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Elements Of Operational Design In The Planning For The Marianas Campaign In 1944

by Major Chas. J. Smith

Operational art and the operational level of war became a doctrinal focus for the U.S. Army in the 1980s. This focus led to the development of the elements of operational design. These concepts are not new, and were developed in the interwar period prior to World War II at the staff and war colleges. During this time, however, the military did not doctrinally recognize the operational level or war or operational art. Even though the concepts were not recognized, the intellectual process permeated the officer education system prior to World War II. Clearly, American officers in World War II used something of operational art, including in the planning and execution of the Marianas Campaign. This monograph looks at the question in more detail, by testing the extent to which planners within CENPAC used the elements of operational design in the Marianas Campaign, including end state and objectives, effects, center(s) of gravity, decisive points, direct and indirect action, lines of operation, operational reach, simultaneity and depth, timing and tempo, leverage, balance, anticipation, culmination, and arranging operations. The implication of this study is that as current doctrine evolves, the development, education, and execution of operational concepts in the World War II era continue to be useful.

Fire Support Employment In The Rhine River Crossing At Remagen, Germany

by Major Jeffrey L. Shafer

This study is an historical analysis of the procedures and doctrine used by the III Corps Artillery during the First U.S. Army's crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen, Germany. This study examines the actions of III Corps Artillery in the employment, organization for combat, and command and control of artillery units at Remagen. The fire support procedures employed by the field artillery are compared with those prescribed by published doctrine and unit standing operating procedures. This comparison is used to evaluate the adequacy of doctrine and the need for standing operating procedures to supplement the published doctrine. The development of standing operating procedures from lessons learned during earlier combat is examined to show how the doctrine allowed flexibility and standardization that was evident throughout the army. This standardization continues to serve as a model for fire support operations in today's emerging combined arms doctrine.The study concludes with lessons learned: (1) Centralized command and control of field artillery should be under the headquarters that is best organized to control a large number or units, (2) doctrine and standing operating procedures are useless unless leaders develop and execute plans that are in accordance with the principles established and practiced, (3) the tendency to establish standing operating procedures that violate or contradict doctrine should be avoided, (4) a need for more liaison officers was evident at Remagen as well as through the war and continues to exist today even with improved technology, (5) the redundancy of tasks outlined in doctrine provides the flexibility needed to accomplish the fire support mission during a fast moving battle, and (6) field artillery units should practice several tactical missions and not just the standard mission associated with peace time organizations.

Engineer Aviation Units In The Southwest Pacific Theater During WWII

by Major Natalie M. Pearson

The thesis of this research is that the U.S. Army aviation engineer units played a crucial role in the success of General Douglas MacArthur's island hopping campaign in the Southwest Pacific Theater at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Allied victory depended on seizing lightly defended enemy territory and neutralizing enemy strongpoints from Australia to the Philippines through the following pattern: conduct air and naval bombardment, land the assault forces, defeat any Japanese units in the area, and construct airfields and base facilities. This research demonstrates that aviation engineer units rapidly constructed these airbases and provided the necessary facilities for land-based aircraft so that carrier-based aircraft could focus on protecting the navy's fleet.

From Siege to Surgical:: The Evolution of Urban Combat from World War II to the Present and Its Effect on Current Doctrine

by Major William T. James Jr.

This study investigates what effect the evolution of urban combat from World War II to the present has had on current urban combat doctrine. Urban combat operations have played a pivotal role in the conflicts of the twentieth century, and will continue to be a crucial part of future U.S. power projection operations. It is imperative that lessons learned from previous urban combat operations be studied for applicability to current urban combat doctrine.The study analyzes the urban battles of Aachen, Manila, Seoul, Hue, JUST CAUSE, and Mogadishu to identify salient lessons for conducting successful offensive urban combat operations; then reviews current U.S. Army urban combat doctrine. The study then evaluates current doctrine using identified salient lessons to determine their effect. The study finds that the primary impacts of previous urban combat operations on current doctrine are that doctrine now embraces the idea of varied conditions for urban combat and validates the concept of fighting as a combined arms team in a built-up area. The study further finds that FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urban Terrain is obsolete, and that key procurement decisions have left U.S. forces without critical weapons that have proven decisive in urban combat.

Franklin Roosevelt And General Hap Arnold: The Statesman And The Strategist Build An Air Force

by LTC Robert L. Jahns

Statesman and soldiers: What is the relationship that exists between the policymaker and the strategist? And, when the policymaker is actively involved in determining the strategies, what is the effect of advice given by the senior military leader and what role should he play in formulating policy and strategy? Given that military officers will continue to provide advice and service to civilian leaders, how do these relationships between the statesman and strategist influence or shape the outcome of policymaking, and can successes or failures be attributed to these personal relationships? This study seeks to examine those questions by reviewing the relationship of the somewhat controversial General Hap Arnold and the President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The study will initially focus on the strategist, General Arnold, as he developed personally, and some of the background history and politics in the development of the Army Air Forces. Approaching the World War II era, the focus will shift to the building of the world's greatest air force and the winning of World War II. It will examine the personalities, politics, and policies of the President of the United States in their relationship to General Arnold and other service chiefs. The paper will conclude with thoughts on the relationships between policymakers and strategists to determine if those relationships are still important today and if so, how the strategist can best prepare for this relationship.

Development Of Amphibious Doctrine

by Major David C. Emmel

Although the U.S. had conducted amphibious operations since the Revolutionary War, it was not until after the Spanish-American War that the military services attempted to codify procedures in doctrine. Early emphasis focused on command relationships and the responsibilities of commanders, eventually expanding to incorporate operational concepts, tactical techniques, and the necessary equipment. In an environment characterized by inter-service rivalry, as well as monetary and materiel constraints, dedicated individuals and organizations overcame numerous obstacles to develop, practice, and successfully execute amphibious operations in World War II. This thesis examines the evolutionary development of amphibious doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and Navy, and the employment of that doctrine during Operations Watchtower and Torch in World War II. The examination includes an analysis of the historical efforts to develop innovative solutions to a wide range of challenges the services faced at the beginning of the 20th Century leading up to World War II. How the leadership solved those challenges informs the efforts of current leadership in addressing contemporary doctrinal, operational, and tactical challenges and those of the future.

Field Marshal William J. Slim: The Great General and the Breaking of the Glass Ceiling

by LTC Edward P. Egan

Field Marshal William J. Slim is considered by many historians to be one of the finest generals of World War II. His accomplishments were truly extraordinary. He commanded a polyglot army, consisting of six different nationalities speaking eight different languages, that fought in some of the most inhospitable, disease-ridden country in the world against the war's toughest opponent, the Japanese. In March 1942, he assumed command of a British-Indian force in Burma half way through the longest retreat in the British Army's history. Even though he was unable to reverse the disaster, he kept his force intact and led it to safety. Over the next three and one half years, despite very limited resources and several inept senior commanders, he rebuilt his force into an army that was able to inflict on the Japanese their greatest land defeat of World War II. In the process, he conducted four of the most classic operational campaigns of the war--the battle of the Second Arakan; the battles of Kohima and Imphal; the capture of Mandalay and Meiktila; and the pursuit to Rangoon. Throughout his career, but especially during World War II, Slim met all the criteria for a great general and strategic leader as set forth in Lord Wavell's Generals and Generalship. Despite these great accomplishments, Slim ran into several "glass ceilings" during World War II. Twice he was relieved of command, once immediately after his greatest battlefield victory. This study examines Field Marshal Slim's leadership. It takes a brief look at his biography, then compares him against Wavell's standards for generalship by highlighting events from his career that illustrate each standard. Finally, it addresses the issue of the "glass ceiling"--what it is, the events surrounding Slim's encounters with it, and how Slim was able to overcome it. The intent is to show that Slim was not only a great World War II general, but is still a model of leadership worthy of study by the U.S. Army.

From Teaching To Practice: General Walter Krueger And The Development Of Joint Operations, 1921-1945

by Major George B. Eaton

General Walter Krueger commanded the 6th Army in the Southwest Pacific Theater in World War II. As the Commander, 6th Army, he led the troops that liberated New Guinea and the Philippines and he was designated as the commander of the forces scheduled to invade Japan. Krueger's wartime accomplishments were simply a continuation of contributions made to the United States Army and Navy over a 47 year career. Yet, despite his achievements, after the war Krueger simply faded away. Krueger's lack of historical name recognition some 50 years after his greatest achievements deprives current officers and historians not only the knowledge of wartime exploits, but also of significant understanding of the development of joint operations doctrine in the years between World War I and World War II.The current consensus among historians is that the United States Marine Corps was responsible for the development of amphibious operations. While true at the tactical level, this paper demonstrates that the Army and Naval War Colleges and the Army and Navy General Staffs and War Plans Divisions were key players in the development of doctrine at the strategic and operational level. General Walter Krueger attended both war colleges, served on the faculty of both war colleges, and served two tours in the Army War Plans Division, including a two year stint as its Chief. He was on the Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee for over six years. The intent of this paper is to show Krueger's personal influence in the development of joint doctrine.The paper considers Krueger's assignment history, the war plans he developed, his ideas on unity of command and the need for inter-service understanding, and his principles of war planning. It includes a case study of the Lingayen Gulf Landing in January 1945 to demonstrate the acceptance and rejection of his key ideas. The paper focuses on Army and Navy issues and considers air issues only tangentially.

Field Marshal William Slim And The Power Of Leadership

by Major Frederick A. Baillergeon

On 15 January 1942 the Japanese invaded Burma. Within months, the Japanese occupied the country and forced the Allied forces to conduct a brutal retreat into neighboring India. During the next three and one half years, both forces continued to fight in a campaign with the Allied forces retaking Burma in May 1945. One of the principle figures in this turnaround of the Allied Force was Field Marshal William Slim. During the Burma Campaign Slim served in several key leadership positions culminating as the 14 Army Commander. This focus of this study is to determine the role Slim played in the reconquest of Burma. Specifically, how did Field Marshal William Slim's organizational leadership actions (as defined in the U.S. Army leadership manual, FM 22-100) while serving as the 14 Army Commander, contribute to the Allies reconquest of Burma during World War II? It is hoped that the findings of this study will be of value to leaders of all levels currently fighting the Global War on Terrorism.

Fine Conduct Under Fire: The Tactical Effectiveness Of The 165th Infantry Regiment In The First World War

by Major David G. Fivecoat

Recent historiography has almost universally denounced the tactical prowess of the American Expeditionary Force. However, a detailed analysis of the performance of the 42nd Division's 165th Infantry Regiment tells a surprisingly different story. Despite the challenges of the First World War battlefield, the 165th Infantry Regiment compiled a remarkable record of tactical effectiveness in its 180 days of combat. During its six campaigns, the regiment repeatedly held the line and seized objectives against veteran German units in a variety of situations and under various conditions. At the regimental level, a de facto adoption of trench warfare doctrine enabled the unit to synchronize the combined arms and avoid the doctrinal dysfunction the plagued the majority of the AEF. At the tactical level, the Irish platoons and companies rapidly became adept at using Indian-style or infiltration tactics to advance, seize terrain, and destroy German positions. In addition, superb leadership throughout the regiment and stellar unit cohesion played significant roles in the unit's superior tactical proficiency. In sum, these four factors enabled the 165th to achieve a level of tactical effectiveness second to none among the non-regular regiments of the AEF and equal to the best units within the German Army.

General Creighton Abrams And The Operational Approach Of Attrition In The Vietnam War

by Major Thom Duffy Frohnhoefer

General Creighton Abrams assumed command of United States forces in the Republic of South Vietnam in the summer of 1968. In recent years, this change in leadership has been viewed as a radical departure from the operational approach implemented by his predecessor General William Westmoreland. This monograph proposes that the United States Armed Forces consistently followed a strategy of attrition from the introduction of battalion sized combat troops in 1965, through the Westmoreland-Abrams transition, and ultimately encouraged the South Vietnamese to follow this strategy during the period of Vietnamization.The National Command Authority and General Westmoreland specifically adopted a strategy of attrition in February of 1966. The Military Assistance Command Vietnam implemented this strategy throughout 1966 and accelerated the strategy in 1967, when General Abrams became General Westmoreland's deputy commander. The operations were specifically designed to attrite Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular forces as outlined in the 1966 meeting. The Tet offensive of January 1968 appeared to discredit the strategy of attrition and contributed to the ouster of Westmoreland and his replacement by General Abrams.General Abrams promoted a "one-war" strategy which had the desired end state of population security for the people of South Vietnam. In reality the "one-war" was a multi-tiered strategy of attrition. While the tactics of large scale search and destroy missions were modified, the operational purpose was not. Simultaneously, the Phoenix Program conducted constant low level attrition warfare at the village level to prevent the resurgence of the Viet Cong.While these operations were being conducted the national command authority adopted the policy of Vietnamization in the summer of 1969.

Effective Intelligence In Urban Environments

by Major Jeffrey C. Schrick

This thesis analyzes the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion. The methodology attempts to assess the organic intelligence assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion, the training of the maneuver battalion officers on the employment of intelligence assets, and the availability of doctrinal literature about urban operations. The war in Iraq presents the Army with an operational environment that is unfamiliar to a force that has trained for conventional warfare in open terrain. The commanders, especially at battalion level and below, need an efficient and effective intelligence system.The focus of the research will be on the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level. The FM 3-0, Operations, dated February 2008, is the capstone doctrine for the U.S. Army for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for future prolonged conflicts as an expeditionary force. Discussion among the maneuver and intelligence communities on how to improve the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments is worthy of research. The historic perspective of the urban environment complexities and their military significance provide lessons learned on how military intelligence plays an important role in successful operations in such terrain.

Engaging The Insurgent In Negotiation: Lessons From Northern Ireland Applied To Afghanistan

by Major David J. Rapone

Outreach, negotiation and cooption may be a vital tool for counterinsurgencies as they transform conflict and facilitate Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) of warring elements within a war-torn society. This monograph utilizes a two-system comparison between the Taliban and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to inquire if the Taliban are willing to participate in fruitful dialogue to initiate AR2. The suggestion for adopting a Northern Ireland approach for negotiation is compelling due to the strategic similarities the Taliban and the IRA share. The similarities, however, are the underlying reason why the Taliban will not be amenable to compromise within the short-term context compelled by the United States current strategy.What emerged is that the Taliban is reacting to changing environmental stimuli in the same manner as the PIRA. The direct consequence of this similarity is the likelihood of negotiations and outreach to take hold. The Taliban in 2010, like their IRA counterparts in 1972, believe they have a comparative advantage over their counterparts and are not willing to compromise their ideological convictions. Thus, policy makers in Washington, London, and Kabul should cool their rhetoric surrounding negotiation and dampen expectations that talks with the Taliban will yield significant results.

The Fight For The High Ground: The U.S. Army And Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom I, May 2003-April 2004

by Major Douglas A. Pryer

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I), U.S. soldiers waged a desperate war against a growing insurgency. Mounting U.S. casualties became the catalyst for a hidden "war within the war." Arrayed on one side of this secret conflict were leaders who believed that the "ends justify the means." Opposing this camp were those who believed that U.S. soldiers do not torture because of the higher ideals to which all Americans should subscribe. This clandestine conflict was waged at every level of command, from the fields of Iraq to Washington, D.C. In this history, the adverse influence of the ends-justify-the-means camp in Iraq is charted. Conversely, interrogation operations within the largest division task force and brigade combat team of OIF I are explored to explain why most interrogators treated detainees humanely. Those deficiencies of Army doctrine, force structure, and training that enabled harsh interrogation policies to sometimes trump traditional virtues are explained. Lastly, the Army's recent dramatic improvements with regard to interrogations are summarized and still-existing deficiencies are noted. This history concludes that the damage done by abusive interrogations will be felt for years to come--and that much work still needs to be done to ensure such damage never recurs.

Gathering Of Human Intelligence In Counter-Insurgency Warfare:: The French Experience During The Battle Of Algiers (January-October 1957)

by Major Hervé Pierre

If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society.In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence.Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu's 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended.In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.

Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces

by Major Troy P. Krause

As United States and Republic of Korea forces stand to defend against a DPRK attack, one of the most formidable tasks is how to counter a second front in the Joint Rear Security Area of the Republic of Korea.North Korea has a robust and diverse special operations force capability, their 'Special Purpose Forces.' With nearly 104,000 soldiers committed to these daring tactics and operations, the United States and the Republic of Korea must be vigilant and innovative to protect their forces from such attacks.The principal mission of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces is to infiltrate into the enemies rear area and conduct short duration raids. Their most dangerous avenue of approach for their forces includes amphibious approaches, airborne infiltration and the use of a vast tunnel network. How would the North carry out such an attack against such formidable foes? Will they use special operation's type forces to disrupt the South in their rear areas? How would they move their forces into South Korea? What solutions does the United States and the Republic of Korea have to solve this problem and which one is the best?This analysis examines the various methods the United States and the Republic of Korea will use to counter the North Korean Special Purpose Forces today and in the future.

Disengaging From Insurgencies: Insights From History And Implications For Afghanistan

by Major James M. Kimbrough IV

To determine insights for future disengagements, this thesis examines four historical episodes in which Western nations withdrew from on-going conflicts against insurgent-like enemies.Relatively unsuccessful results flowed from the British withdrawal from Aden during the 1960's and the American withdrawal from Vietnam during 1972-1973. As the last British troop departed Aden, a state of turmoil prevailed. Not only could the insurgents realistically claim victory in evicting the British by force, but also the territory later became the Arab world's first Marxist state and a base for terrorists. America's departure from Vietnam produced similar disappointment.More successful outcomes occurred during the British withdrawal from Malaya in the 1960's and the American withdrawal from El Salvador in 1988-1989. After World War II, the British attempted to re-establish colonial control of Malaya and faced resistance from communist insurgents. In the midst of their counterinsurgency, the British government granted Malaya independence in August 1957. The Malayan government, backed by British support, continued its struggle against the communist insurgents for another three years. The Malayan government announced victory in 1960 and began to enjoy a relatively peaceful and prosperous aftermath. From kidnappings, assassinations, and other political-criminal activities, an insurgency emerged in El Salvador in 1979. As the movement transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the insurgent fighters rivaled the strength of the Salvadoran security forces. From 1980-1992, the government of the United States provided El Salvador extensive funding for social and political reforms, military material support, and training to counter the communist insurgents. These efforts, coupled with effective El Salvadoran governance, eventually led the communists to abandon their cause.

Ensuring The Continued Relevance Of Long Range Surveillance Units

by Major Valery C. Keaveny Jr.

Long Range Surveillance Units (LRSUs) provide a unique and necessary capability to today's commanders and to commanders who will fight in the future. In looking to the future operational environment, LRSUs must ensure their ability to operate across the full spectrum of operations at a rapid tempo and in a short-notice, force projection Army. Current LRSU doctrine is primarily built around the AirLand Battle doctrine of the Cold War, a conventional threat, linear battlefield, and employment at great distances behind enemy lines. As a result, LRSU doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) require update or change. These changes will ensure continued LRSU relevance and their maximum effectiveness.This study identifies an increased and unaddressed emphasis on target acquisition, Stability and Support Operations, and operations in urban environments. These operations lend themselves to non-traditional and creative tasking of LRSUs and will necessitate increased requirements for friendly unit coordination, vehicular insertion, and potential task organization of reconnaissance elements.This study recommends changes to doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training based on lessons learned by LRSUs on recent operational missions and the lessons of similar units. These changes require proponent leadership, LRS community teamwork, and warrant additional Army oversight and assistance.

Enhancing Combat Effectiveness;: The Evolution Of The United States Army Infantry Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II

by Major Timothy M. Karcher

This study analyzes the organization of the US Army infantry rifle squad since the end of World War II, focusing on the attempt to gain and then maintain the capability of fire and maneuver at the squad level. Since the end of World War II, the US Army has conducted or commissioned at least nine studies, aimed at determining the optimum organization of the infantry rifle squad. Common trends affect all recent attempts at transforming the US Army and become evident when studying the evolution of the squad, but the goal must remain developing a combat effective unit.Combat effectiveness is determined by applying the evaluative criteria of control, sustainability, flexibility, and lethality. By applying these four criteria to analyze various squad organizations, one can determine the strengths and weaknesses inherent to these organizations, thereby recommending the most combat effective rifle squad organization.The US Army's current focus on strategic deployability and emerging weapons capabilities is not a new phenomenon, but potentially could cloud the essential issue, developing a military force for optimum combat effectiveness. This study concludes by recommending the optimum squad-level organization for the "Objective Force."

Ignoring The Obvious: Combined Arms And Fire And Maneuver Tactics Prior To World War I

by Major Thomas A. Bruno USMC

Fairly or unfairly, the stalemate on the First World War's Western Front is often attributed to the intellectual stagnation of the era's military officers. This paper traces the development (or absence of development) of combined arms and fire & maneuver tactics and doctrine in the period prior to WW I, focusing on the Russo-Japanese War.The Western armies that entered the Great War seemingly ignored many of the hard-learned lessons and observations of pre-war conflicts. Though World War I armies were later credited with developing revolutionary wartime tactical-level advances, many scholars claim that this phase of tactical evolution followed an earlier period of intellectual stagnation that resulted in the stalemate on the war's Western Front. This stalemate, they claim, could have been avoided by heeding the admonitions of pre-war conflicts and incorporating the burgeoning effects of technology into military tactics and doctrine. Some go even further and fault the military leadership with incompetence and foolishness for not adapting to the requirements of modern war.The Russo-Japanese War showed the necessity for combined arms techniques and fire and maneuver tactics on the modern battlefield. Specifically, the war showed the need for: (1) the adoption of dispersed, irregular formations; (2) the employment of fire and maneuver techniques and small unit-tactics, including base of fire techniques; (3) the transition to indirect-fire artillery support to ensure the survivability of the batteries, and; (4) the necessity for combined arms tactics to increase the survivability of assaulting infantry and compensate for the dispersion of infantry firepower.

In the Line of Fire - Peacekeeping in the Golan Heights

by Major Jeffery S. Bess

This monograph examines the considerations involved in maintaining a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. The examination is based on the assumption that Israel and Syria have reached an agreement concerning the Golan Heights and that the United States is going to establish a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.The monograph first examines the historical background of the area since the 1967 War. Based on this examination and on lessons learned from previous UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations, the monograph addresses national composition of the force, command of the peacekeeping force, and force structure. Next, based on the military and political aspects of the region, the monograph addresses the future peacekeeping force commander's concerns with military credibility, freedom of movement, and force protection.The study concludes with a summary evaluation of the necessary size and type of force for future peacekeeping in the Golan Heights. Based on the assumption and an analysis of the political and military considerations, future peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights would require a MFO type force under the command and control of the United States. Due to the essential requirement for force protection due to the potential of pre-emption by either Israel or Syria and of terrorist attacks, a heavy brigade would be the most effective force in maintaining the peace while protecting the force.

Gen Otto P. Weyland USAF: Close Air Support In The Korean War

by LTC Michael J. Chandler

This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland's impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland's perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support "controversy." Throughout his career, Weyland was a staunch advocate of tactical airpower. As Patton's Airman in World War II, Far East Air Force commander in Korea, and the commander of Tactical Air Command in the mid-1950s, Weyland helped the tactical air community to carve out its role as a critical instrument of national power.

General Crook And Counterinsurgency Warfare

by LTC William L. Greenberg

This thesis investigates the operational and tactical procedures in counterinsurgency warfare developed by General George Crook while commanding U.S. Army forces in southwest and the northern plains. This work includes a brief introduction of General Crook's career before and during the Civil War. The study examines the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its Apache and Sioux opponents during Indian campaigns, which Crook participated in. Inherent in the study is an in-depth examination of Crook's campaigns against the Apaches in the 1872-75, 1882-86, and against the Sioux and Cheyenne in 1876-77.This study concludes that General Crook, through trial and error, developed a distinct brand of operational and tactical procedures to conduct effective counterinsurgency warfare. Though lacking a coherent strategic national policy concerning the Indians, Crook was capable of successfully developing and executing a coherent counterinsurgency policy at the operational and tactical levels. This comprehensive program produced victories against his enemies in the field and an integrated acculturation policy for the Indians who resided on the reservation. Crook's use of Apache scouts and the pack mule train revolutionized the Army's ability to track down the insurgents and defeat them. His use of population controls coupled with economic development provided his Indian opponents an alternative way of life for their societies.

Engineer Operations During The Vicksburg Campaign

by Major Robert M. Puckett

This study investigates the role that Engineer Operations played in the Vicksburg Campaign of the American Civil War. A background study and description is made of the structure, composition, capability, and employment of engineer officers and units during the American Civil War. The Vicksburg Campaign is analyzed in detail to determine the contributions that Engineer Operations made to the Campaign's success. The Campaign is broken down into four phases: (1) the Confederate Fortification of Vicksburg. (2) Operations in the Bayous, (3) the Campaign of Maneuver, and (4) the Siege of Vicksburg. Each phase is examined in an engineer context to determine what type of Engineer Operations were conducted and whether they were critical to that phase and the Campaign overall. The final conclusions derived from this study are that Engineer Operations were critical to the success of the Campaign and without the engineering capability the Union Army, possessed. It would not have been able to overcome the natural and manmade obstacles faced in the effort to seize Vicksburg.

Guerrilla Operations in the Civil War: Assessing Compound Warfare During Price’s Raid

by Major Dale E. Davis

One of the most significant areas of guerrilla warfare during the American Civil War occurred along the Missouri-Kansas border. Many of these guerrilla forces had been active during the Bleeding Kansas period and continued their activities into the Civil War supporting the Confederacy. The guerrillas attacked Federal forces and disrupted their lines of communications, raided settlements in Kansas, and attempted to support Confederate conventional forces operating in the area. In 1864, Major General Sterling Price led a raid into Missouri in a final attempt to bring the state into the Confederacy. This thesis explores the nature of guerrilla warfare in the Missouri-Kansas border area and explains how Price and the guerrillas failed to employ the elements of Compound Warfare to bring Missouri into the Confederacy.

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