- Table View
- List View
Strategic Nuclear Sharing
by Julian SchofieldMost nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France Israel, US NATO, Russia China, Israel South Africa, China Pakistan and Pakistan Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India. "
A Strategic Planning Approach
by Melanie W. Sisson Lynn E. DavisWhile the United States government has historically undertaken strategic reviews and produced numerous strategy documents, these have provided only very general directions for U.S. policymakers. This paper defines an approach to strategic planning and illustrates its application using the example of the critical national security topic of counterterrorism.
The Strategic Student Veteran: Successfully Transitioning from the Military to College Academics
by David Cass<p>The college graduation rate for military veterans is unsatisfactory. While the life transition for veterans goes far beyond academics, by lessening the stress of the academic transition, the likelihood of collegiate success is significantly increased. <p>The goal of <i>The Strategic Student Veteran</i> is to help raise graduation rates amongst our nation's veterans. The reason so many college students under-perform is because they're not taught how to transition from the structured military environment to the unstructured college academic environment. <i>The Strategic Student Veteran</i> teaches college-bound military veterans how to make this transition and become self-reliant, successful students.
Strategic Studies: A Reader (Studies In Strategic And Military History Ser.)
by Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. MaioloThe second edition of Strategic Studies: A Reader brings together key essays on strategic theory by some of the leading contributors to the field. This revised volume contains several new essays and updated introductions to each section. The volume comprises hard-to-find classics in the field as well as the latest scholarship. The aim is to provide students with a wide-ranging survey of the key issues in strategic studies, and to provide an introduction to the main ideas and themes in the field. The book contains six extensive sections, each of which is prefaced by a short introductory essay: The Uses of Strategic Theory Interpretation of the Classics Instruments of War, Intelligence and Deception Nuclear Strategy Irregular Warfare and Small Wars Future Warfare, Future Strategy Overall, this volume strikes a balance between theoretical works, which seek to discover generalisations about the nature of modern strategy, and case studies, which attempt to ground the study of strategy in the realities of modern war. This new edition will be essential reading for all students of strategic studies, security studies, military history and war studies, as well as for professional military college students.
The Strategic Survey 2021 (Strategic Survey)
by The International Institute for Strategic StudiesStrategic Survey 2021: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics provides objective, in-depth analysis by leading experts of the events, actors and forces driving international relations. It is the indispensable guide for policymakers, business leaders, analysts and academics who need to understand the geopolitical and geo-economic trends shaping the global agenda in 2022 and beyond. Key features · Comprehensive annual review of world affairs from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the leading international research institute that provides objective analysis of military, geopolitical and geo-economic developments that could lead to conflict. · Covers developments in all regions as well as emerging issues and trends not yet on most radars, and analyses the major themes and forces shaping each continent. · Essays on a comprehensive range of global issues including vaccine diplomacy, digital conflict, Europe’s emerging Asia-Pacific strategies, the rise of carbon neutrality, the prospects for Iran’s nuclear programme, and the future of political Islam. · Drivers of Strategic Change for major states: Verified, comparable data on state power that provides a rich and vivid guide to forces underlying geopolitical change. · Data-rich graphics and maps that provide fresh insights into geopolitical change, and a timeline of the key events of 2020–21.
The Strategic Survey 2022
by The International Institute for Strategic StudiesStrategic Survey 2022: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics provides objective, in-depth analysis of the events that have shaped relations between major powers, region by region, over the past year, and highlights the pressing geopolitical and geo-economic challenges that will shape the international agenda in 2023. It features essays on global issues such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, the arms race in space and the deepening US–China rivalry, as well as in-depth analysis of the major themes shaping each continent. Specially commissioned maps and graphics illustrate major arguments, and multi-source data illuminates longer-term trends in power relations.
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Revised and Expanded Edition)
by John Lewis GaddisWhen Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.
Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces: Detecting, Characterizing, and Documenting Exposures
by Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces: Technology Methods For Detection Tracking of Exposures to a Subset of Harmful AgentsA report on Detecting, Characterizing, and Documenting Exposures
The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security
by Bartholomew SparrowBased on the full cooperation of the subject--with no restraining conditions--The Strategist provides an in-depth portrait of a man whose career has been intimately linked to the great transformations in U. S. foreign policy, from the last third of the Cold War, to September 11, 2001, and up to the present. Bartholomew Sparrow brings color and focus to the complex and often secretive nature of U. S. foreign policy and strategic adjustments--an intellectual battlefield on which ideas and worldviews clash, in which economics, politics, and strategic concerns intertwine, and in which private citizens and non-office holders may exert as much influence as highly visible Cabinet officials. Among the most important foreign policy minds of the 20th and early 21st centuries, Brent Scowcroft is also among the least well-known or understood. In a now-famous August 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed titled "Don’t Attack Saddam Hussein,” Brent Scowcroft, who had been national security advisor under President George H. W. Bush, went to war himself, in a sense, with his closest and longest-standing friends. He noted the scant evidence that tied the Iraqi government to terrorist organizations. He warned that an invasion and occupation of Iraq would be costly and potentially disastrous for a variety of carefully considered reasons. He recommended that the Bush administration work with the U. N. Security Council and wait for definitive proof of Saddam’s wrongdoing before taking action. The essay at once made Scowcroft the most outspoken and most credible critic of the Bush administration’s plans for war and immediately generated national controversy. It provoked a sudden, deep split in the Republican Party over the plans for war. Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and President George W. Bush all vigorously reaffirmed their cause and their course of action, and the media and American public opinion soon fell in line. Clearly, Scowcroft, 84, continues to participate in the most central and important debates over U. S. foreign policy and national security. He has been a leading architect of U. S. foreign policy and grand strategy for almost a half-century, and though long out of office, still gives speeches, makes media appearances, and leads tasks forces and commissions. He is a rare creature, one of the few "wise men” of the nation’s capital: someone who is regularly consulted by top government officials in Democratic and Republican administrations, ranking members of the House and Senate from both sides of the aisle, and the country’s leading foreign-policy journalists. As recently as April 2009, Scowcroft co-chaired an extensive Council of Foreign Relations study of the U. S. nuclear weapons policy. More than anyone else, he stands at the center of the United States’ foreign policy establishment. Most significantly, Scowcroft is trusted--a scarce and typically fleeting quality in Washington--and has been for four decades. The unprecedented insights into the man and his career Sparrow offers in The Strategist are vital to anyone who wishes to understand America's changing role in the world.
Strategists Break All The Rules
by Major Adelaido Godinez IIIEmory Upton believed that politicians should leave war to professionals. This led to two assumptions that became conventional wisdom: first, an apolitical army represented a more professional force; and second, the problems at the tactical and operational level were similar enough to be useful in developing strategic thinking. These assumptions resulted in what Samuel P. Huntington described as the "normal-theory" relationship between policy-makers and generals. The assumption made sense for the United States but had one unfortunate result. The Army as an institution misread the nature of an apolitical force. The essence of an apolitical force should be non-partisan -Army professionals above political interference or interest. There is a difference, however, between policy and politics. While not involving itself in the political life of the nation, the Army is vitally concerned with the policies of the nation. The discussion strategists must prepare for are political, but in the nature of policy as the object of war. A historical survey of strategists from General Winfield Scott to General Creighton Abrams suggests that the most successful strategists are life-long learners. They build holistic understanding of the interdependent and infinite connections of the whole problem. Once they develop a hypothesis about the whole problem, they reshape those connections to create a better peace for the United States. Strategists that take time to understand the whole problem encourage discourse. Retaining the Functional Area 59 Strategist program will continue to benefit the force because they do not follow a traditional route to generalship. After all, few have earned stars by arguing, debating, and taking intellectual risk.
Strategy
by Captain B. H. Liddell HartThis is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, a perfect companion to Sun-tzu's The Art of War and Carl von Clausewitz's On War.Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WWI) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkrieg in WWII). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.-Print ed."The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time."--Library Journal
Strategy: A History
by Lawrence FreedmanIn Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. <p><p> The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. <p><p> Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment - subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends - provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition
by Edward N. Luttwak“If you want peace, prepare for war.” “A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive.” “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of “post-heroic” war in Kosovo in 1999—an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed. In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world’s foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.
Strategy and Arms Control
by Thomas C. Schelling Morton H. HalperinThis study is an attempt to identify the meaning of arms control in the post war period. It presents an analysis of arms control with particular emphasis on the military policy involved. The general objectives of the study is to advance some aspects of the intellectual state of the art in arms control and to provide some concrete data on the technical and strategic problems of importance.
Strategy and Command: Issues in Australia's Twentieth-century Wars (Australian Army History Series)
by David HornerIn Strategy and Command, David Horner provides an important insight into the strategic decisions and military commanders who shaped Australia's army history from the Boer War to the evolution of the command structure for the Australian Defence Force in the 2000s. He examines strategic decisions such as whether to go to war, the nature of the forces to be committed to the war, where the forces should be deployed and when to reduce the Australian commitment. The book also recounts decisions made by commanders at the highest level, which are passed on to those at the operational level, who are then required to produce their own plans to achieve the government's aims through military operations. Strategy and Command is a compilation of research and writing on military history by one of Australia's pre-eminent military historians. It is a crucial read for anyone interested in Australia's involvement in 20th-century wars.
Strategy and Command: The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1915
by Roy A. PreteFalling between the “War of Movement” in 1914 and the major attrition battles of 1916, 1915 was a critical year in the First World War. As France failed in ever-larger offensives to break through the German trenches, Britain shifted its strategy from defence of empire to total commitment to the continental war.In the second of three planned volumes, Roy Prete analyzes the political and military policies and strategies of Britain and France and their joint command relationship on the Western Front in 1915. The opposing strategies of the two governments proved to be the main determinant in the sometimes ragged relations between the French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, and his British counterpart, Sir John French, as they sought to drive the German army out of France and to aid their hard-pressed Russian ally. With an impressive marshalling of evidence, Strategy and Command demonstrates that the increased British commitment to the continental war, manifested in sending Kitchener’s New Armies to France in 1915, was largely due to the disastrous situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front and the perceived weakness of the French government.Based on extensive research in French and British political and military archives, this new in-depth study of Anglo-French military relations on the Western Front in 1915 fills a major gap in the unfolding drama of the First World War.
Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (Strategy and History)
by Colin S. GrayStrategy and History comprises a selection of Professor Gray's key contributions to strategic debate over the past thirty years. These essays have been selected both because they had significant messages for contemporary controversies, and because they have some continuing relevance for today and the future. Each essay in this book is really about strategy in the modern world, and reflects the many dimensions of this complex subject. This book covers a wide range of subjects and historical events, but there are key issues covered throughout: being strategic the consequences of actions a respect for Clausewitz’s theory of war historical dependency the importance of geography being critical of enthusiasm for technology over human factors the primacy of politics. This important publication provides an invaluable insight into the development of strategic studies over the past 30 years from one of the world's leading theorists and practitioners of the subject. The book will be of great interest to all students and analysts of strategy and international studies.
Strategy and Politics
by Colin S. GrayThis book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars. This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and how this interaction has had significant consequences historically. Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone. Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not) why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies and war and conflict studies.
Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tier
by Michael CohenThe period covered by this book witnessed a significant change in Allied strategy for the Middle East. Its focus switched from Egypt to the states of the so-called northern tier of the Middle East: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions and used bluff, even deception, in order to give the impression that it disposed of greater military resources than was in fact the case. It describes not only Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, but also the Americans' reluctance to take over Britain's former hegemony in the region. Finally, it reveals the extent to which the Allies' relationship with Israel was a constant restraint upon their freedom of action in the area, and their ability to forge military alliances with Arab states.
Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Global and regional dynamics (Canberra Papers On Strategy And Defence #No. 139)
by Robert Ayson Desmond BallFrom the war on terror to the rise of China, this book unlocks the major strategic themes and security challenges of the early twenty-first century. Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific provides the analytical frameworks needed to make sense of this complex but exciting strategic universe. Offering a unique mix of global strategic thinking and Asia-Pacific security analysis, this book is for readers from Sydney to Seoul who want to put their own local security challenges in a wider regional and global context. It is also for North American and European readers requiring an understanding of the dynamic security developments in the Asia-Pacific region around which so much of global strategy is increasingly based. The really vital questions facing the international community are dealt with here: Why do governments and groups still use armed force? Has warfare really changed in the information age? Why should we be concerned about non-traditional security challenges such as water shortages and the spread of infectious disease? Is a great clash imminent between the United States and China? What are the prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula and between India and Pakistan? Can Southeast Asia survive the challenges of transnational terrorism? What does security mean for the Pacific island countries and for Australia and New Zealand? With contributions from leading commentators and analysts, Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific offers a comprehensive and authoritative introduction to the field.
Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914-1917 (Routledge Library Editions: The First World War)
by Keith NeilsonBased on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.
Strategy and Tactics (Indochina Monographs #1)
by Col. Hoang Ngoc LungIncludes over 10 maps and illustrationsThis monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion."During the war years, the Republic of Vietnam and the United States pursued a common goal; their armed forces fought against the same enemy, under the same campaign plan, with the same weapon systems, and in the same environment.The strategic approaches to fighting this war, however, evolved through several stages depending on the enemy's kind of warfare and force structure; so did the tactics designed to counter his large-unit and guerrilla activities. This monograph endeavors, therefore, to trace back and evaluate our strategic alternatives at each stage of the war and the evolving tactics employed, with particular emphasis on the period of American withdrawal and reduced support.In the preparation of this monograph, I have expressly confined my discussions of strategy to its military aspect. While this conforms to the limited scope of a military subject, the encompassing nature of strategy, especially one conceived to face the enemy's approach to total war, implies that for a better understanding of military strategy, the interplay of social, political, and economic factors should also be brought in as a backdrop. Therefore, wherever appropriate, I have found it necessary to place strategic discussions in the total war context."-Author's Introduction.
Strategy and the Second World War: How the War was Won, and Lost
by Jeremy BlackA concise, accessible account of strategy and the Second World War. How the war was won . . . and lost..In 1941, the Second World War became global, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union; Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor; and Germany declared war on the United States.In this timely book, which fills a real gap, Black engages with the strategic issues of the time - as they developed chronologically, and interacted - and relates these to subsequent debates about the choices made, revealing their continued political resonances.Beginning with Appeasement and the Soviet-German pact as key strategic means, Black examines the consequences of the fall of France for the strategies of all the powers. He shows how Allied strategy-making was more effective at the Anglo-American level than with the Soviet Union, not only for ideological and political reasons, but also because the Americans and British had a better grasp of the global dimension.He explores how German and Japanese strategies evolved as the war went badly for the Axis powers, and discusses the extent to which seeking to mould the post-war world informed Allied strategic choices from 1943 onwards, and the role these played in post-war politics, notably in the Cold War. Strategy was a crucial tool not only for conducting the war; it remains the key to understanding it today.
Strategy and the Second World War: How the War was Won, and Lost
by Jeremy BlackA concise, accessible account of strategy and the Second World War. How the war was won . . . and lost..In 1941, the Second World War became global, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union; Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor; and Germany declared war on the United States.In this timely book, which fills a real gap, Black engages with the strategic issues of the time - as they developed chronologically, and interacted - and relates these to subsequent debates about the choices made, revealing their continued political resonances.Beginning with Appeasement and the Soviet-German pact as key strategic means, Black examines the consequences of the fall of France for the strategies of all the powers. He shows how Allied strategy-making was more effective at the Anglo-American level than with the Soviet Union, not only for ideological and political reasons, but also because the Americans and British had a better grasp of the global dimension.He explores how German and Japanese strategies evolved as the war went badly for the Axis powers, and discusses the extent to which seeking to mould the post-war world informed Allied strategic choices from 1943 onwards, and the role these played in post-war politics, notably in the Cold War. Strategy was a crucial tool not only for conducting the war; it remains the key to understanding it today.
Strategy and the Second World War: How the War was Won, and Lost
by Jeremy BlackA concise, accessible account of strategy and the Second World War. How the war was won . . . and lost..In 1941, the Second World War became global, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union; Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor; and Germany declared war on the United States.In this timely book, which fills a real gap, Black engages with the strategic issues of the time - as they developed chronologically, and interacted - and relates these to subsequent debates about the choices made, revealing their continued political resonances.Beginning with Appeasement and the Soviet-German pact as key strategic means, Black examines the consequences of the fall of France for the strategies of all the powers. He shows how Allied strategy-making was more effective at the Anglo-American level than with the Soviet Union, not only for ideological and political reasons, but also because the Americans and British had a better grasp of the global dimension.He explores how German and Japanese strategies evolved as the war went badly for the Axis powers, and discusses the extent to which seeking to mould the post-war world informed Allied strategic choices from 1943 onwards, and the role these played in post-war politics, notably in the Cold War. Strategy was a crucial tool not only for conducting the war; it remains the key to understanding it today.