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Intellectuals in the Latin Space during the Era of Fascism: Crossing Borders (Routledge Studies in Modern History)
by Valeria Galimi Annarita GoriThis volume investigates a galaxy of diverse networks and intellectual actors who engaged in a broad political environment, from conservatism to the most radical right, between the World Wars. Looking beyond fascism, it considers the less-investigated domain of the 'Latin space', which is both geographical and cultural, encompassing countries of both Southern Europe and Latin America. Focus is given to mid-level civil servants, writers, journalists and artists and important 'transnational agents' as well as the larger intellectual networks to which they belonged. The book poses such questions as: In what way did the intellectuals align national and nationalistic values with the project of creating a 'Republic of Letters' that extended beyond each country’s borders, a 'space' in which one could produce and disseminate thought whose objective was to encourage political action? What kinds of networks did they succeed in establishing in the interwar period? Who were these intellectuals-in-action? What role did they play in their institutions’ and cultural associations’ activities? A wider and intricate analytical framework emerges, exploring right-wing intellectual agents and their networks, their travels and the circulation of ideas, during the interwar period and on a transatlantic scale, offering an original contribution to the debate on interwar authoritarian regimes and opening new possibilities for research.
Intellectuals in the Latin Space during the Era of Fascism: Crossing Borders (Routledge Studies in Modern History)
by Valeria Galimi Annarita GoriThis volume investigates a galaxy of diverse networks and intellectual actors who engaged in a broad political environment, from conservatism to the most radical right, between the World Wars. Looking beyond fascism, it considers the less-investigated domain of the 'Latin space', which is both geographical and cultural, encompassing countries of both Southern Europe and Latin America. Focus is given to mid-level civil servants, writers, journalists and artists and important 'transnational agents' as well as the larger intellectual networks to which they belonged. The book poses such questions as: In what way did the intellectuals align national and nationalistic values with the project of creating a 'Republic of Letters' that extended beyond each country’s borders, a 'space' in which one could produce and disseminate thought whose objective was to encourage political action? What kinds of networks did they succeed in establishing in the interwar period? Who were these intellectuals-in-action? What role did they play in their institutions’ and cultural associations’ activities? A wider and intricate analytical framework emerges, exploring right-wing intellectual agents and their networks, their travels and the circulation of ideas, during the interwar period and on a transatlantic scale, offering an original contribution to the debate on interwar authoritarian regimes and opening new possibilities for research.
Intellectuals in the Society of Spectacle
by Christopher Britt Eduardo SubiratsThis book reveals the sense in which our postmodern societies are characterized by the obscene absence of the intellectual. The modern intellectual--who had once been associated with humanism and enlightenment—has in our day been replaced by media stars, talking heads, and technical experts. At issue is the ongoing crisis of democracy, under the aegis of the société du spectacle and its vast networks of politically-induced idiocy, industrially-produced biocide, and militarily-provoked genocide. Spectacle fills the resulting moral and intellectual vacuum with electronic technologies of control, punishment, and destruction. This postmodern tyranny reduces intelligence to mechanistic, positivist, and grammatological models of inquiry, while increasing the segmentation, fragmentation, and dissolution of human existence. The apotheosis of the spectacle explains the intellectual void that lies at the heart of our postmodern decadence; it also accounts for the need to recuperate the humanist values of enlightenment promoted by the modern intellectual tradition.
Intellektuelle Emigration
by Frank Schale Michael Vollmer Ellen ThümmlerEine Intellektuellengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts muss die geistigen Einflüsse deutscher Wissenschaftsemigranten zwischen 1933 und 1945 berücksichtigen. Zu einschneidend prägte sie das literarische, kulturelle und politische Denken diesseits und jenseits des Atlantiks. Aus einem breiten Verständnis von Ideengeschichte heraus werden nicht nur prominente Emigranten wie Hannah Arendt, Arnold Bergstraesser und Franz L. Neumann, sondern zugleich dem drohenden Vergessen anheim fallende Flüchtlinge wie Sigmund Neumann, Ferdinand Hermens und Otto Neurath oder bisher kaum beachtete Biographien von André Gorz und Romain Rolland vorgestellt. Einerseits rekonstruieren die Beiträge die dramatischen Lebenslinien sowie die oft unter beklemmenden Bedingungen angefertigten politischen, gesellschafts-, kultur- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Arbeiten. Andererseits wagen sie auch einen Blick auf die Perspektiven der Emigrationsforschung heute.
Intelligence (Indochina Monographs #2)
by Col. Hoang Ngoc LungIncludes over 10 maps and illustrationsThis monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion."The war in Vietnam was often called an intelligence war. The challenges and responsibilities placed on the South Vietnam--United States--Free World intelligence community were great and constant.During this long war the entire intelligence program improved each day as our data base expanded, as more was learned about the elusive enemy, personnel were trained, and new procedures and techniques were tested and found effective.The most rewarding experience in intelligence activities during the Vietnam war was the very close cooperation and coordination between American and Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and systems. It was this cooperation that helped RVNAF military intelligence upgrade and become self-reliant during the post-cease-fire period.This monograph attempts to record all the facts concerning intelligence activities, its organizations and coordination procedures, its successes and failures during the period from 1965 to the final days of the Republic of Vietnam. In this attempt, one of the difficulties I faced was the lack of documentation to help make my work more accurate and more substantial. To overcome this shortcoming, I have interviewed several former colleagues of mine, American and Vietnamese, all of them highly experienced with intelligence activities in Vietnam. Apart from their invaluable contributions, most of the writing was based on my personal knowledge and experience."-Author's Preface.
Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods but Verify (Studies in Intelligence)
by Rose Mary SheldonProfessor Sheldon uses the modern concept of the intelligence cycle to trace intelligence activities in Rome whether they were done by private citizens, the government, or the military. Examining a broad range of activities the book looks at the many types of espionage tradecraft that have left their traces in the ancient sources: * intelligence and counterintelligence gathering* covert action* clandestine operations* the use of codes and ciphers Dispelling the myth that such activities are a modern invention, Professor Sheldon explores how these ancient spy stories have modern echoes as well. What is the role of an intelligence service in a free republic? When do the security needs of the state outweigh the rights of the citizen? If we cannot trust our own security services, how safe can we be? Although protected by the Praetorian Guard, seventy-five percent of Roman emperors died by assassination or under attack by pretenders to his throne. Who was guarding the guardians? For students of Rome, and modern social studies too - this will provide a fascinating read.
Intelligence Analysis and Assessment (Studies in Intelligence)
by David A. Charters Glenn P. Hastedt A. Stuart FarsonThese essays cover: assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia; the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment; the changing ground in intelligence; and the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.
Intelligence and Espionage: Secrets And Spies (Seminar Studies)
by Daniel Lomas Christopher John MurphyIntelligence and Espionage: Secrets and Spies provides a global introduction to the role of intelligence – a key, but sometimes controversial, aspect of ensuring national security. Separating fact from fiction, the book draws on past examples to explore the use and misuse of intelligence, examine why failures take place and address important ethical issues over its use. Divided into two parts, the book adopts a thematic approach to the topic, guiding the reader through the collection and analysis of information and its use by policymakers, before looking at intelligence sharing. Lomas and Murphy also explore the important associated activities of counterintelligence and the use of covert action, to influence foreign countries and individuals. Topics covered include human and signals intelligence, the Cuban Missile Crisis, intelligence and Stalin, Trump and the US intelligence community, and the Soviet Bloc. This analysis is supplemented by a comprehensive documents section, containing newly released documents, including material from Edward Snowden’s leaks of classified material. Supported by images, a comprehensive chronology, glossary, and 'who’s who' of key figures, Intelligence and Espionage is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the role of intelligence in policymaking, international relations and diplomacy, warfighting and politics to the present day.
Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904-1924 (Studies in Intelligence)
by Richard James Popplewell Richard J. PopplewellThis is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.
Intelligence and Military Operations (Studies in Intelligence)
by Michael I. HandelTraditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (Studies in Intelligence)
by John FerrisJohn Ferris' work in strategic and intelligence history is widely praised for its originality and the breadth of its research. At last his major pioneering articles are now available in this one single volume. In Intelligence and Strategy these essential articles have been fundamentally revised to incorporate new evidence and information withheld by governments when they were first published. This volume reshapes the study of communications intelligence by tracing Britain's development of cipher machines providing the context to Ultra and Enigma, and by explaining how British and German signals intelligence shaped the desert war. The author also explains how intelligence affected British strategy and diplomacy from 1874 to 1940 and world diplomacy during the 1930s and the Second World War. Finally he traces the roots for contemporary intelligence, and analyzes intelligence and the RMA as well as the role of intelligence in the 2003 Gulf War.This volume ultimately brings new light to our understanding of the relations between intelligence, strategy and diplomacy between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 21st century.
Intelligence And Surprise: The Battle Of Midway
by LCMR Stephanie A. Markam USNIntelligence is a key element in the military strategy of surprise. It is perplexing to many that in today's high technology environment that intelligence cannot prevent surprises from happening. The very nature of the intelligence, no matter how much or how sophisticated it is, will still permit one adversary to surprise another. It is crucial that the operational commander have a clear understanding of the process of the production of intelligence, the uses of intelligence and how it can affect the strategy of surprise. The dramatic success of the Battle of Midway, coming so closely on the heels of the shocking disaster at Pearl Harbor, demonstrated that Admiral Nimitz gained an appreciation for the value of intelligence. I will examine intelligence and the strategy of surprise in general terms and shows how the battle of Midway was influenced by them. Finally, I want to point out that though today's operations may be more sophisticated than those of World War II, there are plenty of critical concerns to consider today with regard to intelligence and surprise at the operational level.
Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Studies in Intelligence)
by James G. BlightThis is the first study to examine throughly the role of US, Soviet and Cuban Intelligence in the nuclear crisis of 1962 - the closest the world has come to Armageddon.
Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges
by Roger Z. George Robert D. KlineThis timely reissue of the 2004 edition (National Defense U. Press), with a new introduction by the assistant director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, targets a broad audience. Based on a class at the National War College taught by the editors, this anthology of 39 previously published and new articles treats the evolution and structure of US intelligence and perspectives on controversial issues facing the intelligence community operating in a democracy. Appendices include the National Security Act and a summary of the beleaguered US Patriot Act. Not indexed. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform
by Paul PillarA career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations.In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge.Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.
Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform
by Paul R. PillarPaul R. Pillar's twenty-eight-year career with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed him that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources underwriting failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside forces. They misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. These assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, he claims, diverting attention away from smarter reform. They also refuse to recognize the limits of our knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He also reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. He offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch that interjects slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainty.
Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 (Studies in Intelligence)
by Adam D.M. SvendsenThis book provides an in-depth analysis of UK-US intelligence cooperation in the post-9/11 world. Seeking to connect an analysis of intelligence liaison with the wider realm of Anglo-American Relations, the book draws on a wide range of interviews and consultations with key actors in both countries. The book is centred around two critical and empirical case studies, focusing on the interactions on the key issues of counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation. These case studies provide substantive insights into a range of interactions such as 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings, the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, the prelude to the 2003 Iraq War, extraordinary rendition and special forces deployments. Drawing on over 60 interviews conducted in the UK and US with prominent decision-makers and practitioners, these issues are examined in the contemporary historical context, with the main focus being on the years 2000-05. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, foreign policy, security studies and International Relations in general. Adam Svendsen has a Phd in International History from the University of Warwick. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, and has contributed to the International Security Programme at Chatham House and to the work of IISS, London.
Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World (Studies in Intelligence)
by Richard J. Aldrich Michael F. HopkinsWhat was Britain's reaction to the death of Stalin? How has Britain reconciled a modern nuclear strategy with its traditional imperial defence commitments around the world? How has secret intelligence affected the Special Relationship' since 1945? Certain clear questions and perennial themes run through British overseas policy since 1945. This book examines them, drawing on new research by leading historians and scholars in the field.
Intelligence Elites and Public Accountability: Relationships of Influence with Civil Society (Studies in Intelligence)
by Vian BakirThis book provides a definitive overview of the relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. The secrecy surrounding intelligence means that publication of intelligence is highly restricted, barring occasional whistle-blowing and sanitised official leaks. These characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicised, can be highly manipulated by intelligence elites, while civil society’s ability to assess and verify claims is compromised by absence of independent evidence. There are few studies on the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites, which makes it hard to form robust assessments or practical recommendations regarding public oversight of intelligence elites. Addressing that lacuna, this book analyses two case studies of global political significance. The intelligence practices they focus on (contemporary mass surveillance and Bush-era torture-intelligence policies) have been presented as vital in fighting the ‘Global War on Terror’, enmeshing governments of scores of nation-states, while challenging internationally established human rights to privacy and to freedom from torture and enforced disappearance. The book aims to synthesise what is known on relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. It moves away from disciplinary silos, to make original recommendations for how a variety of academic disciplines most likely to study the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites (international relations, history, journalism and media) could productively cross-fertilise. Finally, it aims to create a practical benchmark to enable civil society to better hold intelligence elites publicly accountable. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, surveillance, media, journalism, civil society, democracy and IR in general.
Intelligence Failure In Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s Role In The United Nations Command’s Defeat In November 1950
by Major Justin M. HaynesIn November, 1950, the United States Army suffered one of its most devastating defeats ever, in the frozen mountains of North Korea at the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This defeat fundamentally changed the nature of the Korean War, from a near-certain United Nations victory into a fight for its very survival. It was, however, avoidable.This Chinese victory was partially the result of one of the most glaring failures in U.S. military intelligence history. The officer most responsible for this failure was the Far East Command Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2), Major General Charles Andrew Willoughby. His inaccurate intelligence picture contributed to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's flawed understanding of the nature of the Chinese Communist intent.Charles Willoughby correctly identified the potential threat of a Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in late 1950, yet failed to acknowledge the significance of China's strategic warnings, operational preparations for war and tactical confirmation of their intentions. Willoughby's flawed assessment of Chinese intentions in the fall of 1950 was a result of rampant mirror imaging, complicated by circular analysis stemming from his exclusive control over intelligence reporting on the Korean theater. His significant personal prejudices against the Chinese ability fight exacerbated this problem. Once the United Nations Command undeniably confirmed that Chinese forces had entered North Korea, he minimized their significance in order to support MacArthur's final offensive to the Yalu River in late November, ultimately resulting in the defeat of his command.
Intelligence for Peace: The Role of Intelligence in Times of Peace (Studies in Intelligence)
by Hesi CarmelThis collection of articles is by experts in the field who are convinced that intelligence has an important role to play, not only in times of war and confrontation, but also in times of conciliation and political processes.
Intelligence Images from the Eastern Front (Looking Down on War)
by Colonel Roy M. Stanley IIDespite the Luftwaffe being ordered to destroy millions of aerial photos in 1945, the Allies found no less than twenty tons of photos in eleven locations, including a hoard in a Bavarian barn. These together with vast numbers of photographs taken by German soldiers used for Intelligence analysis were put into classified Allied Intelligence files at a time when USAAF and RAF imagery was being destroyed. Covering Iron Curtain countries they were valuable for cartography and target intelligence during the Cold War.The captured German imagery (called GX) in this book show what the German Army knew about the Soviet Union before and during Operation Barbarossa. Examples show Eastern Front landforms, key cities such as Stalingrad, Moscow, Sevastopol, Leningrad and factories. They are accompanied by helpful comments from a skilled photo interpreter.This unique and diverse collection, some taken from 28,000 feet overhead, others taken by soldiers on the ground, reveal the war on the Eastern Front as it has never been seen before.
Intelligence in Context: The Cultural and Historical Foundations of Human Intelligence
by Robert J. Sternberg David D. PreissThis book reflects on the various ways in which intelligence can manifest itself in the wide range of diverse contexts in which people live. Intelligence is often viewed as being tantamount to a score or set of scores on a decontextualized standardized intelligence test. But intelligence always acts within a sociocultural context. Indeed, early theorists defined intelligence in terms of adaptation to the environment in which one lives. The tradition of decontextualization is old, dating back to the very beginning of the 20th century with the development of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scales. This tradition is not only old, however, but obsolete. Because people live in different sociocultural as well as physical environments, intelligence can take somewhat different forms in different places and even at different times. The chapters in this edited volume show that intelligence viewed in the abstract is a somewhat vacuous concept - it needs to be contextualized in terms of people’s physical and sociocultural surroundings.
Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda
by John Keegan'No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence, ' wrote Marlborough, and from the earliest times commanders have sought knowledge of the enemy, his strengths and weaknesses, his dispositions and intentions. But how much effect, in the 'real time' of a battle or a campaign, can this knowledge have?In this magisterial new study, which will fascinate readers of both military and more general history, the author of A History of Warfare goes to the heart of a series of important conflicts to develop a powerful argument about intelligence in war. From the Napoleonic Wars to the sophisticated electronic warfare of the twenty-first century, John Keegan finds linking themes which lead to a compelling conclusion. His narrative sweep is enthralling, whether portraying the dilemmas of Nelson seeking Napoleon's fleet, Stonewall Jackson in the American Civil War, Bletchley as it seeks to crack Ultra during the Battle of the Atlantic, the realities of the secret war in the Falklands or the polymorphous intelligence issues of the contemporary fight against terrorism.
Intelligence In War: The Value--and Limitations--of What The Military Can Learn About The Enemy
by John KeeganA masterly look at the value and limitations of intelligence in the conduct of war from the premier military historian of our time, John Keegan. Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway. In Intelligence in War, John Keegan illustrates that only when paired with force has military intelligence been an effective tool, as it may one day be in besting al-Qaeda.