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The objective of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan has been firmly embraced by most of the potential parties to a treaty. However, arriving at an agreement about the sequencing, timing, and prioritization of peace terms is likely to be difficult, given the divergence in the parties' interests and objectives. The U.S. objective in these negotiations should be a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that neither hosts nor collaborates with terrorists.
From the post-World War II era through the Cold War, post-Cold War era, and current war on terrorism, this volume assesses how U.S. presidential decisionmaking style and administrative structure can work in favor of, as well as against, the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies.
Aid During Conflict: Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002by Olga Oliker James Dobbins Kurt W. Basseuner Donald L. Sampler Richard Kauzlarich
Description and evaluation of relief, reconstruction, humanitarian, and humanitarian-type aid efforts in Afghanistan during the most intense phase of military operations, from September 2001 to June 2002. The efforts were generally successful, but there were serious coordination problems among the various civilian and military aid providers. Critical issues, both positive and negative, are identified, and a list of recommendations is provided for policymakers, implementers, and aid providers, based on lessons learned.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for post-conflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical ?"how-to?" manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.
Hope for a prosperous and peaceful future for Haiti lies in building a more effective, resilient state. This report identifies the main challenges to more capable governance, evaluates existing plans for improving the delivery of public services, and proposes a realistic set of critical actions. The proposed state-building priorities merit the greatest degree of Haiti's andinternational donors' policy attention and financial commitment.
Some time in the coming decade, Iran will probably acquire nuclear weapons or the capacity to quickly produce them. This monograph provides a midterm strategy for dealing with Iran that neither begins nor ends at the point at which Tehran acquires a nuclear weapon capability. It proposes an approach that neither acquiesces to a nuclear-armed Iran nor refuses to admit the possibility--indeed, the likelihood--of this occurring.
On March 21, 2007, the RAND Corporation held a public conference on Capitol Hill, "Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement?" Participants sought to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of various policy options to address the Iranian challenge. This report summarizes remarks presented during the conference. The views expressed in this document are those of the participants, as interpreted by the RAND Corporation.
Two previous RAND volumes addressed the roles of the United States and the United Nations in nation-building, defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government. This volume presents six case studies of recent European-led nation-building missions: Albania, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Bosnia. It also reviews the Australian assistance mission to the Solomon Islands. Using quantitative and qualitative measures to compare inputs (such military levels, economic assistance and duration) and outcomes (such as levels of security, economic growth, refugee return, and democracy), the analysis concludes that these European-led missions have been competently managed and, within their sometimes quite limited scope, generally successful. Most helped achieve sustained peace, gross domestic product growth, and representative government. The EU has a wide array of civil competencies for nation-building, but it is sometimes slow to deploy them in support of its military operations, particularly when these are conducted far from Europe. The UN offers the most cost-effective means to address most postconflict stabilization requirements and NATO the better framework for large-scale force projection in cases in which the United States is ready to participate. But the EU now offers European governments a viable alternative to both these organizations in cases in which European interests are high, U.S. interests are low, and the UN is, for some reason, unsuitable or unavailable.
Focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the occupation of Iraq. Based on interviews and nearly 100,000 never-before-released documents from CPA archives, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, counter a burgeoning insurgency, and create the basis for representative government.
Following on a series of RAND Corporation studies of nation-building, this monograph analyzes the impediments that local conditions pose to successful outcomes in these interventions. It examines how external actors and local leaders in a variety of societies modified or worked around those conditions to promote enduring peace.
Looking to the 2030-2040 time frame, U. S. policy and military strategy will need to strike a balance among maintaining a cooperative relationship with China, deterring Chinese aggression in regional disputes, and preparing for the possibility that China could become more assertive. The U. S. Army will have an important role to play in preparing for these developments and for protecting and furthering U. S. interests in the region.
Reviews UN efforts to transform eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than 20,000 men-one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.