreography of the elements of strategy is the study of the great strategists of history. This worthy endeavor, however, should not be limited to the study of success. Many significant lessons concerning the components of strategy can only be derived from studying the examples of great strategic failure. Erich Ludendorff failed as a strategic leader. This case study traces the genesis of his failure in the context of his inability to properly coordinate the elements of strategy. It is an analysis of the process which led to his failure. An appreciation of his background and heritage reveals the nature of his values and prejudices which accompanied him to the strategic level. An analysis of his strategic development links his character with his personal experiences at the different levels of leadership. Finally an essay of his work as a strategic leader is diagrammed in terms of his character, his development and the strategic environment of the times. Collectively, this diversified group of inputs, some complimentary, others often in direct competition, serve to identify the base from which his strategic decisions were made. The value of this study becomes apparent as the errors suddenly become glaring and the student finds himself learning from the strategic solution that in fact led to failure.
How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetryby Major Dale S. Ringler
This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.
A. T. Mahan's 1890 book The Influence of Sea Power on History presented a theory of sea power that proclaimed the capital ship-centered battle fleet essential to any great maritime nation's long-term prosperity. Mahan also formulated a beguilingly simple operational concept based on the teachings of Jomini. His ideas quickly became dogma in the world's navies, including the U.S. Navy. In the decades before World War I, the U.S. Navy's force structure and operational plans reflected Mahan's emphasis on the battleship and fighting as a concentrated fleet.The naval conflict between Germany and Great Britain in World War I did not resemble Mahan's vision for what war at sea between two great powers should look like. Rather than consisting of decisive battles between fleets of capital ships, the War involved distant blockade, raids, mining, and especially commerce raiding by German submarines. Mahan's rival theorist, Sir Julian Corbett, better described the character of World War I.Despite the advantage of almost three years of observing the European conflict, the U.S. Navy did little to prepare for this new kind of war. It entered the War in April, 1917 with a "top-heavy" force of battleships, and operational plans completely unsuited to the anti-submarine conflict it would undertake. This monograph attempts to determine the effects of World War I, a decidedly non-Mahanian war, on the U.S. Navy's force structure and operational planning. These variables manifest the Navy's ends, ways, and means, and thus shed light on the theoretical underpinnings of the Navy's policy.
In September 2004, the Intelligence Science Board, an advisory board appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, initiated the Study on Educing Information (EI). This study is an ongoing effort to review what is known scientifically about interrogation and other forms of human intelligence collection and to chart a path to the future.As part of our efforts, we have worked closely with faculty and students of the National Defense Intelligence College. The NDIC Press published Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future, a book based on Phase I of the Study on EI. Three students, Special Agent James Stone, U.S. Air Force; Special Agent David Shoemaker, U.S. Air Force; and Major Nicholas Dotti, U.S. Army, completed master's thesis studies during Academic Year 2006-07 on topics related to interrogation. Each thesis is a remarkable and useful document.Special Agent Stone researched U.S. efforts during World War II to develop language and interrogation capacities to deal with our Japanese enemy. He found that military leaders, often working with civilian counterparts, created and implemented successful strategies, building on cultural and linguistic skills that substantially aided the war effort for the U.S. and its Allies.Special Agent Shoemaker studied the experiences of three successful interrogators during the Vietnam War. Like S/A Stone, S/A Shoemaker suggests that policymakers and practitioners have much to learn from professionals who served effectively for years in the field educing information. And like Stone, Shoemaker highlights the importance of a deep understanding of the language, psychology, and culture of adversaries and potential allies in other countries.
The Maoist-inspired Communist Party of the Philippines celebrated its 37th anniversary on December 2005. It marks a long history of violence, terror, and instability in the archipelagic country of 87 million people, causing thousands of casualties among government troops, insurgents, and including civilians. This study seeks to find a lasting solution that will finally bring to a close the final chapter to insurgency in the country. It was approached from a historical point of view by studying the events that lead to the birth of the movement in 1932 until its defeat in 1954. A new chapter of the Maoist insurgency started in 1969 and this movement emerged into a formidable guerrilla force that became the primary threat to the nation's security. This paper tries to analyze how that insurgency persisted to challenge the government this far and what went wrong with the government's response. It will attempt to answer the primary question: How to defeat the communist insurgency?
With the development of the "long war," the U.S. military's focus has shifted dramatically from its traditional emphasis on conventional operations to irregular and indirect approaches to safeguard America's vital interests. One of the least understood aspects of Irregular Warfare is Unconventional Warfare (UW), which includes operations conducted through, with or by indigenous forces and provides the U.S. with an indirect means of accomplishing its objectives.This thesis examines the current ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct UW with air support, specifically air support provided by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This thesis examines the questions--Does AFSOC currently have airpower assets with the capability to support UW operations with mobility, resupply, and fires?Three case studies were used to examine airpowers role in UW: Allied support to the French resistance in WWII, United States support to the Hmong during the conflict in Laos and a hypothetical scenario using AFSOC's current capabilities. The three case studies were examined using the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort. The analysis found that AFSOC could currently support UW operations, but effectiveness would be limited by a number of factors.
This study examines the campaigns of Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte and William T. Sherman. By analyzing the influences of the logistics policies and practices employed during these campaigns common underlying logistics principles are identified. The resultant logistics principles are then codified into a logistics paradigm to be used when developing and managing operational level logistics.Using an analysis schema that employs inductive reasoning, principles of historical analysis and critical thinking, each of the three campaigns is analyzed to identify events of interest. The events of interest are specific occurrences during the campaign when what occurred was directly influenced by logistics or logistics, policies and practices were influenced by what occurred. Using a modified version of the Threads of Continuity approach to the study of history, four key logistics principles are identified: centralized control/decentralized execution, flexibility, the proper application of technology, and understand the environment.The four principles are then codified into a general logistics paradigm. The viability and the application of the paradigm are discussed. Additionally, previous logistics principles from different authors are described and compared to the paradigm offered in this thesis.
Includes 8 maps and more than 20 illustrationsArmies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
The seminal treatise on Generalship, by Major-General Fuller, reputed to have been the most formative book in General Patton's military training which he kept with him at all times."IN the summer of 1921 I was lunching at the Restaurant la Rue with the Deputy Chief of the French General staff when he told me the following story:At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried into a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating.One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking up a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table.Just as he had finished, in rushed an aide-de-camp, shouting: 'Is General Clement here?'Clement, hearing him, sat up and exclaimed: 'No! but Colonel Clement is.''Oh, mon général,' cried the aide-de-camp, embracing him, 'the Emperor was overwhelmed when we heard of your gallantry, and has promoted you on the field of battle to the rank of General,'Clement rubbed his eyes, got off the table, clapped the top of his skull on his head and was about to leave the farm, when Larrey shouted after him: 'Mon général--your brains!' To which the gallant Frenchman, increasing his speed, shouted back: 'Now that I am a general I shall no longer require them!'In this modest study, my object is to prove that, though Clement was wrong about brains, without his courage there can be no true generalship."-Foreword.
The urgent requirement for US Army preparedness in conducting urban operations (UO) is very real. As global urbanization continues to increase, the contemporary threat environment makes operations in cities impossible to avoid. The past decade has demonstrated through the American experiences in Mogadishu and Russian experiences in Grozny, less capable forces will attempt to use urban terrain asymmetrically to even the balance of power against technologically superior military forces.While we have always had a serious requirement to conduct urban operations, the very nature of the cold war, which was successful by its deterrence, prevented us from ever having to face the reality of fighting such urban engagements. In the post-cold war era, the U.S. Army is forced to face the realities of fighting in the urban environment. It is not enough to speak of preparing for "future urban operations"; the future is here today and the Army must be prepared to engage in urban operations even as it moves towards the objective force. Being prepared means having solid doctrine, realistic training programs and facilities, and appropriate equipment to ensure success on the urban battlefield when the time comes to fight there.
The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the "cult of the offensive" by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower's professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences?The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force's air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one's actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.
A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian "Intifada" or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13th, 1993.Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios.
This study examines the historical record and primary source of conflict between the armed services over the issue of the effective employment of close air support during the Korean War. The study considers the impact of the single air asset manager on CAS employment during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The disagreement examined and explained in this study is the distinction and desire between the Navy-Marines control system and the Army-Air Force control system. The author evaluates the development of service and joint doctrine and the arguments over centralized and decentralized command and control in the execution of the air war. The thesis emphasizes CAS issues during the Korean War using General Keith B. McCutcheon's writings and papers as a guide to develop and understand CAS employment, methodology, and effectiveness from World War II through Vietnam. The Korean War period significantly shaped the persistent argument concerning CAS employment among Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers and its value to a winning strategy. This study emphasizes General McCutcheon views on CAS employment and how he provided a template for cooperation during the Philippines Campaign. Cooperation and coordination as well as the role of doctrine are the primary themes throughout this study. Doctrine, and coordination and cooperation are necessary tools to develop the most effective means of employing CAS.