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This study investigates the decisive factors that affected the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson campaign in February 1862. The thesis is relevant not only to the study of history, but as a series of lessons for all commanders.In the final analysis, the ultimate failure of the Confederates during this campaign can be attributed directly to the actions of General Albert Sidney Johnston. He failed to develop an adequate strategy to meet the expected invasion from the North or to insure that each subordinate command in his department was prepared for the onslaught. Johnston also failed to establish a command structure to support his Department. Most damaging of all, Johnston neglected the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, which served as invasion routes through the center of his department.Ironically, one of the worst generals of the Confederacy correctly saw Fort Donelson as the key to stopping Grant and protecting Nashville. Had he been better supported by his superiors and by the officers serving at the fort with him, the Confederates may have won a victory at Fort Donelson and secured the Western Department for several months.
This thesis is a historical analysis and an assessment of Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis' life with special emphasis on his division's performance during the Civil War.The thesis will discuss Davis' quick rise through the military ranks, which led to his eventual assumption of a corps command by the end of the Civil War. Davis' career was not without controversy. He was a non-traditional soldier in an army that was very traditional. He was a tough disciplinarian and took training of soldiers seriously. He was also aggressive, feisty, and confrontational. It was these later characteristics that on occasion led him into trouble with his superiors and may have been determiners in his non-selection for promotions and specific assignments.The thesis begins with an examination of Davis' background and life from his birth through his participation in the Mexican War and the initiation of hostilities at Fort Sumter. Next, Davis' Civil War experiences to include the Battles of Pea Ridge and Murfreesboro and details of Davis' performance at the Battle of Chickamauga will be discussed. Thereafter, Davis' march through the South with General Sherman and the remainder of his military career and life will be discussed. Finally, an analysis will be presented of who Davis was and why he did or did not achieve the potential that he thought he deserved.
History is often overlooked for its value in terms of lessons learned. By examining General Robert E. Lee's distinctive application of operational art and leadership as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, we can discern many lessons which are still pertinent to our commanders at the operational level today. From his selection of Lieutenant General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson as one of his corps commanders during his reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia, his methods to build morale to his strategy and his balancing of Space, Time and Force there are many lessons to be learned.
Between May and December 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman conducted two highly successful campaigns through Georgia, seizing Atlanta and Savannah and inflicting significant damage on Confederate military resources. Sherman's operations were founded in thorough logistics planning, skillful movement and maneuver of a light, mobile force, and bold movement behind enemy lines without a fixed line of communications. This paper will examine and analyze General Sherman's use of operational art, focusing on the operational factors of space, time and force and the operational functions of command and control, logistics, movement and maneuver and protection. The analysis will provide lessons learned for today's operational commander, including applicability to the concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).Sherman's campaigns skillfully blended the advantages of terrain and mobility with maneuver, maintaining the initiative and freedom of action. Current defense initiatives point toward a leaner force, with the ability to respond to crises quickly with minimal logistic support. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not have the luxury of secure bases of operations or a lengthy period to build up supplies prior to the commencement of hostilities. Sherman emphasized maneuver, mobility and logistical self-sustainment to the maximum extent possible. Success in future conflicts may depend on the ability of joint forces to operate very much like Sherman did in 1864.
The Forty-Sixth Indiana Regiment:: A Tactical Analysis Of Amphibious Operations And Major Combat Engagements During The American Civil Warby Major Michael S. Beames
This thesis is an historical analysis of the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana. The primary research question is whether the amphibious operations of the 46th Indiana were effective towards the Union's success in the Mississippi River valley. Using Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3, Tactics, this thesis will compare the 46th Indiana's employment of tactics to the Marine Corps' current use of tactics according to doctrine. Tactical concepts that achieve success on the battlefield are achieving a decision, gaining an advantage, being faster, adapting, cooperating, and exploiting success. These six concepts form the foundation of the analysis of the 46th Indiana's operations and tactics during the Civil War. Secondary research areas to determine the effectiveness of the 46th Indiana's amphibious operations are training, command and control, casualty statistics, unit cohesion and morale.
This paper looks at Ulysses S. Grant's development as a strategic leader with emphasis on the time period July, 1863, to March, 1864. It has a dual focus. The first is an examination of Grant's growth as a strategic thinker. The second is on the opening of opportunity for Grant to become a leader at the strategic level. The paper is written chronologically, with both subjects interwoven.Bruce Catton, Lloyd Lewis, Carl Sandburg, and T. Harry Williams wrote the primary sources used in research and provided a good balance of "Grant-centric" and "Lincoln-centric" views. Whenever possible, The Official Records of the Rebellion were used. Care was taken to use source material written during the Civil War. Sherman's war time views of Grant's abilities carry more weight in this paper than what he wrote after the war. Similarly, Grant's Memoirs were read with a jaundiced eye.The findings of the research are laid out in the body of the paper. Grant's career is reviewed in order to show a steady progression of ability. There is also a noticeable maturation in Grant's strategic thinking that can be seen in the period highlighted. Finally, incidents are examined in which Grant proved himself to President Lincoln to be a perceptive, adept actor in the politics of high level command, earning Lincoln's trust and confidence.The conclusion of the paper is that just when the nation called for him, Grant had developed the essential skills for the job of general-in-chief.
The Mediterranean And Middle East: Volume II The Germans Come To The Help Of Their Ally (1941) [Illustrated Edition]by Air Vice-Marshal S.E. Toomer C.B. C.B.E. D.F.C. Brigadier C. J. C. Molony Major-General I.S.O. Playfair C.B. D.S.O. M.C. Captain F. C. Flynn
Illustrated with 29 maps/diagrams and 44 photographs"The second of the eight volumes dealing with the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern theatres in the 18-volume official British History of the Second World War, this book is largely concerned with the consequences of Germany's decision to prop up its faltering Italian ally in North Africa in 1941. It opens with General Rommel reversing Britain's conquest of Italian Cyrenaica, and increasing Axis air attacks on the fortress island of Malta. Britain's naval victory against the Italians at Cape Matapan in March is swiftly followed by British reverses in the Balkans. A British-backed anti-Nazi coup d'état in Yugoslavia results in April in Germany's occupation of that country and Britain's retreat from Greece before a relentless German advance. Germany's airborne invasion of Crete sparks a fierce battle for the island, ending in a British evacuation. A pro-Axis coup in Iraq is followed by a successful British intervention, which deposes the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime in Baghdad. British and Free French forces also occupy Vichy French-ruled Syria. The book ends with more attacks on Malta, the building-up of Allied forces in the Middle East, and General Wavell's replacement by General Auchinleck as British Commander in North Africa."-Print Edition
This monograph is an analysis of the impact of organizational culture on tactical joint warfare. The merger of the Tiger Brigade with 2d Marine Division during the Persian Gulf War serves as a laboratory for this analysis. The author researched after action reports, the papers of authors who have written on the Persian Gulf War and interviewed commanders and key staff of both units to determine whether differences in service culture reduced the combat effectiveness of either unit. This research is analyzed using a recently developed organizational theory that postulates that the human element is the most important and least understood factor in determining whether a merger between two organizations with different cultures will succeed or fail.This study concludes that the merger of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division was very successful. The key elements to that success were the relationship between the commanders, the effectiveness of liaison officers, the willingness of both units to learn from and understand the culture of the other and the amount of time available before actual combat to reduce cultural barriers.
Usually in history it seems that the technologically advanced society has a greater advantage in warfare than more primitive societies. For most battles this seems to hold true; however, there are exceptions to this rule. This document examines three different battles in history where a primitive, tribal force was able to decisively defeat a better-equipped, more advanced army. Following the introduction the second chapter focuses on the Romans versus Germanic tribes at the Battle of Teutoburg Forest; the third chapter investigates Custer and the Battle of the Little Bighorn; and the fourth chapter discusses the Battle of Maiwand in the Second Afghan War. Although each of these battles has its own unique circumstances that contributed to the victory of the primitive forces, three main themes link each of the battles. In each battle the technologically advanced army followed predictable tactics. The primitive armies employed new tactics that generally served to negate some of the technological advantages of the superior force. And finally, cultural influences played a role in strengthening the resolve to fight despite apparently poor odds. In each of the battles these factors combined with others to produce a victory over a technologically advanced foe.
Illustrated with more than 30 maps plans and photos.Written in August 1944 when the Japanese Imperial armies had tasted their first bitter defeats in Burma; the staff of GHQ India were determined to record all of the lessons learned and ensure that the troops in the field would profit from the knowledge. A brilliant exposition of the Japanese methods of land warfare in the later stages of the Second World War as can be found.Although titled as a second edition, this World War Two briefing book is in fact almost completely different from the first Edition.
Illustrated with more than 20 maps plans and photos.When this handbook was written in 1943 the Japanese soldier was seen by British Empire troops as a jungle fighting superman, who had largely blitzed and defeated them at every turn. As part of an effort to dispel this myth the Intelligence Section of General Headquarters in India set about distilling the tactics that the Japanese had used and to formulate counter-measures. As the staff point out in their introduction;"The Japanese are an island race who have mastered the art of war, not through any mysterious or indefinable quality inherited from their Emperor, their islands, or their ancestors during your grandfather's time they were still in the bow-and-arrow stage-but through serious study of ancient and modern methods, and by intensive training. If we analyse their tactics, reducing them to fundamentals, all that they practise is to be found in our own training manuals, or in the military histories of ancient campaigns; not even the snipers in the trees are new-the jungle tribes of Africa and Brazil have employed them since time immemorial."In their long history the peoples of our Empire have shown the world that they possess more than an average share of courage and tenacity, and today we must add to these advantages our undoubted superiority in arms and equipment. Any success which the Japanese have had against us was due to intensive training, carefully rehearsed plans and normal guts. Whatever the task in hand-be it the digging of a single fox-hole or the preparation of a large-scale invasion-their work is done with meticulous care, and by intensive and sustained training alone can we hope to outmanoeuvre them."As close to a handbook in English of how the Japanese fought and won their battles in the jungles of Southeast Asia at the beginning of the Second World War: A fascinating read.
The purpose of this text is to provide the Army with a factual account of the organization and operations of the Soviet resistance movement behind the German forces on the Eastern Front during World War II. This movement offers a particularly valuable case study, for it can be viewed both in relation to the German occupation in the Soviet Union and to the offensive and defensive operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.The scope of the study includes an over-all picture of a quasi-military organization in relation to a larger conflict between two regular armies. It is not a study in partisan tactics, nor is it intended to be. German measures taken to combat the partisan movement are sketched in, but the story in large part remains that of an organization and how it operated. The German planning for the invasion of Russia is treated at some length because many of the circumstances which favored the rise and development of the movement had their bases in errors the Germans made in their initial planning. The operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army are likewise described in considerable detail as the backdrop against which the operations of the partisan units are projected.Because of the lack of reliable Soviet sources, the story has been told much as the Germans recorded it. German documents written during the course of World War II constitute the principal sources, but many survivors who had experience in Russia have made important contributions based upon their personal experience.
This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans' decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one's plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding "group-thinking" among a staff.
The thesis is a historical analysis of Colonel John T. Wilder's infantry brigade in the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns of the American Civil War. In 1863 General Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, authorized Wilder to mount the brigade on horseback and rearm it with Spencer repeating rifles, giving the brigade unsurpassed mobility and firepower. The thesis examines the mounting and rearming of the brigade, then examines the role the brigade played in the Army of the Cumberland through the Chickamauga campaign. The primary research question concerns how effectively the leadership in the Army of the Cumberland employed the brigade in light of its capabilities. Subordinate questions concern Wilder's leadership, the impact of technology on the performance of the brigade, and the brigade's potential for offensive operations. The thesis concludes that the leadership of the Army of the Cumberland, in particular General Rosecrans, did not employ the brigade well. Lack of a clear concept of how to employ the brigade and command and control problems led to ineffectual tasks and minimal contributions. Wilder's personality compounded the problem. During the campaigns, the brigade's Spencer repeating rifles proved to be an improvement over standard-issue rifled muskets. The mobility of the brigade was its most influential asset, but the army was not able to take advantage of it.
This study attempts to show the misapplication of tactical airpower by the Luftwaffe in support of German ground forces during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. The analysis is based on an investigation of historical references and provides lessons learned which might be applied in future conflicts.The study shows that the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts at Kursk on Close Air Support and neglected Battlefield Air Interdiction. This was primarily because Close Air Support had proven itself so successful in German experience prior to Kursk. However, the failure of the Luftwaffe to interdict Russian reinforcements at Kursk proved to be critical and contributed to the German defeat.Air planners must realize that a correct balance between Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction is essential to the efficient use of airpower during any tactical application in support of ground forces. Neither Close Air Support nor Battlefield Air Interdiction should gain primacy in doctrine, rather, a mix of the two should be applied on a situational basis.
This study examines the planning, execution, and results of US military involvement in the 1970 Cambodian incursions. Named Operation Rockcrusher, the attacks targeted North Vietnamese sanctuaries in officially neutral Cambodia. Strategic guidance for the operation reflected the Nixon administration's desire to proceed with troop reductions and quickly "Vietnamize" the war in Southeast Asia. Efforts to set conditions for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, including a covert bombing campaign of Cambodia, failed. These factors, along with a deteriorating political situation within Cambodia, led to approval of the assaults.The thesis describes the operational and tactical objectives that were derived from the strategic situation. Then, by discussing key portions of the campaign, the study examines how well the US Army accomplished these objectives. Reviewed within the context of selected battlefield operating systems, the operation reveals a decided "mixed bag" of success and failure.The study highlights lessons that may be appropriate to today's lower intensity conflict environment and force structures. It also promotes the need to synchronize goals and objectives throughout the levels of war. It concludes that attritional warfare, a dubious legacy from Vietnam, remains a danger to the Army today.
In 1979 the age old struggle for the control of Islam between the Shiite and Sunni sects re-emerged in the Middle East. Four events occurred in 1979 that defined the context of contemporary Middle Eastern politics: the Islamic revolution in Iran, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords, the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This monograph directly addresses the roots of current Middle Eastern actors such as HAMAS, FATA, Hezbollah, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban in the aftermath of these four critical events that occurred in 1979.The methodology for this monograph consists of analyzing each of these four events and then synthesizing this information in order to determine how 1979 shaped the modern Middle East. Since the seventeenth century the Sunni sect dominated Islam. The Iranian revolution reenergized the Shiite sect throughout the Middle East while Sunni power simultaneously eroded throughout the region. While the Shiites were inspiring the Islamic community in 1979, the Sunni suffered significant blows to their legitimacy as the leaders of Islam.This monograph asserts that the prevailing conflict within the Middle East is first and foremost a contest between the Shiites and the Sunni for preeminence within the Islamic world. The conflict between Islam and the outside world remains secondary in importance. The contemporary Middle Eastern actors that dominate the western consciousness such as HAMMAS, FATA, Hezbollah, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban constitute proxy armies created by the Shiite and Sunni leadership to wage a war for influence within the Islamic world. The events of 1979 have resulted in a leveling of power in the Middle East and the emergence of the Shiites as an ideological peer competitor to the traditionally dominant Sunni.
Although the government's reliance on contractors to support military forces is not a new phenomenon, the degree to which contractors are involved in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has increased substantially. In OIF in particular, contractors perform a wide range of services in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Perhaps the most controversial and arguably the most troublesome of these contractors are those that are armed and use violence in the course of fulfilling their contractual obligations. This thesis explores whether or not such contractors, herein identified as private security providers (PSPs), have a destabilizing influence on United States political and military objectives. In doing so, the thesis identifies and evaluates the legal environment in which PSPs operate the intersection between PSP activities and critical requirements and vulnerabilities of coalition forces and PSP involvement within logical lines of operation within Iraq. In concluding, the author posits that PSPs have a destabilizing impact on not only the political and military mission, but the United States military as well. Finally, the author provides recommendations for employing PSPs in the present and future conflicts.
DET ONE: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, 2003 - 2006:: U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism [Illustrated Edition]by Lieutenant Colonel John P. Piedmont
Illustrated with over 30 photos.The story of the Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, which became known as Det One, is an extraordinary tale. On its face, the story would not rate a minute's glance. One small group of Marines, about a hundred in number, formed, trained, and went to war. This all happened as the nation was 18 months into the Global War on Terrorism and as the Marine Corps was deploying I Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet the story behind the basic facts is not only far more intricate and fascinating, with dramatic episodes and intrepid characters from the Pentagon to Camp Pendleton, it portended great significance for the Marine Corps.What makes the Det One story extraordinary is the shift in Marine Corps policy that brought it about, the maturation of the special operations capabilities of forward-deployed Marine expeditionary units that made it possible, and the patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities of the Marines and Navy Corpsmen who manned it. Although Det One has passed now into the history books, its legacy survives in the formation of Marine Corps Special Operations Command and in the lessons learned and experiences of its members, who now continue to serve in dozens of units.
This paper examines the potential for military working dogs to support Special Operations Forces (SOF). Modern technology has not eliminated the operational prospective for the military employment of dogs. Canine olfactory superiority, advanced hearing, and ability to detect movement offer significant military employment potential. Military working dogs can be trained for scouting, patrolling, building and ship searches, countermine, counterdrug and tracking. When used properly, dogs are an inexpensive and efficient force multiplier.Qualitative research using correlational data comprises the monograph's methodology. Military working dog capabilities, limitations, and historical employment will be discussed and then compared to Special Operation Forces principal missions and collateral activities.The conclusion demonstrates that dogs have a wider role to perform in today's operational environment and that military working dogs can augment and complement SOF operations. Nearly every SOF mission can benefit from the inclusion of dogs- particularly in support of Stability and Support Operations conducted in developing countries that cannot employ or sustain complex and technologically sophisticated equipment. Military working dogs are a proven, low technology, combat and combat support capability and may have a future role in support of Special Operations Forces.
The 1956 Suez Crisis is the first example of a pre-emptive strike after World War II. The episode provides lessons about the lengths to which nations will go to secure their interests and the limits of the United Nation's influence. How the UN uses its power is the point of contention. In 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel believed the organization would protect their security interests through the unbiased maintenance of international law. Yet, as common in the Cold War, UN action was hampered. A war began and ended with a cease-fire in fifty-five hours. Three militarily superior armies won their tactical fights but were strategically defeated. Most notably, the influence of global authority shifted to the superpowers. Through all this, the UN changed its mission and purpose. The primary question therefore is did the UN resolve the 1956 Suez Crisis? Resolution had to include a status quo ante bellum, the return to the existing system before the war, or the recognition of a new international Regime. The UN's ability to resolve such crises directly affects its legitimacy in the international community.
In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive, three-pronged attack into South Vietnam that was eventually repulsed by South Vietnamese forces, United States (US) advisors and massive amounts of American airpower. The problem is determining what factors were key to South Vietnam's successful defense. To that point, this thesis will address the overall effectiveness of US airpower in defeating North Vietnam's attack. This paper first examines the strategic and operational environment surrounding the 1972 offensive, including the role and influence that the leaders of the US, Saigon, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union had on the conflict. It then shifts to the three primary tactical battles, describing each in detail, from the initial communist successes to their ultimate defeat. Finally, the analysis focuses specifically on airpower's role, from the massive strategic deployment that doubled the available assets in theater in just over a month, to its operational success striking targets in North Vietnam, to its tactical successes on the various battlefields of South Vietnam. Ultimately, this analysis determines that US airpower, with US advisors playing a critical enabling role, was the decisive element in the defeat of North Vietnam's Easter Offensive.
Analysis Of The Relationship Between Technology And Strategy And How They Shaped The Confederate States Navy [Illustrated Edition]by Lt-Cmd Wesley A. Brown
Includes 23 illustrations and 3 tables.This study investigates the use of technology by the Confederate States of America to develop naval strategy and ultimately the Navy during the American Civil War. The study concentrates on the building and use of: ironclads to break the blockade and coastal defense, torpedoes (mines) for coastal defense, and Submarines to help break the blockade at Charleston.The use of technology had a significant influence on the Confederate Navy not only on the strategic, but also on the operational and the tactical levels of war. Operational campaigns were planned and executed around the presence or absence of confederate ironclads by both the North and the South. Battles were won, lost, or never fought due to the presence of confederate torpedoes laid in Southern harbors. The threat of Confederate submarines caused Union blockading squadrons to reduce the capabilities of catching runners by moving the fleet out of the submarines tactical range.Today's Navy, in its quest for new technology, faces a similar situation as the Confederate Navy did in 1861. The Navy must seek new technology to enhance warfighting skills and not simply look for the "ultimate weapon," as the Confederate Navy first thought of the ironclad.
This thesis examines the Battle of Hampton Roads, 8 and 9 March 1862, the first battle of ironclads, to determine if it was a Revolution in Military Affairs. This study is an analysis of naval developments prior to March 1862, the battle, and the impact the battle had on the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy from 1862 to 1871. The battle signaled the end of the wooden warship era when the CSS Virginia destroyed two wooden warships on 8 March 1862. The USS Monitor influenced a change in naval design, which led the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy to build turreted warships, which culminated in the launching of the first modern battleship in 1871. The transformation from sailing and steam ships with broadside armament to steam-powered turret ships led to a reduction in the size of the crews and the acceptance of engineers into the naval community. The battle led both navies to assign ironclads to their squadrons to counter ironclads of hostile nations. The battle influenced the development of tactics for fighting ironclads including ramming and coastal warfare. The Battle of Hampton Roads was a Revolution in Military Affairs and the onset of modern naval warfare.
This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics. Limited by available material, especially those documenting Confederate efforts, this paper highlights the history of ballooning prior to the Civil War, and focuses on the Union balloon operations during the initial fall and winter of 1861-2, the Peninsular campaign, and Chancellorsville. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from these three periods indicates the Union balloon corps amply validated its worth. War, however, is more than just a science. In this case, the "art" of warfare better explains the collapse of Thaddeus Lowe's organization after Chancellorsville. The first two modern implications of this case study involve both the unfavorable impact of personality, and the commander's influence on the assimilation of new technology. Are we better today at bringing on line the benefits associated with technology? The final point links to the concept of battle command. With the massive infusion of information available to the modern commander, are we still sending him to the lions without a whip?