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A Great War - More Worthy Of Relation Than Any That Had Preceded It: The Peloponnesian War As A Rosetta Stone For Joint Warfare And Operational Artby Cmdr Kevin M. McGowan
The study of military history is a vital component of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as a complement to the study of Joint Doctrine. The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (JMOHC) illustrates principles of Joint Doctrine and Joint Force Employment through historical and modern example of U.S. Joint Force Operations.Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War is recognized dogmatically as a definitive text with regard to the study of National Strategy and Policy, international relations, and political science. In addition to being the first true military historian, many regard Thucydides as the father of the study of International Relations, and the first writer in the intellectual tradition of Realism. This paper proposes that Thucydides history of the 27 year long Peloponnesian War is not only important to Strategic level of military studies, but is equally applicable to the military studies at the Operational level of war. Thucydides history is the first account of complex Joint Military Operations (JMO) in a major conflict between the joint forces (land and sea) of multi-national coalitions fighting in multiple theaters (sometimes simultaneously) across multiple domains. This paper will demonstrate that the fundamentals of Joint Force Employment were clearly validated in the Peloponnesian War as the outcome at key decisive points (Major Operations) was ultimately determined by superior (or inferior) operational execution when examined within the frameworks of the Principles of War and Center of Gravity at the Operational level.Finally, this paper will draw conclusions as to which principles of Joint Force Employment were the most determinant in the Peloponnesian War and draw lessons learned based upon these conclusions as to the enduring importance of the Principles of War and Operational Art for Joint Force Planning and Joint Force Employment in the modern era.
This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), final peace accords, and brought order to a failed state. The paper will explore the following points: what was the British foreign policy and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene; what was the British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone; did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique; why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn? Beyond the scope of this paper is a comparison of United Kingdom (UK) COIN doctrine and current United States (US) COIN doctrine. The focus will be to analyze the UK's actions against their doctrine, not the doctrine of the US. There is one major assumption for this case study. The paper categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for the assumption is current day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war torn failed state, Sierra Leone has lasting peace, completed disarmament of insurgent forces, ended the large scale human rights abuse, and democratic elections, not coups, determining the leadership of the country.
This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of the British and American campaign strategies in the Southern Campaign of the War for American Independence. After over four and one-half years of inconclusive fighting in America, the British government developed a plan to restore Royal control of the American South where large numbers of Loyalist Americans were expected to rally in support of the Crown. Control of the southern provinces would allow the British army to isolate the North where the rebellion was strongest. In May 1780, the American army of the South surrendered to a British army at Charlestowne, South Carolina. The Americans raised a new army in the South, but it too was decisively defeated at Camden, South Carolina, in August 1780. American prospects in the Southern Department appeared bleak until the arrival of Nathanael Greene in December 1780. Despite a scarcity of resources, Greene rebuilt the American southern army and fought an inspired campaign of compound warfare to counter the expanding British control of the Carolinas. Lord Cornwallis led the British army on a protracted pursuit of Greene's forces across North Carolina following the American victory at Cowpens in January 1781. The British army, operating well beyond its supply lines, was exhausted by the pursuit of Greene. Despite winning a narrow tactical victory at Guilford Courthouse in March of 1781, the British force was rendered operationally ineffective. Cornwallis withdrew to Virginia where he would ultimately be trapped at Yorktown.This thesis demonstrates the application of operational design using the British and American strategies in the Southern Campaign as a historical case study. The methodology for this study is based on the linkages between ends, ways, and means through the elements of operational design. Nathanael Greene ultimately succeeded because he implemented a strategy that was designed to match his means to his ends.
The military organization of nation states and their employment of armies are central aspects of early modern European history. The seventeenth century was particularly a period of transformation that witnessed drastic change in armies' preparation for and execution of military campaigns. To date, historians have tended to overlook military development as it occurred in the British Isles. Yet Britain offers the historian an interesting subject for the examination of first, how emerging ideas of military organization, doctrine, and strategy were transmitted from the European continent; and second, how British soldiers demonstrated their familiarity with contemporary military practice through the conduct of campaigns.The evidence of military publications within Britain, as well as the experience of British soldiers overseas, indicates that English and Scottish soldiers grappled with the important tenets of the continental military revolution. The campaign strategies employed by British military commanders during the Second Bishops' War of 1640 and the English Civil War of 1642-1646 were undoubtedly complex and reflective of the confused political conditions of the period. Nonetheless, British soldiers attempted to fight and to win using a contemporary, thoroughly European understanding of warfare.
The American Indian policy, formulated at the turn of the 19th century, significantly impacted the national military strategy. President Jefferson's plan for Indian removal became the cornerstone for federal policy. Congress would bear the responsibility for crafting the nation's Indian policies, but the burden for execution was left to an unprepared and undermanned Army.From the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the principal mission of the Army was fighting Indians. Returning to the Western frontier the Army attempted to fight the Indians using the tactics that proved successful in the Civil War. The diverse Great Plains tribes, using raids and ambushes, successfully fought a thirty-year war against a superior military force. It would finally take the unorthodox tactics of several field commanders to bring an end to the fighting.This paper examines the national policy and the means used to implement it. The paper examines asymmetrical warfare through its discussion on critical shortcomings in military preparedness and strategy. The past several conflicts that U.S. military forces have participated in (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) suggest that the American Indian Wars offer valuable strategic lessons.
Leadership is an intensely studied subject, and a considerable number of models exist. By reviewing four leadership theories, two German, one British, and one American, a model developed that contained the enduring interrelated tenets of courage, judgment, determination, integrity, vision, and luck.George Washington displayed considerable ability in all these. He had tremendous courage both in battle and in his conviction of a victorious outcome of the war. His judgment above the tactical level was exceptional, and, from limited resources, he developed a standing army and a defensive military strategy, both of which became the cornerstone of victory. He continually frustrated the British. Throughout all the stresses of the war, Washington remained a man of integrity while pursuing a vision of a free and fair republic. His lack of resources forced him to be unconventional. This he achieved by seeking out as much information as possible, so that every favorable opportunity could be exploited and every unfavorable one avoided.William Howe displayed a limited ability in all the aforementioned tenets. Although brave, he lacked the moral conviction required to prosecute an aggressive military campaign. His tactical judgment was good, if ponderous, but he failed to develop this into operational or strategic success. In particular, he failed to focus to destroy Washington's army. Consequently, his efforts lacked tenacity, and he became distracted while showing limited integrity by setting a poor example. His focus became purely his army, rather than his area of responsibility as a whole. His limited vision was consistently complicated by his dual role as both military leader and diplomat, and he failed to address either with vigor. His frustration saw him use slow and conventional tactics which were unsuited to the circumstances, while he consistently failed to exploit his opportunities.
Hilariously funny, An American Werewolf In Hoboken takes you on a laugh-out-loud roller-coaster ride from beginning to end, as Max Adams, one strong alpha male, finds himself at the mercy of a woman who thinks he's a big fluffy dog. USA Today bestselling paranormal romance author Dakota Cassidy takes you on an erotic journey as Max seduces his mate, who just happens to be his human owner, at least according to the local dog pound. Dog by day, man by night, things can't get any more complicated...or can they? An American Werewolf In Hoboken is Book 1 in Dakota Cassidy's Wolf Mates series. This is one romantic comedy you don't want to miss.Wooing a life mate can be hard enough for a wolf, wooing one while under the threat of a curse, even more so.Wooing a mate while pretending to be her dog? Nearly impossible.After being drugged and captured by Animal Control, Max Adams is on Hoboken's doggie death row when his life mate adopts him, takes him home, and promptly names him Fluffy. While JC, in all her new-pet-owner-ness, feeds "Fluffy" vile kibble, dresses him in mortifying dog couture, and schedules to have his manhood removed, Max's human side gets to know JC. Especially in the biblical sense.Hopefully well enough to make her fall madly in love, mate with him under the full moon, and move with him to Cedar Glen to live happily-ever-after forever and ever amen. And fast.Because the curse comes with a deadline...and the clock is ticking.Dear readers: Please note, this book, originally published in 2006 with a small e-press, has been updated, revised, expanded, and in general, beaten into a whole new submission. If some of my earliest readers recognize the general concept, I hope you'll enjoy the new, expanded version of this series."Dakota never disappoints!" MaryJanice Davidson, New York Times bestselling author.This paranormal romantic comedy contains humor, shifters, werewolves, and LOL fun. An American Werewolf In Hoboken is not intended for readers under the age of 18.Previously Published: (2014) Dakota Cassidy | (2006) Changeling Press.
When sword for hire Teodoro Ciéza de Vivar accepts a commission to "rescue" Lord Christian Blackwood from unsuitable influences, he has no idea he's landed himself in the middle of a plot to assassinate King Philip IV of Spain and blame the English ambassador for the deed. Nor does he expect the spoiled child he's sent to retrieve to be a handsome, engaging young man. As Teodoro and Christian face down enemies at every turn, they fall more and more in love, an emotion they can't safely indulge with the threat of the Inquisition looming over them. It will take all their combined guile and influence to outmaneuver the powerful men who would see them separated... or even killed.
General George Washington; Exemplar-in-Chief:: A Historical Analysis Of George Washington’s Influence On The Early Continental Army And Civil Military Relationsby Major A. J. Straley
George Washington was an "Exemplar-in-Chief" who had an indelible influence on the nature and character of the early Continental Army, an influence that set the precedence and affected how the United States military would interact with civil authority under the new institution of a democratic republic.Through an analysis of the historical record there are multiple examples of George Washington's early influence in shaping the nature and character of the United States military. Today's American military is a direct descendant of the early Continental Army which fought the War for Independence, and was shaped by Washington's influence. In analyzing Washington's motives, actions, to include correspondence and court martial rulings, this study will attempt to open a window into understanding Washington's influence on the Continental Army and, therefore, the American military tradition among the officer corps to the present day.Washington was not just a Command-in-Chief, but an Exemplar-in-Chief who left a lasting impression on the American military structure, that has held strong for over two hundred years. Through his actions during the creation of the army and leading that army during the Revolution, he forever set the framework for the civil-military tradition which has never seen a credible or serious military coup. The character and nature of today's military will not permit an environment that would allow a military coup to begin. This character and nature is a direct result of the profound significance of George Washington's motives in joining the cause and his actions during the struggle. Washington's influence is not only significant.... it cemented the military subordination to civilian authority which has lasted till today.
George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American Revolution. Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods.During the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution. General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations. Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence. He directed the operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis. The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis. Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British. These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of George Washington and the actions of his operatives.
The militiaman of 1775 evolved into the regular soldier of 1783 because Americans changed their perception as to what constituted military preparedness. Political pamphlets and religious sermons had readied the colonists emotionally and intellectually to take up arms against the British. But their militia's training which stressed musket drill was inadequate and prepared them only for battle. During 1776 and 1777 Washington attempted to correct the soldiers' deficiencies and used his General Orders to train the Continental Army for war. After 1778 Washington was assisted by Steuben, who as the army's Inspector General stressed uniformity in drill and maneuver, as well as emphasizing the maintenance of equipment. Steuben's and Washington's efforts transformed the soldiers of the Continental Army into competent professionals who were able to engage successfully their European counterparts in battle while sustaining themselves in a war.
George Washington is widely recognized as one of the greatest strategic leaders in our nation's history. His ability to lead a rag-tag group of militia against the most powerful nation of his time appears to be unexplainable. Through further analysis though, one can begin to see a pattern appear that may explain why Washington's personal theory of war was so successful, and hence explain why he became such a great strategic leader. George Washington was not a particularly successful tactical leader, and his experiences in leading troops culminated prior to the Revolutionary War at the Regimental level. He went on to lead a productive life as a statesman in the Virginia legislature until the war with Britain erupted and he was cast into the role as America's first Commander in Chief. His ability to comprehend the conflict for what it was, as well as his ability to understand the will of his fellow countrymen allowed him to craft a wartime strategy for victory against the most powerful nation on earth at the time. He kept the will of the people, the tactics of the army and the desires of the state in balance to devise a strategy that would allow him to go down in history as America's first strategic leader.
Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds And The Saint Patrick’s Day Celebration On Powder River;: Battle Of Powder River (Montana, 17 March 1876)by Major Michael L. Hedegaard
The Battle of Powder River occurred on 17 March 1876 in southeastern Montana. Historians and researchers have consistently overlooked the importance of this battle on the outcome of the Great Sioux War of 1876. Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds set out to destroy the Indian camp established by the combined Cheyenne and Oglala Sioux in order to push the Indians back to the reservations and allow miners to enter the Black Hills to mine gold. Reynolds failed to accomplish this mission. The intelligence from his Indian scouts was flawed. Logistically, the soldiers were not fed, clothed, armed, or supplied for actions against the Indian tribes during the winter months. There was no written doctrine for the soldiers to follow. Tactically, Crook was delinquent because of the overconfidence in his force against the Indians. Crook failed to support Reynolds with troops, ammunition, logistics, and supplies. The outcome of this battle contributed to the defeats of Crook at the Rosebud and Custer at Little Big Horn because it caused the Indians to form a massive nation for self-preservation. Historians estimate that Crook faced more than 1,500 warriors at the Rosebud and Custer faced more than 2,500 braves at the Little Big Horn.
The partisan war in the Revolutionary War South demonstrated the vital linkage between the civil and military authorities. In the policies created to persuade the people of the righteousness of the American cause and neutralize opposition, the civil leadership of South Carolina inadvertently set the conditions for a violent civil war. The experiences derived from a century's worth of almost constant conflict, both internal and external, determined the nature of the ensuing civil war. Upon the occupation by the British in 1780, the calm that settled over the Southern colonies was brief, as British military leaders addressed the political problem in such a way as to lead to renewed revolt and an effective partisan campaign. The civil war became intertwined with the overall campaigns of the American and British forces, with the nature of the leaders having equal effect on the concurrent civil war.
Includes over 20 maps and illustrationsThe American Revolution, the Bicentennial of which we are celebrating in 1975 and 1976, was an event of utmost significance in the history of both this country and the world. It brought into being a nation, dedicated to the ideals of liberty and justice, that was destined to become, in less than two centuries, the leader of the western world. And it marked the beginning of vast changes that would sweep that western world in the century following, thrusting aside old monarchical institutions in favor of representative government and free economic institutions. Albeit fought on the battlefields much like other eighteenth century wars, it also carried within it the seeds of change in the military sphere that were to sprout and grow in the French Revolution less than two decades later. It was, in this sense, a war of transition between the epoch of limited wars fought by professional armies and people's wars fought by the "nation in arms."Our first national army, the Continental Army, was created to fight the Revolution. As the forebear of the United States Army of today, the Continental Army established many of the traditions and practices still honored in our service. The War of the American Revolution was, until Vietnam at least, the Army's longest war. It is altogether fitting and proper then that the United States Army should pay particular attention to the study of its origins during the bicentennial years and commemorate the events of the Revolution in which the Continental Army and its adjunct, the militia, participated.The purpose of this small volume is to provide a ready reference for such study and observance. The American Revolution has been intensively studied and written about in the two hundred years that have elapsed since 1775. There is much good scholarship as well as popular writing, both old and new, covering all aspects of the conflict and the political and social changes that accompanied it.
This study evaluates Confederate cavalry operations 12 June to 3 July 1862, as a prelude to and as a part of the "Seven Days Campaign." General Robert E. Lee's Seven Days Campaign succeeded in defeating a Union offensive aimed at Richmond, Virginia and served as an important turning point in the American Civil War. The thesis seeks to determine the substantive contributions General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry brigade made to this Confederate victory, as well as to assess the strengths and shortcomings of his particular style of mounted employmentStuart launched an armed reconnaissance 12-15 June 1862 known thereafter as the "Chickahominy Raid" that provided intelligence vital to General Lee's success in the campaign and helped to bolster sagging Confederate morale. This was the first of the Confederate cavalry leader's renowned "raids," a style of operation that would be adopted by other Confederate mounted units and the Union cavalry as well. Stuart also attempted to strike out independently during the Seven Days Campaign itself, but his activities in this regard were not well synchronized with the rest of Lee's army. As a result, Stuart missed opportunities to play a more decisive role in the battles outside Richmond.
This study investigates General Braxton Bragg's use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy.First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance?This study concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This study presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this "victory" at the "River of Death".
Civil War Arkansas endured many forms of irregular or guerilla warfare including activity that approached insurgency. It was a complex arena that resembles the present day and it illustrates much of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.Arkansas was a Southern state with a significant Unionist population and this divide fueled and shaped much of the conflict. Arkansas was unique in that the Confederate commander seeking to make up for conventional weakness, initiated guerilla warfare directed at Union forces. In response, Union commanders who were merely to protect lines of communication responded with punitive actions against individuals and communities which did little to reduce guerilla activity and served to alienate the local population.As the war progressed, however, guerilla bands shifted from military targets becoming progressively more terrorist, criminal, and once a Unionist state government was installed, insurgent. The Union army's role also changed as the main war moved on from the Mississippi basin and Arkansas became an early field for Lincoln's plan to reincorporate rebel states. The army's emphasis thus shifted to extending Federal authority and its organization and tactics evolved into a successful combination of locally raised troops, intelligence led operations, isolation of the guerillas, and political reconciliation.
Major General William T. Sherman commanded three field armies under a single command all having the same operational objective. Modern doctrine states that two to five field armies constitute an army group, therefore, by definition, Sherman was an army group commander. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley's actions in forming the 12th Army Group during World War Two, established modern doctrine for field army groups. Bradley chose British Field Marshall Alexander's army group as his model but could have used an American example of this type of organization by studying Sherman and the Atlanta campaign. Sherman has never been looked at before as an army group commander. This study examines Sherman and the Atlanta campaign focusing on the shaping and management of his army group. Command relationships, both personal and professional are investigated through messages, letters and orders of Sherman and his army commanders.
Lieutenant General Pete Quesada And Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Von Richthofen What Made Them Great?by Major Jeremy Kreuder
During World War II, certain air force generals demonstrated an uncommon ability to succeed on the battlefield in spite of considerable obstacles. Whether solving operational issues, developing technical innovations, or devising logistic solutions, these commanders transcended service-centric doctrine and loyalties in order to achieve their objectives. Are there common elements among their personal background, professional education, officer development, and operational experience that helps explain their success? This paper will examine two contemporary tactical airpower commanders, Lieutenant General Elwood "Pete" Quesada and Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr Von Richthofen, in an attempt to answer this important question.This study comprises an analysis of two contemporary tactical airpower commanders from World War II, Lieutenant General Elwood "Pete" Quesada and Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr Von Richthofen. It attempts to determine how they succeeded where others failed. Whether solving operational issues, developing technical innovations, or devising logistic solutions, these commanders transcended service-centric doctrine and loyalties in order to achieve their objectives. The author searches for common elements among their personal background, professional education, officer development, and operational experience that help explain their uncommon triumphs. The analysis includes both external and internal factors to determine which is dominant. The final section includes five recommendations intended for those who conduct officer accession, professional development, and promotion boards. The ultimate objective is to provide timeless criteria that transcend technological advancements and the changing character of war.
Richly illustrated with 12 maps and 46 photos.The lightning campaign that toppled the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003 seemed to herald the arrival of a new way of war, as Germany's blitzkrieg had done at the beginning of World War II. But the initial victory soon devolved into a persistent counterinsurgency conflict reminiscent of the long U.S. effort to pacify the Philippines after the rapid defeat of Spain in 1898. In Iraq, American soldiers and their Coalition partners had merely traded one fairly weak and generally conventional opponent for a more deadly, diverse, and determined foe relying on the tactics of the guerrilla and the terrorist.This volume focuses on that second and longer campaign. But rather than a narrative of the overall course of the conflict, it provides a soldier's-eye view of the war by focusing on detailed accounts of selected engagements. Each illustrates the everyday challenges that America's soldiers faced in a difficult struggle against an inventive and often elusive enemy. Weapons, doctrine, and procedures developed to fight a conventional campaign against a similar opposing force had to be adapted to fit a different type of conflict. The U.S. Army's combat and support forces brought both resourcefulness and resilience to this task while continuing to demonstrate the same courage shown by previous generations fighting the nation's battles.These stories not only symbolize the tip of the spear formed by units in contact, but they also represent the contributions of all American men and women who have served their country in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Taken together, these accounts will provide our deploying leaders and soldiers a better understanding of the environment that they will encounter and prepare them for the work that must be done.
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the leadership competencies of Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, the most consistently successful corps-level commander of the Civil War. Over the course of his 44 years in uniform, General Hancock participated in the Mexican War, Civil War, and Indian Wars. He was the candidate of the Democratic Party in the 1880 Presidential election. Nicknamed "Hancock the Superb", he was recognized as the best combat commander in the Army of the Potomac. Remaining a general in the Regular Army after the Civil War, Hancock played a major role in post-war affairs. In order to gain insight into Hancock's leadership competencies, DA Pamphlet 600-80 and Field Manual 22-103 will be used as a framework. Research will chronologically follow aspects of Hancock's life and career to identify skills as they are developed and employed.
In June of 1815 Napoleon led French forces on an offensive campaign into Belgium against the Allied Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies under Wellington and Blucher. During this campaign Napoleon and several of his marshals made serious errors that led to missed opportunities for victory and ultimately to defeat at Waterloo. Less than 50 years later Robert E. Lee led Confederate forces on an offensive campaign into Maryland and Pennsylvania against the Union Army under Hooker initially, then Meade. A meeting engagement near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania led to three days of fighting during which Lee and several of his generals made critical errors that allowed opportunities for victory to pass and ultimately led to decisive defeat.These campaigns were remarkably alike in a number of ways. This paper reviews the campaigns and discusses similarities in the strategic settings, campaign objectives, size and disposition of forces, battlefield terrain, tactics employed, and leadership of each army. In particular, the paper compares the performances of selected French and Confederate leaders and how they contributed to the defeat of their respective armies. These comparisons provide valuable lessons learned for the conduct of future military operations.
Includes 29 maps."The author of this diary is an artillery officer who served on the Western Front from 1 Sep. 1915 till his death in action on 31st March 1918, and it is one of the best, ranking alongside Old Soldiers Never Die and The Journal of Private Fraser. Following two brief spells in 1914/1915 with the BEF during the first of which he was injured when his horse fell on him, he arrived in France on 1st Sep. 1915 as OC 'C' Battery, 108 Brigade RFA, 24th Division and before the end of the month he was in the thick of it at Loos. His description of the scene is graphic. He writes about trying to get his guns forward on roads jammed with traffic, trying to find the infantry brigade he was supposed to support, floundering about in the dark under heavy shellfire in an enormous plain of clay having the consistency of vaseline, devoid of any landmark or feature, covered in shell holes...Later he gives a vivid account of the German gas attack at Wulverghem on 30 April 1916, when a mixture of chlorine and phosgene was used causing 338 casualties in the division. During Aug. and Sep. 1916 his division took part in the bitter fighting for Delville Wood and Guillemont, and the diary entries for this period provide some of the most powerfully descriptive writing recorded in any memoirs...He was in action at Messines in June 1917 and a month later at Third Ypres. In Aug. 1917 he was finally given command of a brigade, 108th Brigade RFA still in the 24th Division. When the Germans struck on 21st March 1918 Hamilton was on leave in the UK, but he quickly managed to get back to his brigade, which was in action near Rosieres, a few miles east of Amiens. On 31st March he was killed when a shell burst under his horse just as had happened in Oct. 1914; on that occasion he got away with an injury, this time there was no reprieve..."-Print Ed.
A Study Of The Medical Support To The Union And Confederate Armies During The Battle Of Chickamauga:: Lessons And Implications For Today’s US Army Medical Department Leadersby Major David A. Rubenstein
The Union's Campaign for Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its resulting Battle of Chickamauga, is a valuable study of marked contrasts. On the one hand, brilliant strategic planning and operational maneuver, in concert with skillful deception, allowed the Union's Army of the Cumberland to advance virtually unchallenged into the vital Southern city of Chattanooga on 9 September 1863. Following this drive into the gateway of Georgia and the Confederacy, however, was the Union defeat on the tactical battlefield just twelve miles to the southwest. Supporting each army was a medical support system grounded on the experiences and lessons of previous campaigns and battles. Both armies had medical leaders familiar with the medical organization, its recent accomplishments, and its capabilities. How these leaders applied the medical support doctrine of the era, within the scope of their duties, affected the lives of thousands of soldiers wounded on the Chickamauga battlefield.The objective of this study is to examine the medical structures of both combatants, describe medical actions during the Chickamauga Campaign, from August to October 1863, and evaluate the effectiveness of each. As a result of this analysis appropriate implications are offered to the leadership of the Health Service Support system in the United States Army of 1990. Among the various implications discussed are the need for Health Service Support planning, tactical competence, staff cooperation, unity of command, and understanding of unique casualty care issues. The intended beneficiary of this historical analysis, and its suggested requirement of complete command support and dedicated medical training, is the very essence of an army: the soldier.