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Jedburgh Operations: Support To The French Resistance In Eastern Brittany From June-September 1944

by Major Ralph D. Nichols

Specially trained teams, known as Jedburghs, were inserted into France in conjunction with Operation "Overlord," to help liberate it from German occupation. The Jedburghs were three-man allied teams, comprised of two commissioned officers, (at least one French) and a non-commissioned officer in charge of the radio (wireless telegraphy). All Jedburghs were volunteers. They received highly specialized training in guerrilla warfare. Jedburghs served in harm's way, deep behind enemy lines. They were subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and its commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Their covert mission in Operation "Overlord" helped pave the way for the liberation of France, and ultimately resulted in a campaign to free Europe from Nazi rule.This study explores the origins, purpose, training and missions of the Jedburghs. I will examine the actual operations of seven Jedburgh teams in Eastern Brittany. Their actions and effectiveness will be compared with operations of other Jedburgh teams.

Self-Inflicted Wound: Allied Defeat In Crete, May 1941

by Major Andrew J. Kostic

The Germans appeared unstoppable during the early stages of World War II. Inexperienced Allied forces were willing to fight, but the sentiment was the Germans were too powerful. Defeat became a forgone conclusion. To defend at all costs no longer appeared viable. Withdrawal and evacuation seemed almost commonplace in Allied strategy.Great Britain and Germany identified early in the war the strategic importance of the island of Crete for conducting military operations in the Mediterranean. Operationally the British maintained naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, while the German Luftwaffe ruled the skies.The German plan for the occupation of Crete, Operation MERCURY, called for gliders and Hitler's elite paratroops to conduct the largest airborne operation to date. The plan pitted 22,000 men and 1280 aircraft against an erroneously estimated enemy strength of 5,000 men. The success of this plan relied upon surprise and the paratroops securing one of the three airfields on the island so reinforcements could be flown in.A reluctant Crete Force Commander set the tone for subordinate commanders' leadership failures. The invasion began the morning of 20 May 1941. The Germans suffered heavy casualties. At the end of the first day of fighting, they were short ammunition, and the Allies maintained control of the airfields. However, the battalion commander defending the airfield at Maleme, lacking communications and situational awareness, was unaware of the success of his unit and that night mistakenly ordered its withdrawal from the airfield. The Germans occupied the airfield in the morning and reinforcements were flown in. The Allies conducted an attack the night of 21 May to retake the airfield, but poor Allied leadership at the Brigade and Division level resulted in failure. Consequently, the Germans were able to mass combat power on the island and defeat the Allies.

Operational Employment Of The Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment As A Case Study

by Major Matthew J. Konz

Given the focus on the Brigade Combat Team as the Army's primary combat unit, the limited availability of U.S. Air Force airlift assets, and the U.S. Army history of employing predominantly medium sized airborne units, future airborne operations in support of operational level objectives will likely center around the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The combat airborne operations of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment will provide a case study to assess the elements of risk, surprise and the operational context of how the airborne unit contributed to the achievement the operational and strategic outcomes. The combat airborne operations discussed are the jump to re-take the island of Corregidor in the Philippines in February 1945, Operation Junction City in February 1967, and the airborne insertion of the 173d Airborne Brigade onto the Bashur airfield in Northern Iraq in March 2003. The intent of this monograph is to provide insights into the possible employment of the current ABCT and how to best use the resources and organization that we have, not necessarily to advocate a radically new airborne organization, propose new equipment, or recommend a new mission for airborne forces.

Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored

by Major Joel Jeffson

Authors and historians have made the words Market-Garden and intelligence failure virtually synonymous. Is this really the case? Operation Market-Garden, the plan envisioned by Field Marshal Montgomery, would open the gate into Germany and simultaneously force General Eisenhower to abandon his broad-front strategy in favor of his narrow-front strategy. Executed on 17 September 1944, this operation became one of the greatest defeats suffered by the Allies during the Second World War. Until 1974, when the British Government declassified Ultra, no one beyond the producers and consumers of Ultra intelligence knew of its existence. With the program now declassified, it was learned that Ultra allowed Allied commanders an unprecedented capability to read high-level German messages that were thought to be unbreakable. The release of these documents now showed that senior Allied commanders knew that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were located on the corridor that the Allies planned to make their narrow-front thrust on. Despite this new information, numerous authors still continue to describe as an intelligence failure. While intelligence was not perfect in supporting this operation, it is not justifiable to say that Operation Market-Garden failed due to the intelligence system's failure to warn commanders of the threat to the operation.

President Truman And (The Challenge Of) The Potsdam Conference 1945

by Col. Uwe F. Jansohn

This monograph examines how U.S. President Harry S. Truman was prepared for the Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945 which is seen as a crucial turning point in modern history. Reviewing his preparations and assessing his actions during the actual conference allows one to examine whether Truman had a strategy for the Potsdam Conference in 1945 with achievable objectives. This monograph argues that Truman did have a strategy for the Potsdam Conference, which was coordinated with Roosevelt's former advisors, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, this strategy diverged from Roosevelt's original intent. Truman's goals were not achieved in their entirety as the new President found himself confronted by the challenges of international policy and had to adapt his strategy during the conference for various reasons.The method used in this monograph to analyze the U.S. strategy towards the Potsdam Conference is drawn from the contemporary U.S. design methodology outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. There does not exist one comprehensive document which provided Truman a strategic approach for the conference in understanding the ends, ways, and means that was clearly defined. The monograph shows, that the preparing papers were more a conglomeration of documents containing a mix of background information, objectives, and ideas. Using the design methodology, the monograph will emulate a strategy, as it could have been formulated by Truman advisors in 1945. Having this strategy the monograph evaluates the events of the Potsdam conference day by day and assesses the reasons why there was a requirement for an adjustment in Truman's strategy during the conference and why he changed his course of action. The monograph also provides an assessment of whether Truman had an opportunity to avoid the start of the Cold War in Potsdam.

Reading The Enemy’s Mail:: Origins And Development Of US Army Tactical Radio Intelligence In World War II, European Theater

by Major Jeffrey S. Harley

This thesis traces the development of American radio intelligence at the operational and tactical levels from its beginnings in World War I through the end of World War II. It shows that signals intelligence is useful to the tactical and operational level commander. The study recommends the Army rethink signal intelligence support to the various echelons, primarily through changes to tables of organization and equipment.The thesis covers the initial appearance of radio intelligence units on the battlefields of France in the first world war, identifying specific instances where radio intelligence played a role in a command decision. It also looks at training and doctrine in the period between the two world wars. The thesis also covers the organization, doctrine, and training of radio intelligence units as they prepared for combat. It provides a glimpse into the intelligence support provided to the corps, army, and army group commanders during World War II through examination of actual intercept operations. Where possible the study compares and contrasts German radio intelligence units and operations with their American counterparts.

Magic And Ultra In The China-Burma-India Theater

by Col. Stephen K. Fitzgerald

The U.S. broke the Japanese diplomatic cipher "Purple," codenamed MAGIC, prior to Pearl Harbor. Decoding success with the various Japanese military codes, codenamed ULTRA, was not achieved until 1943. MAGIC and military (as distinct from naval) ULTRA were the responsibility of the U.S. Army. All MAGIC and ULTRA decrypts were shared with the British. MAGIC and ULTRA were made available to major commanders in the China-Burma-India Theater as they became available. This study makes use of the official U.S. Army history of the theater, intelligence histories, the daily "Magic Summaries," and ULTRA material to examine the operational use of MAGIC and ULTRA. The study focuses on the Second Burma and North Burma Campaigns while making observations about the Salween Campaign and the British defense of India. The study concludes that neither ULTRA nor MAGIC were able to consistently fathom Japanese intentions in Burma and that the ultimate importance of MAGIC and ULTRA was to confirm intelligence obtained from other sources. Nevertheless, as the war went on, ULTRA revealed more and more of Japanese operational goals.

Role Of The Office Of Strategic Services In Operation Torch

by Major Thomas W. Dorrel Jr.

This thesis evaluates the role of Allied strategic and operational intelligence in conjunction with Department of State actions in French North Africa from 1940 through the invasion, Operation TORCH, November 8, 1942. The primary focus is to evaluate whether or not the OSS collected the required intelligence information as their accounts have stated. This paper also looks at the operational requirements of advance force operations to determine if the OSS was successful in accomplishing the required tasks for the operational planning and execution of Operation TORCH. The final analysis reveals that the OSS was successful in answering most of the information requirements, but only with the help of other Allied intelligence collection agencies.

Oil Logistics In The Pacific War In And After Pearl Harbor

by Major Patrick H. Donovan

This research paper focuses on oil and its importance to operations in the Pacific during World War II. It specifically concentrates on the period before Japanese-U.S. hostilities, through the strike on Pearl Harbor, and concludes with operations in the Solomon Islands. A secure and reliable source of oil was one of the primary reasons that Japan chose to go to war with the United States that fateful Sunday in December 1941.The Japanese understood their country's need for oil and other resources, but never conformed their military strategy to achieve their national objective of economic self-sufficiency. The Japanese Navy pedantically espoused a maritime strategy that required the United States Navy to fight a war according to the Japanese playbook. The Japanese Navy never understood the importance that oil, including its storage and transportation, had to all Navies that tried to steam the great expanses of the Pacific. This lack of logistical foresight was to eventually play a major role in Japan's defeat in the Pacific.Commanders and their staffs must never forget the importance operational logistics plays in achieving operational and national objectives. This research provides the reader a valuable example of the importance of logistics in the execution of operational strategy while pursuing national goals. Although it is valuable to learn from one's own personal mistakes, it is usually less painful to learn from someone else's error, and thereby ensure that their blunder does not become your own.

Innovation In The Face Of Adversity: Major-General Sir Percy Hobart And The 79th Armoured Division (British)

by Major Michael J. Daniels

On 11 March 1943, the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, made a momentous decision in committing an entire British armored division, the 79th, to the task of developing equipment, tactics, and capabilities to penetrate the "Atlantic Wall," in anticipation of an Allied amphibious invasion of northwest Europe. British leaders chose Major-General Sir Percy Hobart to command this division, largely because of Hobart's affinity for leading and training armored formations, but also due to Hobart's reputation as an individualist, known to seek out unique solutions to unforeseen challenges.This thesis examines the wartime history of this unit--concentrating on aspects of equipment, tactics, organization and leadership that enabled it to ultimately succeed beyond anyone's expectations. More important, this organization provides valuable lessons for current transformation efforts. The key lessons that this subject provide include: the need for leadership that combines vision with action; a close cooperation between the military-industrial complex and the end user; and allowing space in the force structure for a unit that can perform not only standard combat missions, but can also serve as experimentation test-bed and conduit for new ideas, whether in the form of capabilities, organizational structure, or doctrine.

Operational Logic And Identifying Soviet Operational Centers Of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941

by Major David J. Bongi

This monograph examines Soviet operational centers of gravity during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Specifically, the examination focuses in two areas: (1) German planning for Operation Barbarossa; (2) the operational objectives selected for the second phase of the campaign.The second phase was selected because it was during this phase that the focus of the German military effort became diverse. Two competing strategies within the German political and military command structure caused this. While political-ideological and economic factors influenced one, purely military concerns influenced the other. In the end, the Germans diluted combat power in phase two towards three operational objectives: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Ukraine.Thus, the research question for this monograph is: Which, if any, of the German operational objectives for the second phase of the campaign were also Soviet operational centers of gravity?The analysis of operational objectives uses Colonel William Mendel's and Colonel Lamar Tooke's analytical model called "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." Potential centers of gravity are analyzed using a validity and a feasibility test.This monograph concludes that Moscow was the operational center of gravity for the campaign by virtue of its direct and intrinsic relationship to the strategic center of gravity--the Soviet Military.

Personality And Strategy:: How The Personalities Of General MacArthur And Admiral King Shaped Allied Strategy In The Pacific In World War Two

by Kyle B. Beckman

This thesis examines the impact that the dominant personalities of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Ernest King had in shaping Allied strategy in the Pacific during the Second World War. The concept of dominant personality is defined as containing three essential elements: arrogance, tenacity, and supreme competence. The lives of MacArthur and King are examined, demonstrating that the actions of each consistently reflected these characteristics, allowing them to dominate those around them. Three key decisions from the Pacific war are scrutinized for the impact of one or both of these dominant personalities. King and MacArthur affected these decisions in different ways. In the first, the decision to initiate carrier raids against Japan in early 1942, King acted unopposed in pushing his audacious plans through. The second decision was to invade Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) in August 1942. King and MacArthur drove this decision in parallel competition, each striving to begin offensive operations and each desiring to be in control. Finally, the long competition between the Central and Southwestern Pacific drives for primacy, culminating with the debate over invading Luzon or Formosa, is examined. In this case, MacArthur and King pursued mutually exclusive courses and stalemate nearly resulted.

Operational Art In The Defense: The German Abwehrschlachten In 1918

by Major Frank Reiser

The stalemate in World War I created the need for a solution to escape this resource intense form of warfare. Following five unsuccessful German offenses in early 1918, the Germans found themselves in a solely defensive scenario conducting defensive battles, named "Abwehrschlachten."Based on the findings of previous research on these offensives, the monograph analyzes German operational thinking and the display of operational art in the subsequent defensive scenario from the last unsuccessful offensive in July 1918 to the armistice in November 1918.The paper relies on two approaches. First, it analyzes data from primary sources to identify changes in the strategic context from a German perspective, by using a model from Collin S. Gray, and derives implications for the German ability to apply operational art. Second, it reflects German military actions during the "Abwehrschlachten" upon a framework of operational elements, derived from the previous case study of David T. Zabecki on the German offensives.The analysis results in a confirmation of previous findings about the level of German operational thinking at that time, but also depicts the limitations the Germans faced in their attempts to apply their thinking through military action. Those limitations predominately emerged from significant changes in the operational environment in 1918. Current consensus, in line with Clausewitz's thoughts on the defense, is that the defense, tied to a negative aim, is a temporary form of warfare and military leaders always strive to seize the initiative to transit to the offensive form of war-fighting, tied to a positive aim. Based on the analysis of this solely defensive scenario from a German perspective, the monograph questions the applicability of today's understanding of operational art in such a purely defensive scenario and suggest the evolution towards a framework for operational art in the defense.

Incomplete Victory: General Allenby And Mission Command In Palestine, 1917-1918

by Lcdr Geronimo Nuño

The Palestine Campaign of the First World War exhibited a fighting style that brought with it various challenges in mission command. While General Allenby, commanding the Allied Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), gained several victories in the early stages of the campaign, he did not comprehensively defeat the Turkish forces in Palestine. He drove them away from their defensive line, but they escaped, avoided destruction, and retreated north to re-establish a defense and engage the EEF at later date. This thesis argues that General Allenby did not achieve the great successes at the battles of Beersheba, Gaza, Sheria, and the pursuit of Turkish forces that ended with Allenby's capture of Jerusalem. Instead, Allenby had to learn how to succeed in Palestine to finally destroy the armies of the Ottoman Empire in Palestine at the battle of Megiddo in September 1918. The research in this study highlights the mission command challenges in Allenby's early campaigns and how he learned to overcome them and adapt his tactics to achieve complete victory at the battle of Megiddo. This thesis will use the tenets of mission command, consisting preparation, combined arms, prioritization of resources, and communication, to examine General Allenby's Palestine campaign. Mission command, both a function of war and a philosophy of leadership comprises one of the key facets of military thought that leaders must consider in order to achieve complete victory.

Overcoming the Battlefield Stalemate:: The Introduction of Armored Fighting Vehicles and Tactics in the British Army During the First World War

by David P. Cavaleri

This report documents the development of trench warfare on the Western Front during the First World War and the technological experiments conducted by the British Expeditionary Force to overcome the loss of strategic mobility. Reviews the work of E. D. Swinton, Churchill, Haig, J. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart and Guderian with regard to the early development of tank and mechanized operations in W.W.I.

Provide by Parachute: Airdrop In Vietnam, 1954-1972

by Major John A. Tokar

The study of history is a resource that most agree is critical to the betterment of any organization. The U.S. Army has always embraced military history, and by studying the "lessons-learned" from past wars and operations it improves its ability to perform in the future. However, the bulk of rewarding historical military study and education has been devoted to combat operations, at the expense of other fields, such as logistics. Moreover, there has been sparse accounting of logistical operations during the Vietnam War. The use of airdrop was not widespread in Vietnam, but significant developments in aerial resupply doctrine and technology were experienced. This monograph analyzes the airdrop operations at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Khe Sanh in 1968, and An Loc in 1972, and presents the doctrinal and procedural evolution that occurred in each. All three battles presented unique challenges to the logisticians tasked to resupply the beleaguered forces, and the solutions that emerged were equally remarkable.The story of aerial resupply, tactical airlift, and airdrop in Vietnam is largely a story of success in a place and time where (at least strategically and politically) there were few positive achievements. Many of the ideas and tenets employed to relieve besieged forces there were the result of the resourcefulness and ingenuity of Army and Air Force logisticians and aircrews. Some of these methods were incorporated into procedures for future use, but many were not. This study captures these experiences, through an historical analysis of the missions themselves, with the intent of improving the current logistics posture of U.S. forces and their ability to "provide by parachute."

Gradual Failure: The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965-1966 [Illustrated Edition]

by Jacob Van Staaveren

Includes over 100 maps, plans and illustrationsThe United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power.Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war.Readers of this volume will also want to read the sequel, Wayne Thompson's To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973, which tells the more encouraging story of how the Air Force employed airpower to far greater effect using a combination of better doctrine, tactics, technology, and training.

Lifeline From The Sky: The Doctrinal Implications Of Supplying An Enclave From The Air

by John Steven Brunhaver

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves.The primary conclusion of this paper is that four fundamental factors influence airlift operations: requirement to capability ratio, threat, support infrastructure, and weather. The second conclusion is that there are two basic methods to employ airlift forces: continuous flow and surge methods. The additional doctrinal imperatives contained in the conclusion relate to the interactions among the four factors affecting airlift operations to support enclaves and the ways in which they influence the two employment methods.Evidence used to derive the doctrinal propositions came from the Luftwaffe's attempt to resupply the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad from the air, the Berlin Airlift, and the airlift to the Khe Sanh garrison in the Vietnam War.

Israeli Combined Arms Employment: Um Katef, 1967 & Suez Canal, 1973

by Major Charles L. Weeks

The next desert war the United States fights could be against an enemy more comparable to us in training, motivation, and technology than the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is a dangerous part of the world where we have limited experience in the use of high technology weapons, or in large-scale combat even given the recent war against Iraq. Since we have limited experience in these areas, this thesis analyzes two of the most recent historical examples of such combat from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars to reveal conclusions useful to U. S. war fighters.This thesis examines the Battle of Um Katef, Abu Ageila from the 1967 War, and the Sinai Campaign from the 1973 War. They were examined primarily from secondary sources, using the U. S. Army battlefield operating systems, as the framework to evaluate success or failure. The resulting keys to success or reasons for failure were then further evaluated against the four tenets of U. S. Airland Battle Doctrine (Agility, Initiative, Depth, and Synchronization).The result of this investigation is a number of conclusions regarding modern combined arms combat. These conclusions are categorized as strengths or weaknesses and presented as lessons learned. Surprisingly enough, none of the lessons learned proved to be environment specific.

Operational Encirclements: Can The United States Military Decisively Follow Through?

by Major Scott Thomas

This study is a historical analysis of how encirclement operations have been and still are important offensive operations. These operations need to be given priority in planning and execution by the United States Military. Encirclement operations have proven to be decisive military operations throughout history; regardless of the composition and disposition of the enemy encircled. The U.S. military has maintained the decisive edge on the battlefield for over sixty years. Even with the benefits of technology, air supremacy, firepower, mobility, and maneuver, the U.S. military has not yet been completely successful in planning and executing encirclement operations. Today the U.S. military is arguably the best equipped and trained force in history. Even with this professional force, it is questionable whether the U.S. military could successfully execute an encirclement operation. Therefore this monograph provides a historical examination as to why the U.S. military has been unable to reap the benefits of the offensive maneuver of encirclement.To accomplish this examination, this monograph conducts an analysis of four historical case studies: The Argentan-Falaise Pocket, the Battle of Ia Drang, Doctrinal Revolution from 1986-2001, and Operation Anaconda. The analysis identifies the U.S. military has placed an over reliance on firepower to replace the maneuver of ground combat units. Secondly, this monograph also argues the U.S. military has placed too much emphasis on technology. This belief in technology has reduced the number of ground combat units employed in offensive operations. Additionally, U.S. military doctrine historically has not provided the foundation necessary to support and encourage the planning and execution of encirclement operations. These deficiencies together have prevented the U.S. military from capitalizing on the decisive nature resulting from the speed and shock of correctly executed encirclement operations.

Insurgency In Ancient Times: The Jewish Revolts Against The Seleucid And Roman Empires, 166 BC-73 AD

by LTC William T. Sorrells

This monograph examines two insurgencies conducted by the Jews in ancient times: The Maccabee Revolt against the Seleucid Empire from 166-164 BC and the Revolt against the Roman Empire from 66-70 AD. The monograph proposes that all insurgencies have a nature and the nature of insurgency is as critical to understanding an insurgency today as it was two thousand years ago. Ancient Jewish history provides an excellent case study of a successful and failed insurgency. The Jewish revolt against the Seleucid Empire (Maccabee Revolt 166-164 BC) was a successful insurgency, which gained the free practice of religion for the Jewish people and ultimately an independent Jewish State. This independence lasted for one hundred years until 63 BC when Palestine was annexed by the Roman Empire. Subsequently, the Jewish people again revolted in 66 AD against Roman rule, but the result of the insurgency was a failure catastrophic to the Jewish people and the prospects for an independent Jewish state.The monograph contains four sections: Introduction, Prelude and Nature of Insurgency: The Maccabee Revolt, Prelude and Nature of Insurgency: The Revolt against Rome, and Conclusion. The model for analysis is the nature of insurgency as defined by US Army Doctrine. The respective natures of each insurgency are each examined separately to provide data for analysis. The data for each insurgency is then compared against the other to determine why one insurgency failed and the other succeeded.

Mao Tse-Tung And Operational Art During The Chinese Civil War

by Major Thomas P. Reilly

This monograph examines the nature of operational art during the third and final phase of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949. During this period Mao Tse-Tung and the Red Army fought Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Army for the military and political control of China.The initial portion of the monograph discusses the areas of military strategy and the development of operational art. This area was developed using contemporary monographs, research projects, and professional journal articles. Professional military journals such as Parameters and Military Review publish relevant articles covering these subjects on a recurring basis. The majority of the information covering Mao's thoughts and writings were drawn from The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung published in Beijing, China by the Foreign Languages Press.The section dealing with the essence of operational art was developed primarily from James Schneider's theoretical paper; Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art. In this paper Schneider identifies, defines, and argues that eight key attributes must exist for the fullest expression of operational art to be manifested. These eight attributes are; the distributed operation, the distributed campaign, a system of continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, the operationally durable formation, operational vision, the distributed enemy, and distributed deployment. This monograph uses Schneider's eight key attributes of operational art as a measure of effectiveness for evaluating the use of operational art during the Chinese Civil War.This monograph concludes that while Mao Tse-Tung was one-step removed from the operational level of war, the commanders of the Red Army, guided by his theory of protracted war and his controlling strategy, successfully applied operational art to decisively defeat a larger, better equipped, and trained military force in a sequential series of battles and engagements.

Increasing Small Arms Lethality In Afghanistan: Taking Back The Infantry Half-Kilometer

by Major Thomas P. Ehrhart

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. These operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate.Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrainThere are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics-Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.

Sea-Based Airpower—The Decisive Factor In Expeditionary Operations? Norway 1940, Falkland Islands 1982

by Major Willard A. Buhl

This essay examines the British use of sea-based aviation in support of two modern amphibious campaigns: the British campaign in Norway in 1940 and in the Falkland Islands War in 1982. The purpose is to determine whether or not aircraft carriers (sea-based aviation) were at the root of the success or failure of British efforts.In April 1940, there were no airfields in central Norway capable of supporting modern, high performance aircraft. As the Norwegian campaign unfolded and the British faced a significant land-based air threat from the Luftwaffe, they failed to appreciate the tactical and operational potential of sea-based aviation. At the same time, British naval aircraft were technically inferior in design and capability compared to their Luftwaffe land-based counterparts in 1940. Nevertheless, despite determined attacks on British naval assets at the tactical level, at the operational level, the German command limited their campaign goals and did not exploit their advantage in the air to the extent possible. Their actions did, however, place great pressure on British sea based lines of communication in central Norway, the operational pivot of the campaign.In 1982, against the Argentines, the British faced another opponent with superior land-based aviation. Although the British fully appreciated the need for air superiority, they employed a tactical scheme not unlike what had occurred in Norway. Nevertheless, the British were able to successfully contest the airspace above the Falklands and ultimately succeeded in defeating Argentine ground forces and ejecting them from the islands.

Operational Art In The Korean War: A Comparison Between General MacArthur And General Walker

by Major Remco van Ingen

This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur's approach used two major ground commands, was more daring, but more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand suggested an approach under one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur's approach was the one executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The out loading of X Corps, in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment.The monograph provides insight in the relationship between the commander's personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.

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