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The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of the Southern railroad system on interior lines during the Civil War and determine whether or not the South enjoyed the advantage of interior lines. The use of railroads during this conflict placed an enormous physical strain upon the limited industrial resources of the Confederacy, and a great strain upon the intellectual agility of the Confederate High Command. Based upon the evidence studied, and the time-space comparisons of both Northern and Southern railway operations, several conclusions can be drawn: the South entered the war with a rail system that was unable to meet the demands of modern war; the Confederate leadership understood the importance of the railroad and its importance to strategic operations early in the war, but were unwilling to adopt a course of action that best utilized their scarce assets; Southern railroad speeds decreased dramatically by 1863 due to the inability of Southern railroads owners to perform needed maintenance on their railroad equipment; tactical reverses on the field of battle, especially the losses of both Corinth in May of 1862 and Knoxville in September of 1863 increased the distances that re-enforcements would have to travel to fight a mobile intra-theater war; Union control, maintenance, and organization of its railway assets ensured that it would be able to move large numbers of troops at the strategic level efficiently from early 1863 to the end of the war. Based on these conclusions, the Confederacy lost the ability to shift troops on the strategic level more rapidly than the Union by 1863. This was a result of its physically weakened railroad system and military setbacks which caused Southern railroads to move forces over longer distances.
This monograph explores the economic foundations behind General Ulysses S. Grant's 1864-1865 campaign, the final campaign of the American Civil War. This paper will compare and contrast the economic conditions in the Union and the Confederacy with respect to manpower, social systems, finance infrastructure and industrial capacity. This will result in calculus of relative strategic power to analyze the strength and protracted military capability of the two belligerents.The campaign was long and bloody--truly a campaign that destroyed vast resources in people and national treasure. While the fighting was both protracted and vicious, the outcome was never in doubt. Based upon a strategic calculus of power, particularly industrial capacity and economic power it was clear that the Union had a decisive advantage. While the South was primarily a traditional society with an agriculturally based economy, the North was in the stage of precondition for take-off fully on the road to industrialization. Simply stated the South could ill afford to use up resources in manpower, military equipment and treasure at a rate near equal to the North. General Grant's final campaign was successful because it flowed from conditions set by a strong, vibrant economy and was guided by a strategy that thrived on this productive strength. Pressed into a corner due to Grant's final campaign, the South was sure to lose.
Examines the operations of Sherman's 15th and 17th Corps during the march through Georgia in the Fall of 1864, with emphasis on their respective roles in support of Sherman's strategy. The study focuses on the role of the march within the context of overall Union strategy, the special preparations for the movement to the coast, and the actions of the 15th and 17th Corps during the latter two-thirds of the march (23 November-10 December, 1864). The operations of the 15th Corps are particularly emphasized to highlight its role in forcing the rapid collapse of Confederate opposition in front of Sherman's advance.The study concludes that though largely ignored and overshadowed by the actions of the left wing and Union cavalry, the accomplishments of the right wing (particularly the 15th Corps) were a more important validation of Sherman's strategic gamble. After feinting toward Macon, the 15th and 17th Corps "disappeared" into a sparsely settled wilderness--marching unopposed for over one hundred miles through some of the poorest regions of Georgia. But its movements during this period served to fragment and paralyze Confederate efforts to delay Sherman's advance, and played a significant role in enabling the Union Army to rapidly gain the coast and to open communications with the U.S. Navy.At the same time, the study defines the logistical needs of Sherman's army as its greatest vulnerability--one which the Confederates were unable to exploit.
History has demonstrated that amphibious assaults are among the most complex and challenging of all joint operations. The myriad of factors that evolved independently throughout the war did not become fully integrated until the winter of 1864-65. This thesis explores the maturation of joint amphibious operations during the U.S. Civil War, specifically through the assaults on Fort Fisher. This analysis will use modern joint doctrine as the framework to compare and contrast the two assaults. It will elaborate on how seaborne assaults differ from riverine assaults. Utilizing Fort Fisher as the focus develops an understanding of the interrelationship of these various factors and the challenges posed in their synchronization to achieve success. This study concludes that the operations reflected jointness, but also marked the emergence of modern amphibious assault concepts.
While hundreds of volumes exist on the Gettysburg Campaign, most examine the battle's tactical framework and focus on the activities of brigades and regiments. However, of more interest to the serving military professional may be an analysis of the degree to which the Confederacy's design and execution exemplify attributes of what is now known as the operational art. This monograph provides just such a study.The importance of the operational level of war and its supporting art cannot be overstated. Only with a recognition of this level between those of strategy and tactics and a mastery of its art can commanders have the appropriate frame of reference to link strategic goals assigned by national authorities with the tactical activities of their subordinate commanders. Although U.S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such, the concept may have been placed into effect as early as the American Civil War.
Mission command, as outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, is the contemporary philosophy through which army commanders combine mission, intent, and subordinate initiative to win in unified land operations. Though not known to them as mission command, prominent leaders such as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson used similar concepts.This study specifically examines how these leaders employed three of the six principles outlined in current mission command doctrine. They are: (1) build cohesive teams through mutual trust, (2) exercise disciplined initiative, and (3) provide a clear commander's intent. Determining the methods that these commanders employed during their celebrated campaigns through the framework of mission command highlights characteristics that will benefit military leaders at all levels. The linkages between these historical campaigns and current mission command philosophy are the focus of this study.
This study investigates the impact of Confederate naval mine warfare against the operations of the U.S. Navy during the Civil War. Mine warfare was a cost effective method for the Confederacy to defend its long coastline and inland waterways. A wide variety of fixed, moored, and drifting mines were deployed and used with effect at locations along the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and along rivers, including those in the Mississippi basin.Despite loss and damage to thirty five Union naval vessels, mine use had virtually no strategic impact upon the course of the war. At the operational level, effects were apparent. Federal naval operations at Charleston and on the Roanoke River were frustrated, in large part because of the mine threat. The impact of mines was great at the tactical level. These cost effective weapons caused delays in Union operations, resulted in involved countermine operations, and caused fear and apprehension in crews.The lessons from the mine warfare experience of the Civil War are still applicable in today's warfare environment. Naval mines are a preferred weapon of minor naval powers and the U.S. Navy will be required to deal with this threat when operating along the World's coastal regions.
This thesis examines the effect the rifle had on infantry tactics during the Civil War. It traces the transition from smoothbore to rifle and the development of the Minie ball. The range and accuracy of various weapons are discussed and several tables illustrate the increased capabilities of the rifle. Tactics to exploit the new weapon are examined, primarily those of William Hardee. Using Hardee's tactics as the standard rifle tactics before the war, the change in how infantry soldiers fought is documented with two battle analyses. The 1862 Maryland Campaign shows the start of tactical evolution as soldiers seek cover, expend large quantities of ammunition and are decisively engaged at greater distances. During the 1864 Wilderness-Spotsylvania battle, the concepts of fortification defense and skirmish offense take hold. Examining several current books that deal with the rifle and its effects, the thesis concludes that the rifle's increased firepower was a major factor in the move away from Hardee's formation tactics.
One of the critical variables in the successful completion of a military campaign is the functioning of an army's command and control system. In the American Civil War, a commander's primary command and control tool was his staff.Large Civil War armies like the Army of Tennessee required significant numbers of staff personnel. Staffs existed at each level of command from regiment through the army level. Staff officers had responsibility in three broad areas: personnel and logistical support to the army, military administration, and command and control.This thesis analyzes the roles, functional organization, and performance of the staff of the Army of Tennessee and its subordinate corps during the Chickamauga campaign, 16 August-22 September 1863. Primary sources for staff personnel include the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, and the Compiled Service Records of staff officers. Staff performance is evaluated in terms of doctrine and practices as embodied in regulations and military literature of the day.This thesis concludes that, while staff performance was adequate in administration and logistical support, the performance of the command and control system was inadequate. The staff's failure in this area had a significant negative impact on the performance of the army as a whole.
This study examines Union slave policy in the Civil War. Prior to the initiation of hostilities, President Abraham Lincoln stated that the conflict between the states was over the preservation of the Union, and not over slavery. The administration was concerned that a war policy centered on slavery would result in the loss of the Border States. The war started without a slave policy promulgated from the administration to the War Department.By May of 1861, fugitive slaves had entered Union lines and were retained by military commanders as "Contraband of War." The Union employed over 200,000 fugitive slaves before the war ended. Military commanders were forced to create slave policy to handle overwhelming numbers of runaway slaves. Local military policy impacted the administration's agenda. In response, the administration would variously support, dismiss, or ignore the commanders. As the war progressed, Union slave policy caused conflict within and outside the military chain of command.As the conflicts became publicized, President Lincoln created or agreed to slavery policies that conformed to changing congressional and public opinion. The administration had been forced to deal with the issue it had sought to avoid. Military decisions in the field had impacted national goals.
The role of women in the Civil War has often been overlooked in history. Women's roles prior to the Civil War were primarily confined to the home and family. Single women or those who were financially challenged could find work outside the home but opportunities were limited. At the outset of the war, more women were forced into working in factories or for the government, not only to support the war effort but also to provide for the family when the husband was at war. Many women who stayed home also became the nucleus for the formation of ladies aids societies, gathering supplies and raising funds for the soldiers.Other women chose a more direct involvement in the war. These women, including daughters of the regiment, vivandières, militia members, spies, saboteurs, soldiers, nurses and doctors, proved that women could be aggressive, resourceful and patriotic. While little has been written about their contributions, in recent years more research has brought their stories to the forefront. By selecting a representative sampling of women in each category, a better understanding of women's changing roles was revealed.Since many of the roles of women during the Civil War were a departure from those considered traditional at the time, it is important to consider how these changing roles impacted life for women after the war ended. History shows both positive and negative impacts in areas such as careers and education, however, virtually no progress was made for the role of women in the military.
This study is a historical analysis of selected joint Army Navy operations conducted along the East Coast during the American Civil War. It begins with a description of the ante-bellum conditions of the Army and Navy and the organizational structure of the War and Navy Departments. Three joint operations are analyzed; the Fort Sumter Relief Expedition of 1861, the Port Royal Expedition of 1862, and the Charleston Campaign of 1863.In none of the joint operations covered by this study was there a unified command structure between the Army and Navy. Mutual support between the services was dependent upon voluntary cooperation between the respective service commanders.This study determines what factors influenced the degree of cooperation between the service commanders of joint operations during the Civil War. Many of the factors which either facilitated or hindered joint cooperation during that time could affect contemporary joint operations, particularly in the early stages before a unified command structure is established. An appreciation of those factors is both helpful in understanding the outcome of Civil War joint operations as well as providing some insight into the problems faced by contemporary commanders in a joint environment.
[Includes over 12 illustrations and 2 maps]The campaign for the control of Vicksburg was one of the most important contests in determining the outcome of the Civil War. As President Abraham Lincoln observed, "Vicksburg is the key. The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket." The struggle for Vicksburg lasted more than a year, and when it was over, the outcome of the Civil War appeared more certain.The centerpiece of the Vicksburg campaign was the Mississippi River, just as the great river is the centerpiece of the North American continent. The Mississippi and its tributaries drain over a million square miles of territory in the United States and Canada. These waterways included twenty thousand miles of navigable water, extending from Montana to Pennsylvania and from Minnesota to the Gulf of Mexico, making possible the large scale settlement of the west. Between 1810 and 1860, the number of whites residing west of the Appalachians swelled from one million to fifteen million, thanks in large part to the availability of navigable waterways. The black population, mostly slaves, grew from two hundred thousand to over two million, concentrated along the Mississippi. The rivers of the Mississippi basin provided an economic outlet for corn and hogs raised in Iowa and Ohio, as well as the sugar and cotton grown on the great plantations of Louisiana and Mississippi. By 1860, railroads were beginning to penetrate the region, but access to these western rivers remained vital to the economy of both the Midwest and the Deep South.
Includes over 30 maps and IllustrationsThe Staff Ride Handbook for the Vicksburg Campaign, December 1862-July 1863, provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this key Civil War campaign. Part I describes the organization of the Union and Confederate Armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support. It also includes a description of the U.S. Navy elements that featured so prominently in the campaign.Part II consists of a campaign overview that establishes the context for the individual actions to be studied in the field.Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its several phases. For each site, or "stand," there is a set of travel directions, a discussion of the action that occurred there, and vignettes by participants in the campaign that further explain the action and which also allow the student to sense the human "face of battle."Part IV provides practical information on conducting a Staff Ride in the Vicksburg area, including sources of assistance and logistical considerations. Appendix A outlines the order of battle for the significant actions in the campaign. Appendix B provides biographical sketches of key participants. Appendix C provides an overview of Medal of Honor conferral in the campaign. An annotated bibliography suggests sources for preliminary study.
So Rudely Sepulchered: The 48th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment During The Campaign For Charleston, July 1863by LCDR Luis M. Evans USN
The 48th New York was a Union infantry regiment that served in the Department of the South when it attempted to capture Charleston, South Carolina, during the summer of 1863.Recognized for its political, strategic, and maritime value, Charleston was targeted by the North early in the war. The Union Army's Department of the South and the Navy's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron were tasked with its capture. Despite their respective attempts to seize the city in mid-1862 and early 1863, Charleston remained firmly in Confederate hands.In June of 1863, Brigadier General Quincy Gillmore was assigned command of the Department of the South. The new commander believed that in order to capture Charleston, he first had to seize Confederate-held Fort Wagner on the northern end of Morris Island. He claimed that he and his men could take Wagner in less than a week. It would ultimately take them two deadly months.This thesis details the history of the 48th New York, and its contributions and exploits during this campaign. It also analyzes the profound effect this campaign had upon the spirit and character of the regiment for the remainder of the war.
This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist. It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who could plan and execute the North's strategy in the last year of the war. It also focuses on specific instances of success and failure that led him to the position from which he could influence, if not actually author, the strategy followed by the Union in the last year of the war.It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affected the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies.
During the Civil War Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, then Brigadier General John Buford commanded the First Cavalry Division, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, U.S.A. He is generally credited with determining the importance of, and holding the ground near Gettysburg for the coming battle. This study examines the controversies surrounding Buford's actions and discusses whether the controversies have overshadowed the importance of the lessons to be learned from the events.
Did "Fighting Joe" Hooker of the Army of the Potomac lose his nerve during the Chancellorsville Campaign of 1863? Perhaps history has failed to recognize Major General Joseph Hooker's true commander's intent for this campaign. Hooker's intent was simple: maneuver forces to Lee's flank and rear in order to force a withdrawal of Confederate troops from Fredericksburg. Hooker had no intention of engaging in a "risky confrontation" with General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.Hooker's approach for planning his spring offensive would focus the Army of Potomac's efforts toward outmaneuvering Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Hooker had put forth the idea of moving on Richmond and Lincoln advised him that his objective was Lee's army and not Richmond. Hooker does pursue Lee's army, as the main objective and not Richmond as the President had directed but the means that Hooker pursued to that end are misleading. Hooker entered what he considered the initial stage of his spring offensive at Chancellorsville thinking that he would first defeat Lee's army by maneuver. Prior to Chancellorsville, however, Hooker was already making preparations for driving to Richmond.Hooker had intended to confront Lee with the dilemma of being threatened from all sides. Unfortunately, Hooker had failed to communicate his intentions for his army's movements of May 1, 1863 and confusion ran rampant among his subordinate commanders. Almost exclusively, Hooker developed the actual details of the plan himself. This flaw would result in numerous disconnects in Hooker's plan.Hooker's plan would fail due to his own steadfast belief in the ability of his plan to force Lee to withdraw. To say that Lee defeated the Army of the Potomac is misleading because Lee did not defeat the army, he defeated Hooker as he fought a very effective defensive battle that removed the Federal threat from Virginia due to Hooker's failings as an army commander.
First Kansas Colored Volunteers: Contributions Of Black Union Soldiers In The Trans-Mississippi Westby Major Michael E. Carter
Over one hundred and eighty thousand black men fought for the Union during America's Civil War. From infantrymen, to artillerist and cavalry soldiers, these soldiers combined to form one hundred and sixty-six Union regiments. On 29 October 1862 at Island Mound, Missouri, the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, an infantry regiment comprised mainly of blacks from Kansas and Missouri, became the first black regiment to experience combat during the Civil War. Their courage and outstanding performance in battle, as recorded, are unquestioned. What have been omitted from research thus far are their contributions to overall Union successes in the Trans-Mississippi West. Their accomplishments are remarkable, for they came in the face of extreme obstacles of prejudice and hatred. "No Quarter" was ever given and "No Quarter" was asked of the regiment's black soldiers. The contributions of the First Kansas Colored Volunteers, in conjunction with those of the many regiments they served alongside of, resulted in a resounding Union victory in the Trans-Mississippi West.
The United States' Civil War ended in 1865. However, the post-conflict period immediately following, known as Reconstruction, lasted another twelve years. This era provides a great case study to examine the impacts of politics on military stability operations. This paper studies the Freedmen's Bureau during its existence from 1865 to 1872. Envisioned as the lead organization for integrating former slaves into American society, the Bureau's efforts in the post-Civil War South were undermined by a hostile political situation at the national and state level and a diminishing lack of popular support throughout the entire nation to embrace radical social changes. The Bureau's operational timeframe splits into three distinct periods: conflict with President Andrew Johnson from 1865 to early 1867, revamped efforts during Congressional Reconstruction from early 1867 to the end of 1868, and a reduced operational focus (primarily education) from 1869 to 1872. The Bureau faced manning challenges and fought racism as it worked to help former slaves become self-sufficient, educated, and true citizens of the nation in which they resided. Unfortunately, hostile political conditions meant much of the civil rights work accomplished by the Bureau was subdued after its demise until the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.
The Battles of Antietam and Gettysburg are widely recognized as tactical victories for the Union's Army of the Potomac. Following both battles, however, the respective commanding generals. General McClellan and General Meade, were sharply criticized for having failed to vigorously pursue General Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia in order to deliver a decisive blow. Both Union commanders offered a list of extenuating circumstances, such as battle fatigue, large casualties and lack of supplies, which precluded a "premature" pursuit of General Lee.Upon examination, however, their inability to conceptualize a decisive pursuit of General Lee's army points to a direct failure at the operational level of War. Both Union generals were unable to link their tactical victories to any larger strategic objective. The reasons for this from the strategic confusion of a conflict evolving from limited War to total War, and from the void in operational training that left both McClellan and Meade ill prepared to perform successfully at this critical level of Warfare.Examining this operational void, it becomes apparent that a commander's construct of War must be complete, that is, fully cognizant of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of War, in order to achieve success beyond the limits of the tactical battlefield. Such an examination points to the criticality of the operational level of Warfare, highlights the importance of the commander's concept of operations and suggests that an operational commander must grow in the sense that his cognitive processes must be tuned into the dynamics of his environment, not only on a tactical level, but on the operational and strategic level.
Includes the Franco-Prussian Map Pack with over 35 maps, plans and diagrams of the engagements of the warJulius von Verdy du Vernois was a noted Prussian General and strategist, he served with great distinction in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and participated in the climactic battle of Königgratz. He was appointed to the General Staff in 1867 as head of the intelligence section becoming a close assistant and confidant of the great Graf von Moltke. His chief fame rests on his service with the German Royal headquarters as one of high-ranking "demi-gods" of the General staff who enabled von Moltke to keep control of the massive German army as they destroyed the French armies so rapidly and successfully."THESE "Personal Recollections of the War of 1870-71," now first issued in book form, have already been partially published in articles which appeared in the "Deutsche Rundschau" in 1874 and 1895. Going again through my letters and the notes in my diary of that period, I have here and there added additional matter."But still they are nowise intended to form an exhaustive description of the war, or even a complete record of personal experiences. Their publication is due to the renewed interest in those great events which the twenty-five years' jubilee has awakened, and their object is a limited one, viz. to give an insight into the daily life of the Royal Headquarters Staff during those times. The opinions held and mental impressions formed at particular moments with regard to the great events of the war are recorded for the most part in the form in which they were noted down at the time, without regard to whether, in the light of better information, they subsequently proved correct or wide of the mark. For thus only can the "Recollections" give a faithful picture of the views obtaining at particular junctures."- von Verdy
[Illustrated with more than 45 diagrams, photos and tables]Captain Rodman, an instructor weapon-systems officer at Dyess AFB, Texas, examines the distinctive nature of Fifth Air Force's role in the air war over the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II. Especially notable is Gen George Kenney's innovative use of light attack aircraft as well as both medium and heavy bombardment aircraft, characterized by theater-specific tactics, ordnance, and structural modifications. A War of Their Own also considers the free exchange of aircraft and missions in the Southwest Pacific a hallmark of that theater; in terms of the conflict between doctrine and tactics that underlay Fifth Air Force's relationship to the prewar Army Air Corps and the postwar Air Force. The author also notes the relevance of the Fifth's experiences to airpower.
[Illustrated with more than 40 maps, photos and diagrams]Command Historian Dr Leo J. Daugherty III reveals the missions, actions and successes of the British and Korean Marines that fought alongside the US Marines in the UN Allied forces during the Korean War."Among the United Nations forces committed to the far-flung battlefield that was Korea, it was the Marine component that stood out in its sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. In Korea, allied Marines, whether American, British, or Korean, demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness that has always been the hallmark on those bearing the title "Marine.""
Illustrated with 16 photos of the ship and crewWriters Gerold Frank and James Horan were struck by their travelling companion on a train between New York and New London, Conneticut in 1943; "He was big and brawny, his giant frame squeezed into a coach seat; he had the clear blue eyes, the hawklike gaze of a Viking; and he was the most beribboned figure we had ever seen in a navy uniform". This man was Chief Radio Operator Jim Eckberg, and as he told Frank and Horan the tale of his ship, the famous USS Seawolf, they were captivated and determined to write a book commemorating the heroic actions of the crew and so "U.S.S. Seawolf: Submarine Raider Of The Pacific" was born.With the expert aid of Eckberg, the authors set about to recreate the history and atmosphere aboard the sub. Her career started slowly; during her first two forays around Manila in 1942 she could not get a clean target and was depth charged for the first time. Her luck changed in February 1942, roaming in the Java Sea, she struck her first live target and so would begin a game of cat and mouse with the Imperial Japanese Navy for months to come. Aggressively handled, stealthy and quick to dive to avoid the inevitable depth charge reprisals, the Seawolf would leave a trail of destruction in here wake until January 1943 when she docked in San Francisco and took on a new crew. The Seawolf received 13 coveted battle stars during the war and sunk a confirmed 71,609 tons of Japanese shipping.An exciting, authentic and atmospheric account of the 'War Beneath the Waves' against Japan.