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Intelligence is a key element in the military strategy of surprise. It is perplexing to many that in today's high technology environment that intelligence cannot prevent surprises from happening. The very nature of the intelligence, no matter how much or how sophisticated it is, will still permit one adversary to surprise another. It is crucial that the operational commander have a clear understanding of the process of the production of intelligence, the uses of intelligence and how it can affect the strategy of surprise. The dramatic success of the Battle of Midway, coming so closely on the heels of the shocking disaster at Pearl Harbor, demonstrated that Admiral Nimitz gained an appreciation for the value of intelligence. I will examine intelligence and the strategy of surprise in general terms and shows how the battle of Midway was influenced by them. Finally, I want to point out that though today's operations may be more sophisticated than those of World War II, there are plenty of critical concerns to consider today with regard to intelligence and surprise at the operational level.
This study examines the role of combat gliders in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States during World War II (WWII). This thesis compares and contrasts each country with respect to pre-WWII glider experience, glider and airborne doctrine, glider pilot training, and glider production while outlining each country's major glider operations. The author then compares the glider operations in the China-Burma-India Theater to the operations in Europe to describe the unique challenges based on the terrain and mission. Next, this thesis presents an analysis of the glider's precipitous decline following WWII. The study concludes with recommendations for glider operations in the future based on the experiences of the past.
This work is a detailed historical study of the Second World War's little known Aleutian Campaign in the North Pacific, commonly referred to as the "Forgotten War." After describing the events that transpired in the North Pacific throughout the war, this work focuses on the strategic reasons why the United States and Japan decided to dedicate critical and limited resources to a secondary effort in the North Pacific. The strategies are compared to determine which country dedicated a higher percentage of available manpower and resources to the region and which country gained an advantage from their respective propaganda efforts. Despite the United States' tactical and operational victories in the North Pacific, the Japanese benefited at the strategic level. Secondary theaters of operations, like the Aleutians during World War II, produced many lessons that were applied to other theaters during the war and remain relevant today in the Global War on Terrorism.
Field Marshal Rommel's North African Campaign demonstrates many of the limitations and restricting factors of modern warfare. Examining the Axis Alliance preparation, implementation and sustainment of its operations provides insight applicable to the warfare commander of today. Relevancy is obtained through analysis of the Axis coalition command and control structure, tactical battle operations, strategic strategy, weapon technology, use of intelligence and logistical support network. Rommel's successful offensive through Libya and Egypt was ended at the Battle of El Alamein due to the critical influence of these factors. His exploits demonstrate excellence of battlefield tactics at the expense of strategic strategy and logistical sustainment.
Although the resistance effort maintained its strength ideologically, the Lithuanian partisan movement never recovered from the culminating point in 1945 because of a shortfall in resources, a lack of external support, and the inability of resistance leadership to adapt rapidly enough against a comprehensive Soviet assimilation campaign.While many authors argue that the high point in the Lithuanian partisan war occurred between 1946 and 1947, the totality of evidence points towards a culmination in 1945 from which the effort never recovered. This culminating point may be attributed to a miscalculation of partisan resources on the part of their leadership as well as a lack of external support. The main reason for achieving culmination, however, rested in the inability of partisans to fight a conventional war against a massive, combined arms Soviet force. Mass deportations between three separate occupations and a wave of 60,000 escapees created a vacuum of political, military and moral leadership. Compounded with the realization that there would be no external support from the democratic West, the will of the Lithuanians was bent by the Soviet campaign. Ultimately, the numbers of partisans killed, captured or given amnesty by Soviet forces reflect an apex in military capability in 1945 that drastically diminished thereafter.The pinnacle of partisan effort in 1945 clearly represents a culminating point that forced the Lithuanian resistance movement to shift their operations drastically. Ultimately, based on the totality of evidence, the 1945 culminating point splits the resistance into two stages: 1) 1944-1945-conventional war operations, a period of traditional offensive warfare by an organized partisan movement; and 2) 1946-1953-irregular warfare operations, a period of unremitting decline by a significantly diminished resistance, relegated to a more defensive posture and small scale offensive operations.
The Red Army's defeat of the Germans during the Second World War is one of the great achievements in military history. The military man most responsible for that victory was Marshal Georgi Zhukov. Though less well known than some of his German or allied counterparts, Zhukov was a brilliant practitioner of a distinctive, and uniquely Soviet, style of operational art. This style was first tested against the Japanese Kwangtung Army at Khalkin Gol in Mongolia. Zhukov's operational scheme at Khalkin Gol was the prototype for his later successes at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk.Zhukov and the Red Army came of age together. Both rose from the ashes of the Tsarist Army and endured two decades of war, debate, reform and crisis. While Zhukov rose through the ranks of the cavalry, the Red Army underwent a period of great intellectual activity. By the mid 1930's, Soviet military theorists began to explore new concepts of successive or "deep" operations that promised to avoid the positional warfare of World War One. During this period, Zhukov became an avowed "tankist" and was extremely well placed to participate in this "renaissance."When Stalin launched his purge of the Red Army in 1937, Zhukov was a Corps Commander. Though interrogated at length, he survived. In 1939, Zhukov, then a Deputy Military District Commander, was summoned to Moscow. Zhukov was relieved to find that he had been ordered to proceed to Khalkin Gol in Mongolia where Soviet troops were facing a Japanese incursion across the border.After assessing the situation, Zhukov prepared a plan to drive the Japanese out of Mongolian territory. Upon assuming command and conducting a massive build-up of combat power, Zhukov launched a devastating offensive spearheaded by massed tanks and artillery that would become the prototype for Soviet offensives during the Second World War.
In September 1943 allied armies of the United States and Great Britain landed on the European mainland in its "soft underbelly" taking another step toward the defeat of Nazi Germany. Expecting to be in Rome by the end of that year, the Allies instead found themselves embroiled in a prolonged struggle of static warfare reminiscent of the western front of 1915-16. In the end the allied armies suffered 312,000 casualties in a campaign whose purpose was not clearly decided. This monograph examines the Allies campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have "won" and, if so, how. More specifically, this study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. This particular historical case study is significant in that the challenges of difficult terrain, coalition command, multinational forces, limited resources, and bad weather faced by the operational commanders of this campaign are factors that may weigh heavily for operational commanders in future conflicts.Conclusions reached in this study are threefold. First, the operational commanders involved did not have a true appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. Second, the operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Third, classical theory, as represented by the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini, and even Liddell Hart, does have utility in explaining cause and effect and may well have provided the commanders concerned in this case clearer insight at the operational level of war.
The Development Of German Doctrine And Command And Control And Its Application To Supporting Arms, 1832–1945by Major Marvin Knorr Jr. USMC
This thesis describes how German doctrine and command and control evolved in World War II with respect to supporting arms. Structured knowledge of a subject, based on empirical data and experience, contributes to successful practice and future development. The German experience of the Second World War is used to discern the applicable lessons of command and control for understanding the development of modern warfare as it relates to supporting arms.
The Tomahawk cruise missile, the conventional Air Launched Cruise missile, and the SCUD surface-to-surface missile each made an impact during the Gulf War. The cruise missiles were instrumental in incapacitating the Iraqi electrical network. The SCUD missile was not as successful, but did divert the coalition air campaign. Although never utilized, the sister of the SCUD missile, the intercontinental ballistic missile, was pivotal during the Cold War. Each of these weapons can trace their initiation to the development of the German V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket during World War II.The German weapons were not as successful as their antecedents. This paper will inspect the military utility of the weapons during World War II. Initially, the paper will define the actors behind the development, and describe the resulting weapons. Next, the essay will examine the strategy in weapon utilization. The paper will quantify the damage caused by both weapons. Then, the document will describe offensive and defensive countermeasures employed by the Allies. The question of the weapons' military utility will be addressed. Finally, alternatives to the weapons development, production, and employment will be presented.
This study analyzes the logistics operations of the North Africa Campaign. The thesis covers wholesale and retail level preparedness and execution of the U.S. ground force sustainment following the Allied landings in northwest Africa in November 1942. The analysis concludes with the German surrender in Tunisia in May 1943.The logistical efforts of the campaign are studied against the framework of modern Airland Battle doctrine. The functional areas of manning, fueling, arming, fixing, and transporting are assessed by the doctrinal imperatives of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation.
The first requirement for this paper is to deal with the problem of exactly what we mean by the three terms employed in the title. Mass in the Russian context has a double meaning. To some it unquestionably calls to mind the image of the Russian steamroller, which provided nightmares of Schlieffen and his planners in the decades before World War I. A simple process of extrapolation based upon the size of Russia's standing army, the number of conscripts being inducted in any year under the universal military service statute, and the Empire's total population provided a rough estimate of the total number of rifles and bayonets which the tsar could put into the field. The tsarist government's adoption of the Grand Program for rearmament in 1912 thus threatened to change the military balance on the continent. Those forces would mobilize slowly, but, like a steamroller, their momentum would carry all before them.
This paper is intended to examine key aspects of senior leadership in the execution of the North Burma Campaign of 1944 by the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The paper addresses the formation and training of the unit, also known as Merrill's Marauders. It also addresses the three major missions performed by the Marauders to include the seizing of the Myitkyina airstrip. In particular, the paper considers the leadership of Generals Stilwell and Merrill during the campaign and examines new evidence concerning their performance.
On 9 September 1943 the United States Fifth Army landed at Salerno, commencing a lengthy and costly campaign that would transit the Italian Peninsula. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark commanded this army. His many supporters, including Winston Churchill and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, considered him a brilliant staff officer and trainer. His detractors, including General George S. Patton, considered him overly ambitious and self serving. Clark had been promoted ahead of many senior and experienced officers, some of whom were now his subordinate commanders within the Fifth Army. His army would come under the jurisdiction of the Fifteenth Army Group, a combined American-British Headquarters commanded by General Harold Alexander, an Englishmen. Clark would command a number of foreign troops, including the British X Corps, the New Zealand Corps and the French Expeditionary Corps. Throughout this campaign, Clark would face the complexities of coalition command, tactical in nature but with strategic consequences. This thesis contends that the command arrangements within Fifteenth Army Group, together with biased perceptions, greatly influenced the decision making of General Clark, an accomplished staff officer yet inexperienced army commander.
This study investigates the role that logistics played in the failure of the German Offensive in the Ardennes in 1944. The thesis explains that despite the incredible build-up of forces and supplies, the inability of the German strategic and operational logistics systems to properly equip, fuel, arm, and move forces caused the failure of the Ardennes Offensive.The concept of this thesis starts with the overall strategic military and political situation of Germany in the fall of 1944 that Hitler used to base his decision to conduct the offensive in December 1944.The study then examines in detail the strategic capabilities during the build-up of supplies and the operational level organization and planning for the offensive. An analysis of the details on the impact of terrain, climate, allied air interdiction, and Operation Point Blank is included in this chapter.Then it examines the first weeks of the offensive and looks at the failure of the fuel and arm and move tactical logistics functions. An analysis of the impact of logistics on supporting operations is included in this chapter.
Between April and August 1943, the U.S. Army's II Corps saw two of its division commanders relieved of their commands. Each relief appeared tied to battlefield setbacks. MG Orlando Ward of the 1st Armored Division was relieved after his division failed to seize a narrow mountain pass near the town of Maknassy, in Tunisia. Ward's superiors labeled him too cautious, unwilling or unable to motivate his soldiers to take their objective. Months later on the island of Sicily, MG Terry Allen was relieved of command of the 1st Infantry Division. His relief followed the failure to seize the Sicilian town of Troina. Allen's superiors accused him of being too hesitant in committing his entire force to the attack. He was branded an insubordinate rebel who cared only for his own troops.In both cases, a standard history of the events emerged. It was based on the official U.S. Army account and a narrow reading of primary sources. This version of events ascribed each relief to flaws in Ward and Allen's leadership ability. The standard description of the reliefs continues to appear in recent scholarship. However, some accounts departed from the accepted portrayal, and point to alternate reasons behind the reliefs. When these alternative accounts are considered along with a comprehensive examination of primary source material, a new argument emerges. Ward and Allen were removed from command for political and military reasons of expediency. From a broader perspective, this investigation revealed how wartime leaders dealt with unprecedented circumstances to accomplish their goals. Understanding the reliefs of Generals Ward and Allen provides insight into organizational decision making and its effect on the U.S. Army in the early portion of World War II.
The Norwegian Resistance during the Second World War (April 1940-June 1945) was basically a peaceful set of events conducted by the civilian population as well as underground military organizations. While sabotage and other hostile resistance acts did occur, they were not great in number. It should not be overlooked the Norwegian Armed Forces did fight for 63 days before admitting defeat to Germany.This paper will answer the question "Was the Norwegian Resistance successful against the German Nazis once their country was taken over by them during the Second World War?" The Warden theory of the organization of a system is used to categorize the Resistance movement, dissecting it and placing it in categories. Centers of gravity are noted and discussed. While the Norwegians did not have the military strength to beat the Germans, they did win many battles via their Resistance to the German Rule. These victories along with German acknowledgment prove the Norwegian Resistance was successful against the German Army and its rule over Norway.
Strategy is the calculated relationship of means to ends. At the highest military level, that relationship guides the use of the joint and combined military instrument of power to achieve national military strategic objectives. At the national or grand strategic level, the relationship becomes more complex, dealing with multiple, interrelated objectives that can only be achieved by the coordinated use of all the instruments of national power, to include that of the military. In a rapidly changing, increasingly more complicated and interdependent world, the U.S. military professional needs to understand not only the dynamics of military strategy, but of grand strategy as well.This book examines the evolution of Winston Churchill's understanding of both strategic dynamics. In the author's view, that understanding came about not so much from any detailed, consistent study of great strategists or immutable strategic principles, but rather from on-the-job strategic training throughout an incredibly rich and varied life. In the military sphere, there were at first only his tactical experiences in the small wars in the closing years of the Victorian era. In the First World War, however, Churchill came to appreciate the operational and military strategic levels of war as well. Moreover, it was that conflict which drew him increasingly to the realm of grand strategy in which all the elements of national power were combined to achieve victory in the first total war of this century.
Following the October 1917 Revolution, the leaders of the fledgling Red Army embarked on a debate concerning the nature, form, and function of military doctrine. A group known as the 'military communists,' including M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevsky, K. Voroshilov, and S.I. Gusev sought to formulate a 'proletarian' military doctrine based on the lessons of the Russian Civil War (1918-21) and purged of supposedly outmoded, bourgeois military thought. Their doctrine, they claimed, would be based overwhelmingly on maneuver and the offensive, which they felt best represented the 'active' nature of the working class. Against them stood Commissar for War Leon Trotsky, supported by ex-Tsarist military specialists, notably A.A. Svechin. Trotsky and his allies, noting the Soviet Union's backwardness relative to the West, professed a policy of expediency in military affairs. Though Trotsky and Svechin proved their position correct both in reference to military affairs and orthodox communist thought, the ripening political struggle eventually secured Frunze's and Tukhachevsky's domination of the Red Army and Trotsky's eventual ouster and exile.
Operation Stalemate II was conducted on 15 September 1944 to secure the Palau Islands in the Pacific Ocean. The primary purpose of this operation was to prevent the Japanese from attacking MacArthur's western flank while he conducted operations in the Philippines. After 72 days of fighting US forces eliminated the entire Japanese garrison of 13,500 soldiers. US casualties included over 2,000 dead or missing.Operation Stalemate II did not achieve its primary purpose of preventing the enemy from attacking MacArthur's flank because that purpose had already been accomplished. The commander of Japanese forces in the Palaus did not have the ability influence actions against the Americans in the Philippines.Prior to 15 September 1944 key leadership realized the intent of Stalemate II had already been achieved. Despite this knowledge Stalemate II was allowed to proceed because military leadership of the Pacific was hampered by an inefficient command structure. The inefficiencies manifested as disputes between personalities and services, competition for resources, and decentralized execution of two distinctly separate courses of action against Japanese forces in the Pacific. This led to duplication of efforts and execution of unnecessary tasks. Stalemate II was one such unnecessary task.Although unnecessary at the time, Stalemate II significantly contributed to today's Joint command and control concepts. The sacrifices made by those who participated in Stalemate II continue to pay dividends for America's modern military forces.
In a constantly changing world threatened by the likelihood of terrorist acts, the American people need military leaders who clearly demonstrate an understanding of American core values, and who are both competent and morally focused. In order to produce military leaders who meet these qualifications and who can successfully meet the future challenges America faces, it is important to develop and refine those leaders early and help them understand how to create and refine a successful leadership style. The process of developing leadership styles, however, is not easy and it requires a prodigious amount of determination, time, and planning from prospective future leaders. It also requires military training institutions to align their curriculums to promote leadership, as well as, to provide guidance and mentoring in order to help develop these future leaders.One way to help develop leaders is to provide examples of both successful and flawed military leadership styles. There are many cases of each in American history. In particular, World War II leaders Admirals Ernest J. King and Chester W. Nimitz provide contrasting examples of naval leadership. An examination of the leadership styles of these two naval officers provides useful examples which future leaders can consider when reflecting on their own leadership styles. After careful review, it soon becomes evident that the leadership style of Nimitz closely aligned with the leadership styles of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, two World War II leaders I closely examined in my previous Master's thesis. In addition, it also becomes evident that King was a diametrically different leader from these three leaders. He provides an example of a leader who was cold, harsh, and morally bankrupt. As result, reviewing the leadership styles of these World War II leaders will benefit future leaders as well as those they lead.
The Fall Of Fort Eben Emael: The Effects Of Emerging Technologies On The Successful Completion Of Military Objectivesby Major Thomas B. Gukeisen
This study details the events of 10 May 1940 at Fort Eben Emael, Belgium, and the elements which led to the successful seizure of the fort by the German military. The central focus of this thesis is the following question: Was the use of emerging technologies the key to victory at Fort Eben Emael? First, the study focuses on the technologies themselves. Secondly, this study examines the leadership and training of the German unit assigned the mission at Fort Eben Emael. Lastly, this study examines administration and personnel issues that existed for the Belgians stationed at Fort Eben Emael. This study determined that the glider did afford troops the advantage of surprise; however, the hollow charge failed to live up to its reputation as it was most effective when used in such a way that it was no different than a conventional charge. Further, the German unit's training and leadership was exemplary and contributed more to the mission's success than the technologies the unit employed. Additionally, Fort Eben Emael was faced with serious internal issues that prevented a successful defence of the fort. Therefore, this thesis concludes that emerging technologies were not the most crucial component contributing to mission success.
Education has been the foundational cornerstone to every profession and continues to be so in the 21st Century. As a profession, the military is obligated to conduct not only training but also education of the keepers of the profession, the officer corps. Since the rise of large military bodies enabled by the levee en masse and industrialization, armies have required educated officers skilled in both command and staff functions. The Prussian-German model of staff officer education embodied in the Kriegsakademie of the Nineteenth and first half of the Twentieth Century's, was highly regarded and much copied. The education officer received at the Kriegsakademie directly contributed to an efficiently organized and employed Prussian-German Army at the tactical and operational levels. The investment in Kriegsakademie officer education paid huge dividends at Gravelotte-St Privat and Sedan 1870, Tannenberg 1914, Battle of Poland 1939, and the Battle of France 1940, critical first battles.With the rearming of Germany in 1955 came the need for the fledgling Bundeswehr to educate general staff officers. This need was met by establishing the Führungsakademie (German Armed Forces Command and Staff College). The Führungsakademie was created with the same time honored principles that had served general staff officer training previously: careful selection of the most highly qualified and promising officers and a broad based education rigorously applied. However, little information on the current Führungsakademie Education System is available in the English language. This monograph attempts to address this void. The author conducted research and interviews with the faculty, staff, and students at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg, Germany in order to understand and assess the education given to German general staff officer aspirants. The central general staff officer's education course is the National General/Admiral Staff Officers Course.
Operating Below Crush Depth:: The Formation, Evolution, And Collapse Of The Imperial Japanese Navy Submarine Force In World War IIby LCDR David W. Grogan USN
Prior to entering World War II, the Japanese Navy did a considerable planning and force development in preparation for a single "decisive battle" with the American fleet. The Japanese submarine force entered the war with highly trained crews operating some of the most capable submarines in the world. Even so, they accomplished little. This study will analyze the genesis and evolution of the technological basis of the Japanese submarine fleet before and during the war. Along with the technological evolution, it will also review the strategic and tactical evolution of the force. It will further analyze the employment of submarines as they apply to two major forms of naval warfare: guerre de course and guerre de main. While the entire study will use comparison with the American and German, the majority of the focus will be on the unique aspects of the Japanese employment of their submarines. These analyses will answer whether the Japanese submarine force would have been capable of influencing the results of major battles and the overall campaign in the Pacific Ocean. Could the Japanese submarine force have influenced the result of the war allowing it to end with a more favorable outcome for the Japanese?
[Includes 36 maps and 10 tables]Deep battle, a major element in both U.S. and Soviet doctrine, is a tenet that emphasizes destroying, suppressing, or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact, but throughout the depth of the battlefield. Airborne forces are a primary instrument to accomplish this type of operation. While the exploits of German, British, and American paratroops since 1940 are well known to most professional soldiers, the equivalent experience of the Soviet Union has been largely ignored--except in the Soviet Union. There, the Red Army's airborne operations have become the focus of many recent studies by military theorists.Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz has done much to remedy this gap in our historical literature. The Soviet Airborne Experience examines the experiences of the Red Army in World War II and traces Soviet airborne theory and practice both before and since the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. Airborne warfare emerges as an essential part of the high-speed offensive operations planned by Soviet commanders.Because Lieutenant Colonel Glantz examines airborne operations within the larger context of Soviet unconventional warfare, the implications of this study reach beyond one specialized form of maneuver. This study, in demonstrating the ability of Russian airborne and partisan forces to survive and fight behind German lines for months at a time, provides us with an instructive example of how Soviet special operations troops probably plan to operate in future wars. The Soviet Airborne Experience is an important reference for anyone concerned with planning and conducting operations.
This report examines the development of the Soviet Army's operational art against the Germans during World War 2. It examines the reconstruction and reorganization of the Soviet military forces after Hitler's invasion, the development and coordination of military tactics on the various fronts and the deployment of forces for defense or attack in several battles.
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