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This is the most authoritative and comprehensive one-volume dictionary of philosophy available in English. It contains over 4,000 entries, which range in length from 100 to 4,000 words. The Dictionary has been written by an international team of over 350 experts, so, rather than offering the limited perspective of a single writer, it distils the collective knowledge of the professional community of philosophers in an accessible manner. The Cambridge Dictionary clearly and concisely defines both technical terms and crucial concepts, and will promote the understanding of philosophy on all levels and across all fields. It includes substantial explanatory articles on all major philosophers as well as hundreds of minor figures. There are expansive, up-to-date overviews of all the important sub-disciplines such as ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and logic. No other reference work on philosophy contains so many entries on related subjects such as cognitive science, linguistics, theology, law, history of science and literature.
This new edition of a one-volume dictionary of philosophy features expansions in standing entries and the addition of some 400 new ones across the entire range of the subject, including selective coverage of a number of living philosophers. It covers not only Western and European philosophy, but also African, Arabic, Islamic, Japanese, Jewish, Korean, and Latin-American. In addition to major philosophers, entries include rapidly developing fields such as the philosophy of mind and applied ethics (bioethics, environmental, medical and professional). Audi is Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, U. of Nebraska at Lincoln.
This book represents the most comprehensive account to date of an important but widely contested approach to ethics--intuitionism, the view that there is a plurality of moral principles, each of which we can know directly. Robert Audi casts intuitionism in a form that provides a major alternative to the more familiar ethical perspectives (utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian). He introduces intuitionism in its historical context and clarifies--and improves and defends--W. D. Ross's influential formulation. Bringing Ross out from under the shadow of G. E. Moore, he puts a reconstructed version of Rossian intuitionism on the map as a full-scale, plausible contemporary theory. A major contribution of the book is its integration of Rossian intuitionism with Kantian ethics; this yields a view with advantages over other intuitionist theories (including Ross's) and over Kantian ethics taken alone. Audi proceeds to anchor Kantian intuitionism in a pluralistic theory of value, leading to an account of the perennially debated relation between the right and the good. Finally, he sets out the standards of conduct the theory affirms and shows how the theory can help guide concrete moral judgment. The Good in the Right is a self-contained original contribution, but readers interested in ethics or its history will find numerous connections with classical and contemporary literature. Written with clarity and concreteness, and with examples for every major point, it provides an ethical theory that is both intellectually cogent and plausible in application to moral problems.
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
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