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In Afghanistan, local communities have played a critical role in security, especially in rural areas. Afghan national security forces are important to the top-down strategy, but the Afghan government and NATO forces also need to leverage local communities to gain a complementary bottom-up strategy. This analysis discusses the viability of establishing local security forces in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies.
Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary counter-coercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. Nation-building involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms, with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors. This guidebook is a practical ?"how-to?" manual on the conduct of effective nation-building. It is organized around the constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: military, police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The chapters describe how each of these components should be organized and employed, how much of each is likely to be needed, and the likely cost. The lessons are drawn principally from 16 U.S.- and UN-led nation-building operations since World War II and from a forthcoming study on European-led missions. In short, this guidebook presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for the preplanning of future interventions and for contingency planning on the ground.
Throughout the history of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, security has been the most important-and most challenging-issue for Palestinians, Israelis, and their neighbors. This study examines key external security issues regarding the construction of a Palestinian state. Its proposals include a NATO-led international peace-enabling force and Israeli-Palestinian confidence-building measures.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups since 2001. There have been some successes, but such groups as al Qa'ida continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and other countries. Pakistan needs to establish a population-centric counterinsurgency that better protects the local population and addresses grievances. It also needs to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign and domestic policy.
In a nation-building operation, outside states invest much of their resources in establishing and maintaining the host country's police, internal security forces, and justice system. This book examines post-Cold War reconstruction efforts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, and assesses the success of U.S. and allied efforts in reconstructing internal security institutions.
Two previous RAND volumes addressed the roles of the United States and the United Nations in nation-building, defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government. This volume presents six case studies of recent European-led nation-building missions: Albania, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Bosnia. It also reviews the Australian assistance mission to the Solomon Islands. Using quantitative and qualitative measures to compare inputs (such military levels, economic assistance and duration) and outcomes (such as levels of security, economic growth, refugee return, and democracy), the analysis concludes that these European-led missions have been competently managed and, within their sometimes quite limited scope, generally successful. Most helped achieve sustained peace, gross domestic product growth, and representative government. The EU has a wide array of civil competencies for nation-building, but it is sometimes slow to deploy them in support of its military operations, particularly when these are conducted far from Europe. The UN offers the most cost-effective means to address most postconflict stabilization requirements and NATO the better framework for large-scale force projection in cases in which the United States is ready to participate. But the EU now offers European governments a viable alternative to both these organizations in cases in which European interests are high, U.S. interests are low, and the UN is, for some reason, unsuitable or unavailable.
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase 'war on terrorism' since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.
Focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the occupation of Iraq. Based on interviews and nearly 100,000 never-before-released documents from CPA archives, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, counter a burgeoning insurgency, and create the basis for representative government.
This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa'ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, and uses qualitative and quantitative data to assess whether this movement has strengthened. The author uses this analysis to examine U. S. strategic options to counter al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups based on the threat level and the capacity of local governments.
Successful counterinsurgency requires getting insurgents to switch sides. Former insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. This document examines reintegrating mid- and low-level insurgents into their local communities in Afghanistan and outlines steps to facilitate that reintegration process. The author discusses the factors that increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters and the key options for fighters as they consider reintegration. Finally, he outlines operational and tactical steps that should be taken when insurgents consider reintegration.
RAND researchers analyzed the health components of seven post-World War II nation-building efforts conducted after major conflicts--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq--and found that two factors are correlated with successful health outcomes: planning and coordination, and infrastructure and resources.
Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimesby Olga Oliker Peter Chalk Seth G. Jones Rollie Lal C. Christine Fair
This study examines the results of U.S. assistance to the internal security forces of four repressive states: El Salvador, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Efforts to improve the security, human rights, and accountability of security forces appear more likely to succeed in states transitioning from repressive to democratic systems. In addition, several factors are critical for success: the duration of assistance, viability of the justice system, and support and buy-in from the local government (including key ministries).
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Optionsby Seth G. Jones Bruce R. Pirnie Alan J. Vick David T. Orletsky
Examines alternative means to decrease the deployment time for the new Army medium-weight brigade, comparing air and sealift from the United States with air and fast (but short-range) sealift from forward bases or preposition sites. Historical experience and an assessment of U.S. regional interests are used to determine how much warning time the United States typically has before major force deployments and where it is most likely to deploy such forces
Reviews UN efforts to transform eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than 20,000 men-one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.
Using a case study of Afghanistan, this study examines gender-specific impacts of conflict and post-conflict and the ways they may affect women differently than they affect men. It analyzes the role of women in the nation-building process and considers outcomes that might occur if current practices were modified. Recommendations are made for improving data collection in conflict zones and for enhancing the outcomes of nation-building programs.
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